Seminario CEDE - Hernán Vallejo | Universidad de los Andes

Seminario CEDE - Juan Escobar

This paper explores how to allocate an indivisible good to agents who are privately informed about their valuations and wealth. Wealth is distributed in the population of agents and restricts the purchasing ability. The optimal mechanism sells the good at a price below the marginal cost of production with strictly positive probability. Some rich agents are rationed. We discuss how inequality shapes the optimal mechanism.

12:30 pm

Universidad de los Andes

Activo

Seminario CEDE - Jonathan Weigel

Progressive taxation is a defining feature of high-income countries' tax systems, but developing countries typically rely on less progressive instruments. We study the introduction of progressive property taxation in a large Congolese city through a citywide field experiment conducted in partnership with the provincial government. Neighborhoods were randomly assigned to either a progressive or a proportional schedule with equal revenue potential. The progressive system increased total revenue by 55\% relative to the proportional one. Revenue gains occurred across the property value distribution: at the top, higher statutory rates mechanically outweighed modest compliance losses, while at the bottom, lower rates induced large compliance gains that more than offset the mechanical revenue loss. Cross-randomized information treatments show that taxpayers' responses were driven by their own rates rather than by others' rates or by the perceived fairness of the overall system. Finally, we examine how statutory progressivity maps into \textit{effective} tax rates (ETRs). Across all systems, ETRs decline with property value --- implying that the rich pay less as a share of wealth --- and this gradient is steepest under the progressive schedule. However, enforcement interventions focused on higher-value properties reverse this relationship, suggesting that investments in targeted enforcement can help align effective with statutory progressivity.

12:30 pm

Universidad de los Andes

Activo

Seminario CEDE - Nicolás González

This paper examines the impact of productivity signals in academia on posgraduate education and labor market trajectories. I exploit discontinuities in the assignment of Latin honors—magna cum laude, summa cum laude, and cum laude—to compare graduates who receive honors with similarly high-achieving graduates who narrowly miss the distinction. Using a regression discontinuity design, I identify the causal effect of academic signaling on postgraduate investments and subsequent labor market outcomes. Evidence shows that while Latin Honors do not significantly increase the likelihood or intensity of postgraduate education, they lead to substantial improvements in the quality of institutions attended. In the labor market, the effects are concentrated on leadership outcomes and, to a lesser extent, international exposure, with little impact on job stability, firm characteristics, or mobility. These findings highlight that academic distinctions primarily operate by shifting individuals toward higher-quality educational and professional opportunities, supporting a signaling interpretation of academic achievement.

12:30 pm

Universidad de los Andes