Seminario CEDE - José Alberto Guerra

Formal rules can only partially reduce opportunistic behavior in human interactions. Cooperative or pro-social behavior, arising as a social norm and enforced by third parties (often at a personal cost) is therefore essential to achieve desirable social outcomes. But social norms do not always promote efficient outcomes. We study one particularly pernicious social norm (the "no sea sapo norm", as it is referred to in Colombia) that breaks the enforcement mechanism through third-party punishment: it dictates people to mind their own business and not snitch on others. We implement a set of fairness games. A third party can punish unfair behavior, but those behaving unfairly can enforce the "no sea sapo" norm upon the third party. We find that the mere possibility of enforcing the "no sea sapo" norm increases the deviation from fair social outcomes. The effects are quantitatively important, to the point that living in a society where people may enforce the "no sea sapo" norm is equivalent to living in a society without third-party punishment. Moreover, players expect others to enforce the norm, and anticipate facing fellow players' condemnation for inviting pro-social behavior. Despite using the norm, players understand that it is normatively unappealing.