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Imagen Seminario CEDE - Daniel Mejía
Activo

Seminario CEDE - Daniel Mejía

In this paper we exploit the arguably exogenous staggered implementation of an extensive criminal procedural reform in Colombia between 2005 and 2008 to assess its intended and unintended consequences. The reform had explicit objectives, such as guaranteeing due process protection of the accused, reducing the use of pretrial detention, making the processing of criminal cases more efficient, reducing procedural times, and improving the mechanisms for early termination of criminal processes. Our results show that the reform achieved most of its goals. Namely, a significant reduction in the use of pretrial detention of about 17%-34%; a large and significant reduction in procedural times (18%); an increase in the use of mechanisms for early termination of the criminal process through settlements (43%-66%); and a large and significant increase in the percentage of cases that reach adjudication. Nevertheless, the reform also had negative unintended consequences on arrest, clearance, and crime rates. Our results indicate that arrest rates decreased by about 33% and clearance rates by 16%-27%. The reform also directly affected the incentives for criminal behavior and led to an increase in both property crimes (19%) and violent crimes (17%) as a result of the implementation of the reform. Our paper shows that well-intended reforms aimed at increasing due process protection can create unintended consequences in the administration of justice that led to increases in crime and raises the question of how to balance constitutional protections with public safety by creating special provisions and guidelines directed to mitigate potential adverse effects on crime rates.

12:30 pm
Universidad de los Andes
Imagen Seminario CEDE - Michael Wintraub
Activo

Seminario CEDE - Michael Wintraub

Protest violence can sap social movements of their legitimacy, deepen political polarization, and help regimes justify state repression. While recent research has focused on how successful protests are in achieving campaign goals, we know little about the relationship between protests and crime. We develop a theoretical framework to explain the relationship between protests and crime, theorizing how protests affect the supply of potential victims of crime, witnesses that could report crimes or exercise informal social control, police assets that could deter crime, and professional criminals interested in benefiting from the disorder that protests typically involve. Harnessing geo-located protest data from confidential government sources in Colombia; geo-located emergency calls for service made by citizens requesting assistance for crime victimization; and geo-located administrative crime data from the Colombian National Police, we use a staggered difference-in-differences design at the street block level to test treatment effects on crime. We find that massive protests in Bogotá in 2021 increased property crimes on street segments that experienced them, especially for robbery (an increase of 5.1% over the control group mean), but had no effect on violent crimes such as homicides, armed robbery, and sexual violence. Because property crime increases persist for up to 8 months---even once protests end---we conclude protesters themselves likely are not responsible for these increases. We discuss the implications of our findings for social movements, policing, and democratic legitimacy.

12:30 pm
Universidad de los Andes