

1. **Horario atención a estudiantes, correos electrónicos y nombres de los profesores complementarios**

Clase magistral

Profesor: Leopoldo Fergusson (lfergusson@uniandes.edu.co)

Horario de clase: Martes de 5:00pm - 6:50pm

Salón: S1 202

Horario de Atención: Martes y Jueves, 10.30am a 12pm. Oficina W-812

Para reservar una cita conmigo, siga las instrucciones de la sección “Atención a Estudiantes”, en:
<http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/fergusson>

Profesor Asistente

Profesor: Francisco Eslava (f.eslava309@uniandes.edu.co)

Horario de atención: Miércoles 2-4pm, Oficina W-719

2. **Introducción y descripción general del curso**

La economía y la política están estrechamente relacionadas en la realidad, y como tal deben ser analizadas. Este curso estudia, en campos variados, cómo las instituciones y procesos políticos influyen en la economía así como la forma en que la economía influye en la política. El curso se concentra exclusivamente en aplicaciones empíricas, aunque muchas de ellas estén motivadas por los avances teóricos de la (nueva) economía política.

El curso hace énfasis en los temas sustantivos tratados por las lecturas cubiertas, pero sobre todo en las estrategias de investigación científica que adoptan.

Así, ustedes aprenderán diversas consecuencias de las instituciones políticas en el desempeño económico. Pero, más que eso, mi ambición es que salgan del curso con la capacidad de evaluar críticamente la validez de las estrategias de investigación de los autores estudiados.

Tengo además la ambición de que participen y discutan activamente en clase. Por eso, también supondré que antes de cada sesión han leído las lecturas asignadas, para sacar mejor provecho de la clase.

Este semestre, adoptaremos una aproximación diferente a la de semestres anteriores, en dos sentidos:

Primero, se reducirá sustancialmente el número de lecturas. La expectativa por supuesto es que lo que perdemos en cantidad lo ganamos en profundidad. En general, estudiaremos qué elecciones hacen los autores (la pregunta que eligen contestar, los datos que usan, el método que aplican, la forma como lo ejecutan, la manera en que escriben y presentan los resultados) y cuáles son sus méritos o limitaciones.

El objetivo es usar ejemplos ilustrativos para entender a fondo cómo funciona el proceso de investigación en todas sus etapas, al tiempo que aprendemos sobre temas interesantes. Evidentemente, sin embargo, esta aproximación hace imposible que el curso sea uno en el que se cubran a fondo los diferentes temas que tocamos. Para estudiantes interesados, en el programa hay muchas lecturas listadas adicionales en cada tema. Y en clase, con frecuencia, se mencionarán ejemplos de otros trabajos de temas similares.

Segundo, los métodos utilizados por los artículos no serán presentados a manera de un gran resumen inicial. En cambio, se hará la presentación en la clase conforme van apareciendo los métodos en la lista de lecturas. Esto evita tener varias sesiones áridas al comienzo del semestre en las que, por experiencia, ustedes quedan fatigados.

Un tema que será dejado de lado en este curso será el de la *economía política del desarrollo*. Esto, porque típicamente durante la Escuela Internacional de Verano, estos tópicos son discutidos en el curso “Desarrollo de América Latina en el Largo Plazo” del Profesor James Robinson y secuaces.

Desde el punto de vista metodológico, un tema que será dejado de lado será la “estimación estructural” de modelos económicos. Esta es un área activa de investigación, complementaria a las aproximaciones de “forma reducida” que caracterizan la mayoría de aplicaciones en este curso y que (por ahora) desborda los alcances del curso.

3. Objetivos de la materia

El curso tiene dos objetivos complementarios.

Primero, familiarizarlos con el tipo de preguntas y respuestas que ofrece la economía política, apoyándonos en algunos ejemplos de investigaciones recientes significativas sobre la relación entre economía y política, en un amplio conjunto de tópicos.

Segundo, enseñarles a entender y evaluar críticamente el proceso de investigación empírica cuantitativa en las ciencias sociales, en particular en el campo de la economía política.

Este segundo objetivo tiene varias partes. Implica entender y conocer los alcances y limitaciones de las diferentes estrategias empíricas que con mucha astucia deben diseñar los investigadores en esta rama de la economía para resolver los enormes problemas de endogeneidad que enfrentan. Así, las aplicaciones empíricas estudiadas variarán no sólo en temas sino en metodología, incluyendo desde experimentos naturales, hasta el uso de encuestas especialmente diseñadas y los experimentos en laboratorios y de “campo”. Pero, como se dijo en la introducción, implica tener un ojo crítico para evaluar todas las decisiones claves en el proceso de investigación. La idea es que al final del curso ustedes tengan buenas respuestas para, entre otras, el siguiente tipo de preguntas sobre un trabajo de investigación: ¿Es la pregunta realmente relevante? ¿La metodología sirve para contestar la pregunta? ¿Son los resultados convincentes? ¿Las conclusiones se derivan de los resultados?

4. Organización del curso

El contenido del curso, con las lecturas respectivas, se encuentra detallado semana por semana en la [lista de lecturas](#).

Se deben tener en cuenta las siguientes fechas importantes:

Marzo 11: Fecha límite de entrega del 30 %*

Marzo 18: Fecha límite de retiro de materias.

Marzo 21 - 25: Semana de trabajo individual.

Mayo 10 - 24: Semanas de exámenes finales

* Para el 11 de marzo, ustedes tendrán las notas correspondientes a aproximadamente la mitad de las comprobaciones totales, realizadas hasta la fecha, correspondientes al 12.5 % para estudiantes de maestría y 17.5 % para estudiantes de pregrado. Además, una nota de participación preliminar (que pesa 15 % para maestría y 20 % para pregrado). Si para la fecha usted ya ha presentado referee reports, tendrá definido además un 30 % para maestría y 45 % para pregrado. Note

que esto significa que si usted (i) es de maestría y (ii) no ha presentado referee report antes del 11 de marzo, no tendrá el 30 % de su nota, sino una cantidad ligeramente menor, de cerca del 27.5 %. *Importante:* Si usted es de maestría y quiere asegurarse de tener el 30 % antes del 11 de marzo, debe solicitar la presentación de un referee report antes de esa fecha.

5. Metodología

No hay libro de texto, en cada sesión se discutirán una serie de lecturas asignadas obligatorias que *deben leerse antes de clase*. En la clase se busca fomentar la participación activa de los estudiantes.

El curso está abierto a estudiantes de Maestría y de Pregrado.

6. Competencias

Aprender a identificar preguntas relevantes de investigación en economía política, conociendo además algunos de los grandes temas de debate en los tópicos estudiados.

Aprender los alcances y limitaciones de las posibles estrategias empíricas que pueden plantearse para contestar dichas preguntas.

Desarrollar la capacidad de formular una pregunta válida de investigación junto con una estrategia para contestarla.

Leer críticamente un artículo de investigación, identificando sus fortalezas y debilidades tanto de forma como de fondo.

Desarrollar habilidades de expresión escrita y oral.

Trabajar en grupo.

7. Criterios de evaluación

Los porcentajes de cada evaluación aparecen en el siguiente cuadro.

Cuadro 1: Actividades y porcentajes de cada evaluación

Actividad	Maestría	Pregrado
Participación en clase.	15 %	20 %
Comprobaciones de lectura.	25 %	35 %
Informe escrito del referee report.	20 %	30 %
Presentación del referee report.	10 %	15 %
Proyecto de investigación. Primera entrega.*	5 %	0 %
Proyecto de investigación. Evaluación primera entrega de un compañero.*	5 %	0 %
Proyecto de investigación. Entrega final.	20 %	0 %

Notas: Los estudiantes de pregrado que quieran presentar propuesta de investigación pueden hacerlo y enfrentan los porcentajes de evaluación de los estudiantes de Maestría.

* La primera entrega será calificada por un compañero, siguiendo unos criterios (matriz de calificación) previamente especificados. Los estudiantes tendrán una semana para hacer esta evaluación.

Las actividades de clase que serán evaluadas son las siguientes:

- Participación en clase.
- Comprobaciones de lectura.
- Un *referee report* de un *paper* asignado aleatoriamente. El *referee report* se presenta en grupos de tres estudiantes, y debe ser expuesto por uno de los estudiantes, elegido al azar, en no más de 15 minutos de clase. La primera semana de clases se asignarán fechas para presentación de referee reports y se explicará qué se espera del referee report. Por lo tanto, los grupos para trabajar en el referee report deben definirse también la primera semana de clases.

- **Para estudiantes de Maestría: Abril 7 (primera entrega) y Mayo 10 (segunda entrega):** Presentación de un proyecto de investigación (motivación, literatura relacionada, fuentes de datos, estrategia empírica). NO se trata de culminar un proyecto de investigación, sólo de plantearlo coherente y claramente.

Nota importante: los estudiantes deben seguir celosamente las reglas para citar trabajos de otros, tanto en los referee reports como en las propuestas de investigación. Violaciones en este sentido, así como el plagio en comprobaciones de lectura, se consideran faltas graves que no deben tener cabida en el ambiente académico.

8. Sistema de aproximación de notas definitiva

Se aproximará la nota definitiva al múltiplo de 0.1 más cercano.

Política de Reclamos (Artículo 62 del Reglamento de Estudiantes) Todo estudiante que desee formular un reclamo sobre las calificaciones de cualquier evaluación o sobre la nota definitiva del curso, deberá dirigirlo por escrito y debidamente sustentado al profesor responsable de la materia, dentro de los ocho (8) días hábiles siguientes a aquel en que se dan a conocer las calificaciones en cuestión. El profesor dispone de diez (10) días hábiles para resolver el reclamo formulado; vencido el término informará al estudiante la decisión correspondiente.

9. Bibliografía

La bibliografía puede consultarse en la [lista de lecturas](#).

Aplicaciones Empíricas en Economía Política

Lista de lecturas

Temario del curso con lecturas obligatorias (*) y complementarias (•):

A continuación el temario del curso organizado por sesiones. A partir de la segunda sesión es indispensable la lectura de los artículos previo a cada sesión. **Lea con detenimiento** para identificar las lecturas obligatorias de cada sesión.

Me reservo el derecho de modificar algunas de las lecturas obligatorias acá listadas. Cualquier cambio será notificado con una semana de anticipación. Pueden consultar mi página web para tener siempre la versión más actualizada de esta lista de lecturas.

Dadas las dos modificaciones al esquema tradicional del curso que implementaré este semestre, la lista de lecturas se divide en dos partes.

En la primera parte, se resumen los temas y lecturas asignadas semana a semana. En la segunda, hay una lista más completa, y más o menos accidental (con esto quiero decir que la inclusión de lecturas en cada tema obedece a un proceso más o menos desorganizado en el tiempo y no debe tomarse como una curaduría rigurosa del tema en cuestión) que es útil tanto para los que quieren profundizar como para los que estarán pensando en hacer una propuesta de investigación.

Listado por sesiones

1. Sesiones # 1-2: Introducción a las Reglas de Juego y al Problema de Inferencia Causal

a) El problema de inferencia causal

- * Esther Dufo. Empirical methods - handout. 2013. URL http://web.mit.edu/14.771/www/emp_handout.pdf
- * Paul W. Holland. Statistics and causal inference. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81(396):pp. 945–960, 1986. ISSN 01621459. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2289064>

b) Sobre los posibles abusos del “identification taliban”

- A. Deaton. Instruments, randomization, and learning about development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49:424–455, June 2010. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14690>
- Daron Acemoglu. Theory, general equilibrium and political economy in development economics. (April), 2010. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15944>
- Una lectura más ligera: Fergusson, El “Talibán de la Identificación” en la Ciencias Sociales, La Silla Vacía

c) Sugerencias para escribir (y hablar) mejor

- * John H. Cochrane. Writing tips for ph. d. students. *Unpublished manuscript, Chicago Booth*, 2005. URL http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/phd_paper_writing.pdf
- Hernán Vallejo. Bases para la elaboración de un artículo publicable como tesis en economía. Documentos Cede 002057, Universidad De Los Andes-Cede, July 2003. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002057.html>

2. Sesiones # 3-4: Clientelismo y compra de votos

Métodos: experimentos aleatorios y experimentos de lista.

- * Thomas Fujiwara and Leonard Wantchekon. Can Informed Public Deliberation Overcome Clientelism? Experimental Evidence from Benin. *American Economic Journal*:

Applied Economics, 5(4):241–55, October 2013. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aejapp/v5y2013i4p241-55.html>

* Kosuke Imai and Graeme Blair. Statistical analysis of list experiments. *Political Analysis*, 20, 2012. URL <http://imai.princeton.edu/research/files/listP.pdf>

Nota: Este trabajo expone una metodología que presentaremos en clase, y no es sujeto de referee report.

• Kosuke Imai, Bethany Park, and Kenneth F. Greene. Using the predicted responses from list experiments as explanatory variables in regression models. *Political Analysis*, 2014. doi: 10.1093/pan/mpu017. URL <http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/11/11/pan.mpu017.abstract>

* Daniel Corstange. Vote buying under competition and monopsony: Evidence from a list experiment in Lebanon. *Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, 2010. URL https://www.dropbox.com/s/q1nwg29d4d8vina/Corstange_Vote_buying_Lebanon.pdf?dl=0

* Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, and David W. Nickerson. Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1):202–217, January 2012. URL <http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/PMF-papers/{N}icaragua.VoteBuying.pdf>

• Ali Çarkoglu and S. Erdem Aytaç. Who gets targeted for vote-buying? Evidence from an augmented list experiment in Turkey. *European Political Science Review*, 7:547–566, 11 2015. ISSN 1755-7747. doi: 10.1017/S1755773914000320. URL http://journals.cambridge.org/article_S1755773914000320

• Daniel Corstange. Vote trafficking in Lebanon. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 44(3): 483–505, 2012. ISSN 00207438, 14716380. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23280469>

• Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter. Vote-Buying and Reciprocity. *Econometrica*, 80(2):863–881, 2012. ISSN 1468-0262. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17411>

• Chappell Lawson and Kenneth F. Greene. Making clientelism work: How norms of reciprocity increase voter compliance. *Comparative Politics*, 47(1):61–85, 2014-10-01T00:00:00. doi: doi:10.5129/001041514813623173. URL <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2014/00000047/00000001/art00005>

• Michael Callen and James D. Long. Institutional corruption and election fraud: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan. *American Economic Review*, 105(1):354–81, 2015. doi: 10.1257/aer.20120427. URL <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.20120427>

• F. Daniel Hidalgo and Simeon Nichter. Voter buying: Shaping the electorate through clientelism. *American Journal of Political Science*, pages n/a–n/a, 2015. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12214. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12214>

• Horacio Larreguy. Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico. 2012(November), 2012. URL <http://economics.mit.edu/files/8456>

• J.I. Domínguez, K.F. Greene, C.H. Lawson, and A. Moreno. *Mexico's Evolving Democracy: A Comparative Study of the 2012 Elections*. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014. ISBN 9781421415543. URL <https://books.google.com.co/books?id=hcxBQAAQBAJ>

3. Sesión # 5: Aid

Métodos: variables instrumentales y diferencias en diferencias.

* Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian. Us food aid and civil conflict. *American Economic Review*, 104(6):1630–66, 2014. URL http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/faidconf_20130806_final_0.pdf

• K Casey, R Glennerster, and Edward Miguel. Reshaping institutions: Evidence on aid impacts using a preanalysis plan. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pages 1755–1812, 2012. URL http://eml.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_gbf.pdf

- Michael Faye and Paul Niehaus. Political aid cycles. *American Economic Review*, 102(7):3516–30, 2012. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v102y2012i7p3516-30.html>

4. Sesión # 6: Estado, democracia, y violencia

Métodos: regresión discontinua.

* Leopoldo Fergusson, Nelson Ruiz, Pablo Querubin, and Juan Vargas. The Real Winner’s Curse. *Unpublished*, 2016

Nota: Este trabajo será enviado por correo electrónico.

* David S. Lee and Thomas Lemieux. Regression discontinuity designs in economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(2):281–355, June 2010. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecolit/v48y2010i2p281-355.html>

• Andrew Gelman and Guido Imbens. Why High-order Polynomials Should not be Used in Regression Discontinuity Designs. Working Paper 20405, National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2014. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w20405>

• Justin McCrary. Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test. *Journal of Econometrics*, 142(2):698–714, February 2008. URL <https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/econom/v142y2008i2p698-714.html>

• Sebastian Calonico, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik. Robust nonparametric confidence intervals for regression-discontinuity designs. *Econometrica*, 82(6):2295–2326, 2014. ISSN 1468-0262. doi: 10.3982/ECTA11757. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11757>

5. Sesión # 7: Constituciones, democracia, y formas de la democracia

Métodos: variables instrumentales y diferencias en diferencias.

* Daron Acemoglu. Constitutions, Politics, and Economics: A Review Essay on Persson and Tabellini’s The Economic Effects of Constitutions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43(4):1025–1048, December 2005. URL <http://economics.mit.edu/files/4468>

* Masayuki Kudamatsu. Has democratization reduced infant mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from micro data. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2006. URL http://people.su.se/~mkuda/HOME_files/Kudamatsu2012.pdf

6. Sesión # 8: Qué pueden hacer los electores, aparte de votar

Métodos: variables instrumentales.

* Emiliano Huet-Vaughn. Quiet riot: The causal effect of protest violence. *UC Berkeley*, 2013. URL <http://econgrads.berkeley.edu/emilianohuet-vaughn/jobmarket/>

* Andreas Madestam, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, and David Yanagizawa-Drott. Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2013. doi: 10.1093/qje/qjt021. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/08/11/qje.qjt021.abstract>

• D Chor and FR Campante. “The people want the fall of the regime”: Schooling , political protest , and the economy. 2011. URL <http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4876868>

• Daron Acemoglu, Tarek A. Hassan, and Ahmed Tahoun. The Power of the Street: Evidence from Egypt’s Arab Spring. Working Paper 20665, National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2014. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w20665>

• Joana Naritomi. Consumers as tax auditors. *Harvard Economics*, 2013. URL <http://scholar.harvard.edu/jnaritomi/research>

7. Sesión # 9: Economía política de los medios I: el lado oscuro

Métodos: Análisis (categorización) de textos.

*Matthew A Gentzkow and Jesse M Shapiro. What drives media slant? Evidence from US daily newspapers. *Econometrica*, 78(1):35–71, 2010b. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v78y2010i1p35-71.html>

* Valentino Larcinese, Riccardo Puglisi, and James Snyder. Partisan bias in economic news: Evidence on the agenda-setting behavior of US newspapers. *Journal of Public Economics*, 2011. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272711000715>

8. Sesión # 10: Economía política de los medios II: el lado bueno

Métodos: IV.

• Andrea Prat and David Strömberg. The political economy of mass media. *Advances in Economics and Econometrics*, 2013. URL <http://perseus.iies.su.se/~dstro/mediasurvey11-02-11.pdf>

* James M. Snyder and David Strömberg. Press coverage and political accountability. *Journal of Political Economy*, 118(2):355–408, 2010. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v118y2010i2p355-408.html>

* Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. The political economy of government responsiveness: Theory and evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4): 1415–1451, 2002. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/117/4/1415.short>

9. Sesión # 11: Economía política de los medios III: el poder de los medios

Métodos: matching, regresión discontinua.

* Jonathan McDonald Ladd and Gabriel S. Lenz. Exploiting a rare communication shift to document the persuasive power of the news media. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(2):394–410, April 2009. URL <http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/jml89/LaddLenzBritish.pdf>

* Taylor C. Boas and F. Daniel Hidalgo. Controlling the airwaves: Incumbency advantage and community radio in Brazil. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(4):869–885, October 2011. URL <http://people.bu.edu/tboas/airwaves.pdf>

• Jeffrey A. Smith and Petra E. Todd. Does matching overcome LaLonde’s critique of nonexperimental estimators? *Journal of Econometrics*, 125(1-2):305–353, March 2005. URL <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S030440760400082X>

10. Sesión # 12: Capital social

Métodos: Experimentos, IV.

* Gautam Rao. Familiarity does not breed contempt: Diversity, discrimination and generosity in Delhi schools. *Berkeley Economics*, 2013. URL <http://scholar.harvard.edu/rao/publications/familiarity-does-not-breed-contempt-diversity-discrimination-and-generosity-delhi>

* Edward Miguel, Rachel Glennerster, and Alexander Rothenberg. Collective action in diverse Sierra Leone communities. *The Economic Journal*, 123 (568):285–316, 2013. URL <http://goo.gl/5ymwjm>

11. Sesión # 13: Grupos de interés

* Jordi Blanes i Vidal, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen. Revolving door lobbyists. *American Economic Review*, 102(7):3731–48, 2012. doi: 10.1257/aer.102.7.3731. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.7.3731>

* Leopoldo Fergusson. Media markets, special interests, and voters. *Journal of Public Economics*, 109(0):13 – 26, 2014. ISSN 0047-2727. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272713002090>

12. Sesión # 14: Sesgos de los votantes y porqué votan como votan los votantes

* Fernanda Leite Lopez de Leon and Renata Rizzi. A test for the rational ignorance hypothesis: Evidence from a natural experiment in Brazil. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 6(4):380–98, 2014. doi: 10.1257/pol.6.4.380. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/pol.6.4.380>

* Chappell Lawson, Gabriel S. Lenz, Andy Baker, and Michael Myers. Looking like a winner: Candidate appearance and electoral success in new democracies. *World Politics*, 62(04):561–593, October 2010. URL <http://goo.gl/NUG1n7>

Lista accidental de lecturas de referencia por temas

1. Otras lecturas sobre los métodos que le gustan al “identification taliban”

- Joseph G. Altonji, Todd E. Elder, and Christopher R. Taber. Selection on Observed and Unobserved Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools. Working Paper 7831, National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2000. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7831>
- Joshua Angrist and Miikka Rokkanen. Wanna Get Away? RD Identification Away from the Cutoff. NBER Working Papers 18662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, December 2012. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/18662.html>
- Marinho Bertanha, Guido W Imbens, et al. External validity in fuzzy regression discontinuity designs. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, 2014. URL http://web.stanford.edu/~bertanha/Bertanha_Imbens_2014.pdf
- Lucas Coffman and Muriel Niederle. Pre-analysis plans are not the solution replications might be. Technical report, 2014. URL <http://web.stanford.edu/~niederle/Coffman.Niederle.PAP.JEP.October2014.pdf>
- Esther Dufo, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer. *Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit*, volume 4 of *Handbook of Development Economics*, chapter 61, pages 3895–3962. Elsevier, January 2008. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/devchp/5-61.html>
- Guido Imbens. Matching methods in practice: Three examples. Working Paper 19959, National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2014. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w19959>
- Guido Imbens and Thomas Lemieux. Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice. Working Paper 337, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2007. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/t0337>
- Robert J LaLonde. Evaluating the econometric evaluations of training programs with experimental data. *American Economic Review*, 76(4):604–20, September 1986. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v76y1986i4p604-20.html>
- Jeffrey A. Smith and Petra E. Todd. Does matching overcome LaLonde’s critique of nonexperimental estimators? *Journal of Econometrics*, 125(1-2):305–353, March 2005. URL <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S030440760400082X>

2. Sobre otras estrategias y métodos de investigación en economía política

- Adam. J. Berinsky, Gregory. A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk. *Political Analysis*, 20(3):351–368, March 2012. URL <http://goo.gl/bIciQ>
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