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Eventos

En esta sección encontrarás la agenda de eventos académicos, conferencias, seminarios y actividades organizadas por la Facultad de Economía.

Imagen Seminario CEDE - Juan José Ferro
Activo

Seminario CEDE - Juan José Ferro

Governments use fines in order to deter socially unwanted behavior on a wide array of issues. It is commonly assumed that, fixing the probability of sanction, the higher the price, the more deterrent a sanction is. I use data from automated speed cameras in Bogotá, Colombia to measure the deterrent effect of a speeding ticket. By using the real speed limit as a source of exogeneous variation and a regression discontinuity design, I find that speeding tickets have a general deterrent effect on speeding behavior but a null effect on reducing traffic accidents. Using the commercial price of the vehicle as a proxy for wealth and the fact that the monetary sanction is fixed, I find that the deterrent effect is concentrated on the higher quintiles of the distribution. I validate these findings with a judge-IV using the fact that a police agent manually verifies all tickets. Other dimensions of driving behavior show that speeding tickets do change behavior, not only adjust beliefs about enforcement. In short, speeding tickets might be less useful for preventing road fatalities than it is commonly assumed and inefficiently expensive for changing behavior for a considerable number of drivers. They also seem to be of little effectiveness for the current public health challenge of traffic fatalities in low and middle income countries. This evidence points to income based fines as a necessary public policy tool.  

12:30 pm
Universidad de los Andes
Imagen Seminario PePe - Julián Fernández Niño
Activo

Seminario PePe - Julián Fernández Niño

En esta presentación compartiré reflexiones derivadas de mi tránsito de la academia a la función pública, un recorrido que me ha permitido observar de primera mano las tensiones y brechas entre la teoría y la práctica de la salud pública. A partir de estudios de caso y experiencias concretas, exploraré los desafíos que enfrentamos al intentar convertir la evidencia científica en políticas efectivas y factibles.  Uno de los ejes centrales será la dimensión política de la implementación: cómo las decisiones no ocurren en un vacío técnico, sino en un entramado de intereses, contextos y complejidades que condicionan su viabilidad. Comprender este entorno político es fundamental para que las políticas públicas no solo se diseñen correctamente, sino que logren materializarse y generar impacto en la vida de la gente. Ilustraré estas tensiones con tres experiencias distintas: la construcción e implementación de políticas de salud para migrantes en Colombia, la respuesta sanitaria a la pandemia de COVID-19, y el desarrollo del modelo territorial de salud en Bogotá. Estos casos permiten visibilizar cómo la evidencia, aunque necesaria, no es suficiente: la práctica de la salud pública exige negociación, adaptabilidad y liderazgo, reconociendo que la implementación es, en sí misma, un proceso político y social. Julian Alfredo Fernandez Niño es médico cirujano de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Magíster en Salud Pública de la Universidad de Antioquia, Maestro en Bioestadística y Doctor de Ciencias en Epidemiología del Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública de México. Ha trabajado en la mejora de los sistemas de información de salud y la reducción de desigualdades en países de ingresos bajos y medios.  Durante la pandemia de COVID-19, fue Director Nacional de Epidemiología y Demografía en el Ministerio de Salud de Colombia, donde co-lideró la respuesta nacional y el diseño del Plan Nacional de Vacunación. Actualmente, es Subsecretario de Salud Pública en Bogotá, liderando la implementación de intervenciones colectivas y la gobernanza intersectorial en salud pública. También es asociado a la Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, donde contribuye en áreas como la epidemiología social y la salud de los migrantes.  

12:30 pm
Universidad de los Andes
Imagen Seminario CEDE - Daniel Schwartz
Activo

Seminario CEDE - Daniel Schwartz

The minimum payment warning, a notice that informs credit cardholders of the downside of making the minimum payment, has been described as a perverse nudge because it negatively affects those who would pay more than the minimum, presumably due to the anchoring bias. This issue is tackled in a massive field experiment by introducing a novel "statement balance warning." The experiment used email payment reminders that randomly added minimum payment or statement balance warnings. Results indicate that the messages shifted actual payment distribution depending on the warning and that payments increased when the statement balance warning was added. The analysis is combined with causal random forests to examine heterogeneous treatment effects, underlying mechanisms, and the optimum policy in different scenarios, and with an online experiment to further examine conditions in which the warnings affect payment behavior. The statement balance warning makes debtors prioritize paying a higher amount, which significantly increases payments by cardholders who are more likely to make deliberate decisions every billing cycle and improves the understanding of the consequences of not paying the statement balance. Furthermore, the optimal policy to decrease interest charges or debt delinquency indicates that cardholders should receive a combination of warning messages depending on their payment history. The results provide evidence that the statement balance warning offers a new element for financial market regulation to improve the decision-making of indebted households.  

12:30 pm
Universidad de los Andes
Imagen Seminario CEDE - Luis Fernando Mejía
Activo

Seminario CEDE - Luis Fernando Mejía

An analysis of corporate income tax reveals a largely overlooked fact: statutory tax rates are higher in developing economies. In addition, statutory tax rates are procyclical in low-income economies, rising during downturns and potentially amplifying recessions. This paper develops a theoretical framework that reconciles these two phenomena. In our model, firms choose between formal and informal operations based on their productivity and the benefits of formalization, while the government---constrained by limited tax collection efficiency---must set a statutory tax rate to finance a given level of expenditure. We show that low state capacity forces governments to adopt high statutory tax rates, which in turn raise the threshold for formalization and exacerbate informality. Moreover, during economic downturns, the contraction of the tax base compels these governments to raise statutory rates, rendering fiscal policy procyclical. We demonstrate that this procyclicality intensifies as state capacity decreases, creating a compounding challenge where the weakest states face the most destabilizing fiscal adjustments during economic downturns. We also show that even when firms in different countries have the same inherent productive capabilities, stronger state capacity leads to higher observed productivity. This creates an artificial productivity gap between developing and developed countries, driven by institutional constraints rather than actual differences in productive potential. A dynamic extension of our model reveals how political instability and high reform costs can trap countries in a low-capacity equilibrium. Our framework offers implications for policies aimed at modernizing tax administration, broadening the tax base, and implementing countercyclical fiscal measures in developing economies.  

12:30 pm
Universidad de los Andes

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