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Seminario CEDE - Nicolás Rodríguez
24 Jan
24 Jan
Activo
Presencial

Seminario CEDE - Nicolás Rodríguez

Facultad de Economía

12:30 pm 01:50 pm Universidad de los Andes

Facultad de Economía

This paper investigates communication with multiple, identically informed Senders with a single, uninformed Receiver. Players have common interests, the state space is infinite, and Senders’ message spaces are finite. Thus, while players prefer full information revelation, their language does not allow for it. Efficient communication requires Senders to use language heterogeneously, assigning non-convex meanings to individual messages, while ensuring that message profiles convey convex information. Achieving efficiency, hence, hinges on solving a delicate coordination problem among the players.

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