Seminario CEDE - Antoine Bommier

We analyze lifecycle saving using a recursive utility model calibrated to match estimates of the value of a statistical life. The novelty of our approach is that we require preferences to be monotone with respect to first-order stochastic dominance while disentangling risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. We show that, with a positive value of life, risk aversion reduces each of savings, stock market participation, and annuity purchase. Risk averse agents insure against early death by consuming more when young and retaining wealth for bequests.

Seminario CEDE - Pablo Querubin

What is the equilibrium effect of politicians’ wages in the presence of criminal groups, that use both bribes and violence? With a regression discontinuity design, we show that better-paid local politicians in Italy are significantly more likely to prevent corruption in public procurement, but are also more likely to be targeted by criminal attacks. The disciplining effect of wages, which subsides after three years, is driven by a change in incumbents' behavior rather than improved selection.