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Seminario CEDE

Tuesday 25 February 2020, 12:30 - 13:45
by Hits : 2052

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Abstract:

Over the last two decades, countries that default on their debts increasingly have had to confront mostly atomistic unconnected bondholders when engaging on restructuring negotiations. According to data, the nature of creditors impacts on restructuring results, reducing investors concession to the government in default. This paper, proposes a model to study the determination of the haircut for defaulted debt when bondholders play a coordination game. The Resulting multiplicity is solved with a global games approach. I find that this new market setting introduces an additional constraint to the government which end up compressing the asked concession in order to increase the probability of program's acceptance. For illustrative purposes I run simulations with calibrated parameters and find that coordination costs account for a significant portion of the haircut reduction (up to 25%) after sovereign debt disintermediation process.

 

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