Seminario CEDE - Hernando Zuleta

This paper investigates optimal taxation in a growth model with capital-biased technological change. We study how the optimal allocation of resources between capital accumulation and innovation depends on who controls this decision. Three scenarios are considered: a centralized economy where a planner chooses the allocation to maximize output, and two decentralized economies that differ in their allocation mechanisms. In the first decentralized scenario, households allocate their savings between capital accumulation and innovation to maximize capital income.

Seminario CEDE - Juan José Ferro

Governments use fines in order to deter socially unwanted behavior on a wide array of issues. It is commonly assumed that, fixing the probability of sanction, the higher the price, the more deterrent a sanction is. I use data from automated speed cameras in Bogotá, Colombia to measure the deterrent effect of a speeding ticket. By using the real speed limit as a source of exogeneous variation and a regression discontinuity design, I find that speeding tickets have a general deterrent effect on speeding behavior but a null effect on reducing traffic accidents.

Seminario CEDE - Camila Galindo

This paper estimates the medium- and long-term impacts of preschool expansion in Colombia and examines whether early education can amplify the effectiveness of a later nutritional intervention. Using administrative data and plausibly exogenous variation in preschool availability, we find that preschool exposure reduces dropout, increases primary and secondary completion, improves test scores on the high school exit exam, and raises higher education enrollment. We then study its interaction with the staggered rollout of a national school feeding program (PAE) beginning in 2012.