

1. Horario atención a estudiantes, correos electrónicos y nombres de los profesores complementarios

Clase magistral

Profesor: Leopoldo Fergusson (lfergusson@uniandes.edu.co)

Horario de clase: Martes de 5:00pm - 6:50pm

Salón: AU 304

Horario de Atención: Martes y Jueves, 10.00am a 12pm. Oficina W-812

Para reservar una cita conmigo, siga las instrucciones de la sección “Atención a Estudiantes”, en:
<http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/fergusson>

Profesor Asistente

Profesor: Juan Felipe Riaño R (jf.riano48@uniandes.edu.co)

Horario de atención: Viernes 1:00pm - 2:00pm, Oficina W-815

2. Introducción y descripción general del curso

La economía y la política están estrechamente relacionadas en la realidad, y como tal deben ser analizadas. Este curso estudia, en campos variados, cómo las instituciones y procesos políticos influyen en la economía así como la forma en que la economía influye en la política. El curso se concentra exclusivamente en aplicaciones empíricas, aunque muchas de ellas estén motivadas por los avances teóricos de la (nueva) economía política.

El curso hace énfasis tanto en los temas sustantivos tratados por las lecturas cubiertas, como en las estrategias de investigación científica que ellos adoptan.

Así, los estudiantes en este curso aprenderán diversas consecuencias de las instituciones políticas en el desempeño económico. Además, aprenderán a evaluar críticamente la validez de las estrategias de investigación adoptadas por los autores estudiados.

El curso es intensivo en lecturas, y tiene la ambición de ser también intensivo en la participación y discusión de los estudiantes en clase. Se espera que los estudiantes lean antes de cada sesión las lecturas asignadas, para sacar mejor provecho de la clase.

3. Objetivos de la materia

El objetivo principal es presentar las investigaciones recientes más significativas sobre la relación entre economía y política, en un amplio conjunto de tópicos.

Un objetivo complementario del curso es hacer énfasis en las diferentes estrategias empíricas que con mucha astucia deben diseñar los investigadores en esta rama de la economía para resolver los enormes

problemas de endogeneidad que se enfrentan. Así, las aplicaciones empíricas estudiadas variarán no sólo en temas sino en metodología, incluyendo desde experimentos naturales, hasta el uso de encuestas especialmente diseñadas y los experimentos en laboratorios y de “campo”.

Un tema que será dejado de lado en este curso será el de la *economía política del desarrollo*. Esto, porque típicamente durante la Escuela Internacional de Verano, estos tópicos son discutidos en el curso “Desarrollo de América Latina en el Largo Plazo” del Profesor James Robinson y secuaces.

4. Organización del curso

El contenido del curso, con las lecturas respectivas, se encuentra detallado semana por semana en la [lista de lecturas](#).

Se deben tener en cuenta las siguientes fechas importantes:

Marzo 13: Fecha límite de entrega del 30 %[†]

Marzo 20: Fecha límite de retiro de materias.

Marzo 30 - Abril 3: Semana de trabajo individual.

Mayo 11 - 25: Semanas de exámenes finales

[†] Para el 13 de marzo, los estudiantes tendrán las notas correspondientes a aproximadamente la mitad de las comprobaciones totales, realizadas hasta la fecha, correspondientes al 12.5 % para estudiantes de maestría y 17.5 % para estudiantes de pregrado. Además, una nota de participación preliminar (que pesa 15 % para maestría y 20 % para pregrado). Es decir, comunicaremos a cada estudiante su nota de participación hasta el momento, la cual puede cambiar según lo sucedido en la segunda mitad del semestre. Adicionalmente, los estudiantes que ya hayan presentado referee reports, tendrán definido además un 30 % para maestría y 45 % para pregrado. Note que esto significa que un estudiante que (i) sea de maestría y (ii) no haya presentado referee report antes del 13 de marzo, no tendrá el 30 % de su nota, sino una cantidad ligeramente menor, de cerca del 27.5 %. *Importante:* Si usted es de maestría y quiere asegurarse de tener el 30 % antes del 13 de marzo, debe solicitar la presentación de un referee report antes de esa fecha.

5. Metodología

No hay libro de texto, en cada sesión se discutirán una serie de lecturas asignadas obligatorias que *deben leerse antes de clase* y algunas lecturas adicionales complementarias. En la clase se busca fomentar la participación activa de los estudiantes.

Algunos temas se desarrollarán con el profesor complementario en un horario adicional a definir la primera semana de clases. Estas sesiones no se llevarán a cabo todas las semanas, únicamente para algunos temas específicos.

El curso está abierto a estudiantes de Maestría y de Pregrado.

6. Competencias

Aprender a identificar preguntas relevantes de investigación en economía política, conociendo además los grandes temas de debate en los tópicos estudiados.

Aprender los alcances y limitaciones de las posibles estrategias empíricas que pueden plantearse para contestar dichas preguntas.

Desarrollar la capacidad de formular una pregunta válida de investigación junto con una estrategia para contestarla.

Leer críticamente un artículo de investigación, identificando sus fortalezas y debilidades tanto de forma como de fondo.

Desarrollar habilidades de expresión escrita y oral.

Trabajar en grupo.

7. Criterios de evaluación

Las actividades de clase que serán evaluadas son las siguientes:

- Participación en clase.
- Comprobaciones de lectura.
- Un *referee report* de un *paper* elegido, entre las lecturas obligatorias, de común acuerdo entre el estudiante y el profesor. El *referee report* se presenta en parejas, y debe ser expuesto por uno de los dos estudiantes, elegido al azar, en no más de 10 minutos de clase. El primer día de clases se asignarán fechas para presentación de referee reports y se explicará qué se espera del referee report.
- **Para estudiantes de Maestría: Abril 7 (primera entrega) y Mayo 12 (segunda entrega):** Presentación de un proyecto de investigación (motivación, literatura relacionada, fuentes de datos, estrategia empírica). NO se trata de culminar un proyecto de investigación, sólo de plantearlo coherente y claramente.

Los porcentajes de cada evaluación aparecen en la siguiente tabla.

Cuadro 1: Actividades y porcentajes de cada evaluación

Actividad	Maestría	Pregrado
Participación en clase.	15 %	20 %
Comprobaciones de lectura.	25 %	35 %
Informe escrito del referee report.	20 %	30 %
Presentación del referee report.	10 %	15 %
Proyecto de investigación. Primera entrega. [†]	5 %	0 %
Proyecto de investigación. Evaluación primera entrega de un compañero. [†]	5 %	0 %
Proyecto de investigación. Entrega final.	20 %	0 %

Nota: Los estudiantes de pregrado que quieran presentar propuesta de investigación pueden hacerlo y enfrentan los porcentajes de evaluación de los estudiantes de Maestría.

[†] La primera entrega será calificada por un compañero, siguiendo unos criterios (matriz de calificación) previamente especificados. Los estudiantes tendrán una semana para hacer esta evaluación.

Nota importante: los estudiantes deben seguir celosamente las reglas para citar trabajos de otros, tanto en los referee reports como en las propuestas de investigación. Violaciones en este sentido, así como el plagio en comprobaciones de lectura, se consideran faltas graves que no deben tener cabida en el ambiente académico.

8. Sistema de aproximación de notas definitiva

Se aproximará la nota definitiva al múltiplo de 0.01 más cercano.

Política de Reclamos (Artículo 62 del Reglamento de Estudiantes) Todo estudiante que desee formular un reclamo sobre las calificaciones de cualquier evaluación o sobre la nota definitiva del curso, deberá dirigirlo por escrito y debidamente sustentado al profesor responsable de la materia, dentro de los ocho (8) días hábiles siguientes a aquel en que se dan a conocer las calificaciones en cuestión. El profesor dispone de diez (10) días hábiles para resolver el reclamo formulado; vencido el término informará al estudiante la decisión correspondiente.

9. Bibliografía

La bibliografía puede consultarse en la [lista de lecturas](#).

Aplicaciones Empíricas en Economía Política

Lista de lecturas

Temario del curso con lecturas obligatorias (*) y complementarias (●):

A continuación el temario del curso organizado por sesiones. A partir de la segunda sesión es indispensable la lectura de los artículos previo a cada sesión. **Lea con detenimiento** para identificar las lecturas obligatorias de cada sesión (note que no siempre están listadas al comienzo de cada tema).

Me reservo el derecho de modificar algunas de las lecturas obligatorias acá listadas. Cualquier cambio será notificado con una semana de anticipación. Pueden consultar mi página web para tener siempre la versión más actualizada de esta lista de lecturas. De hecho, conviene considerar la lista a continuación más o menos definitiva para las primeras 5 o 6 sesiones, pero aún preliminar para sesiones siguientes.

1. Introducción a las Reglas de Juego y Métodos (Sesión # 1-3)

a) El problema de inferencia causal y métodos para enfrentarlo

- * Paul W. Holland. Statistics and causal inference. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81(396):pp. 945–960, 1986. ISSN 01621459. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2289064>
- * Esther Duflo. Empirical methods - handout. 2013. URL http://web.mit.edu/14.771/www/emp_handout.pdf

b) Sobre los métodos que le gustan al “identification taliban”

- Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer. *Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit*, volume 4 of *Handbook of Development Economics*, chapter 61, pages 3895–3962. Elsevier, January 2008. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/h/eee/devchp/5-61.html>
- Guido Imbens and Thomas Lemieux. Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice. Working Paper 337, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2007. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/t0337>
- David S. Lee and Thomas Lemieux. Regression discontinuity designs in economics. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(2):281–355, June 2010. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jeclit/v48y2010i2p281-355.html>
- Joshua Angrist and Miikka Rokkanen. Wanna get away? RD identification away from the cutoff. NBER Working Papers 18662, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, December 2012. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/18662.html>
- Robert J LaLonde. Evaluating the econometric evaluations of training programs with experimental data. *American Economic Review*, 76(4):604–20, September 1986. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v76y1986i4p604-20.html>
- Jeffrey A. Smith and Petra E. Todd. Does matching overcome lalonde’s critique of nonexperimental estimators? *Journal of Econometrics*, 125(1-2):305–353, March 2005. URL <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S030440760400082X>

c) Sobre los posibles abusos del “identification taliban”

- A. Deaton. Instruments, randomization, and learning about development. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 49:424–455, June 2010. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14690>
- Daron Acemoglu. Theory, general equilibrium and political economy in development economics. (April), 2010. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15944>

d) Sobre otras estrategias y métodos de investigación en economía política

- Kosuke Imai and Graeme Blair. Statistical analysis of list experiments. *Political Analysis*, 20, 2012. URL <http://imai.princeton.edu/research/files/listP.pdf>

- Benjamin Edelman. Using internet data for economic research. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(2):189–206, May 2012. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41495310>
 - Adam. J. Berinsky, Gregory. A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk. *Political Analysis*, 20(3):351–368, March 2012. URL <http://goo.gl/bIciQ>
 - D. W. Gingerich. Understanding Off-the-Books Politics: Conducting Inference on the Determinants of Sensitive Behavior with Randomized Response Surveys. *Political Analysis*, 18(3): 349–380, June 2010
 - DS Karlan and Jonathan Zinman. List Randomization for Sensitive Behavior: An Application for Measuring Use of Loan Proceeds. *Journal of Development Economics*, 2012. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387811000873>
 - Columbia Center for the Study of Development Strategies & the Harriman Institute. Workshop on Experiments in Political Economy. (May), 2011. URL <http://cu-csds.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Booklet.pdf>
- e) Sugerencias para escribir (y hablar) mejor
- * John H. Cochrane. Writing tips for ph. d. students. *Unpublished manuscript, Chicago Booth*, 2005. URL http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/phd_paper_writing.pdf
 - Hernán Vallejo. Bases para la elaboración de un artículo publicable como tesis en economía. DOCUMENTOS CEDE 002057, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE, July 2003. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002057.html>

2. Instituciones y políticas (Sesiones #4-5)

a) Constituciones, democracia, y formas de la democracia (Sesión # 4)

- * Daron Acemoglu. Constitutions, politics, and economics: A review essay on persson and tabellini’s the economic effects of constitutions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43(4):1025–1048, December 2005. URL <http://economics.mit.edu/files/4468>
- T Persson and G Tabellini. Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes. *American Economic Review*, 2004. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3592767>
- T Person and G Tabellini. Constitutions and Economic Policy. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(1):75–98, 2004. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3216876>
- * Masayuki Kudamatsu. Has democratization reduced infant mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from micro data. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2006. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/dpr/wpaper/0685.html>
- Casey B. Mulligan, Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala i Martin. Do democracies have different public policies than nondemocracies? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(1):51–74, Winter 2004. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v18y2004i1p51-74.html>
- T Persson. Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development. 2005. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11171>
- Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu. Health and democracy. *American Economic Review*, pages 313–318, 2006. URL <http://econ.lse.ac.uk/~tbesley/papers/healthanddemocracy.pdf>
- Paul Novosad and Sam Asher. Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India. 2012
- X Meng, Nancy Qian, and Pierre Yared. The Institutional Causes of China’s Great Famine , 1959-1961. pages 1959–1961, 2010. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16361>
- Leopoldo Fergusson and Juan F. Vargas. Don’t make war, make elections. franchise extension and violence in sixteenth-century colombia. DOCUMENTOS CEDE 010584, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE, February 2013. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/010584.html>

b) **Elecciones y reglas electorales (Sesión # 4)**

- * A Eggers. Opposition representation and policy moderation: Evidence from French municipalities. (August), 2010a. URL http://andy.egge.rs/papers/opp_rep_france.pdf
- Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. The effects of democratization on public goods and redistribution: Evidence from china. Working Paper 18101, National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18101>
- S Coate and T Besley. Elected versus appointed regulators: Theory and evidence. 2000. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7579>
- F Trebbi, P Aghion, and A Alesina. Electoral Rules And Minority Representation in US Cities. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*..., (February):325–357, 2008. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/1/325.short>
- Gerard Padro-i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. Voter Heterogeneity and Public Goods: Evidence from Religious Fragmentation and Elections in China. 2012

c) **Los efectos de las fronteras políticas (Sesión # 5)**

- * Ryan Bubb. The evolution of property rights: State law or informal norms? NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 12-11, 2012. URL <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025045orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2025045>
- Maxim L Pinkovskiy. Economic Discontinuities at Borders: Evidence from Satellite Data on Lights at Night. 2011. URL <http://economics.mit.edu/files/7271>

d) **Derechos de propiedad (Sesión # 5)**

- * Richard Hornbeck. Barbed wire: Property rights and agricultural development. 125(2):767–810, 2010. URL <http://goo.gl/xvK9l>
- * Markus Goldstein and Christopher Udry. The profits of power: Land rights and agricultural investment in Ghana. *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(6):981–1022, 2008. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v116y2008i6p981-1022.html>

e) **Instituciones presupuestales**

- JM Poterba. State responses to fiscal crises: the effects of budgetary institutions and politics. *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(4):799–821, 1994. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2138765>

3. **Clientelismo, compra de votos, el Estado, y todo eso (Sesiones #6-7)**

a) **El funcionamiento del Estado (Sesión # 6)**

- * Marco Manacorda, E Miguel, and A Vigorito. Government transfers and political support. 2009. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14702>
- B Eifert, E Miguel, and DN Posner. Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. *American Journal of Political ...*, 54(89):494–510, 2010. URL http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_pceia.pdf
- Rafael J Santos. To Share Is To Keep: Politicians, Property Rights and Firm Ownership in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 2012. URL http://www.dartmouth.edu/~neudc2012/docs/paper_238.pdf
- E Dal Bó, Federico Finan, and MA Rossi. Strengthening state capabilities : The role of financial incentives in the call to public service. *UC Berkeley*, 2011. URL <http://businessinnovation.berkeley.edu/williamsonseminar/finan101311.pdf>
- Ruixue Jia and Huihua Nie. Decentralization, collusion and coalmine deaths. *APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper*, 2012. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2104749

b) **Clientelismo y compra de votos (Sesión # 6)**

- * Horacio Larreguy. Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico. 2012(November), 2012. URL <http://economics.mit.edu/files/8456>
- * Daniel Corstange. Vote buying under competition and monopsony: Evidence from a list experiment in Lebanon. *Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American ...*, 2010. URL <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/corstange/doc/corstange-vb.pdf>
- * Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, and David W. Nickerson. Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1):202–217, January 2012. URL <http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/PMF-papers/{N}icaragua.VoteBuying.pdf>
- Alain De Janvry, M Gonzalez-Navarro, and Elisabeth Sadoulet. Can a populist political party bear the risk of granting complete property rights ? Electoral outcomes of Mexico's second land reform. 2011. URL <https://opus.zbw-kiel.de/dspace/handle/10419/53985>

c) **Acción colectiva y capital social (Sesión # 7)**

- * Edward Miguel, Rachel Glennerster, and Alexander Rothenberg. Collective Action in Diverse Sierra Leone Communities. 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16196>
- Edward Miguel and MK Gugerty. Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya. *Journal of Public Economics*, 2005. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272704001562>
- Pelle Ahlerup, Ola Olsson, and David Yanagizawa. Social capital vs institutions in the growth process. *European Journal of Political ...*, 2009. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268008000815>
- Masayuki Kudamatsu. Ethnic favoritism: Micro Evidence from Guinea. 2009
- T Nannicini, A Stella, G Tabellini, and U Troiano. Social Capital and Political Accountability. 2010. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1622136
- John Bellows and Edward Miguel. War and local collective action in Sierra Leone. *Journal of Public Economics*, (December), 2009. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272709000942>
- Gautam Rao. Familiarity does not breed contempt: Diversity, discrimination and generosity in delhi schools. *Berkeley Economics*, 2013. URL https://ebl1f8d-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/graoeconomics/Rao_JMP_latest.pdf

d) **Aid (Sesión # 7)**

- * Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian. Aiding Conflict: The Impact of US Food Aid on Civil War. 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17794>
- * K Casey, R Glennerster, and Edward Miguel. Reshaping institutions: Evidence on aid impacts using a preanalysis plan. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pages 1755–1812, 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17012>
- Michael Faye and Paul Niehaus. Political aid cycles. *American Economic Review*, 102(7): 3516–30, 2012. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v102y2012i7p3516-30.html>

4. **Elecciones (Sesión #8)**

a) **Efectos de gastos de campaña**

- * Steven D. Levitt. Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House. *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(4):777, January 1994. URL <http://rangevoting.org/Levitt94.pdf>
- Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder. The impact of federal spending on House election outcomes. *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1):30–53, 1997. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/5002.html>

- BS Da Silveira and JMP De Mello. Campaign advertising and election outcomes: Quasi-natural experiment Evidence from gubernatorial elections in Brazil. *The Review of ...*, pages 1–33, 2011. URL <http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/78/2/590.short>
- b) **Rendición de cuentas y efectos en política de las elecciones**
 - T Besley and A Case. Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices ? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3):769–798, 1995. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/110/3/769.short>
 - * Monica Martinez-Bravo and Gerard Padro-i Miquel. Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability ? Evidence from Rural China. 2011. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16948>
 - * Ernesto Dal Bó and Martín A Rossi. Term length and political performance. 2008. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14511>
 - JG Matsusaka. Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: Evidence from the last 30 years. *Journal of Political Economy*, 103(3):587–623, 1995. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2138700>
 - Valentino Larcinese. Enfranchisement and representation: Italy 1909-1913. *London School of Economics*, (November), 2011. URL http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LARCINES/enfranchisement_nov11.pdf
- c) **Otras causas de éxito (o fracaso) electoral**
 - David Karol and Edward Miguel. The electoral cost of war: Iraq casualties and the 2004 us presidential election. *Journal of Politics*, 69(03):633–648, July 2007. URL http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_iraq.pdf
- d) **Ventaja del gobernante de turno o incumbency effects**
 - SD Levitt and CD Wolfram. Decomposing the sources of incumbency advantage in the US House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 22(1):45, February 1997. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/440290>
 - Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder. The incumbency advantage in U.S. elections: An analysis of state and federal offices, 1942-2000. *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, 1(3):315–338, 2002
- e) **Efectos de frac o ‘Coattails’**
 - David E. Broockman. Do congressional candidates have reverse coattails? Evidence from a regression discontinuity design. *Political Analysis*, 17(4):418–434, 2009. URL <http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/4/418.abstract>

5. Votantes (Sesiones #9-10)

- a) **Efectos de los votantes (Sesión # 9)**
 - * David S Lee, Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler. Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the US House. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3):807–859, August 2004. URL <http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~moretti/final.pdf>
- b) **Sesgos de los votantes y porqué votan como votan los votantes (Sesión # 9-10)**
 - * Andrew Healy and Gabriel S Lenz. Substituting the end for the whole: Why voters respond primarily to the electio-year economy. 2012. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2108085
 - GA HUBER, SJ HILL, and GS LENZ. Sources of bias in retrospective decision making: Experimental evidence on voters’ limitations in controlling incumbents. 2011. URL http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055412000391

- * Chappell Lawson, Gabriel S. Lenz, Andy Baker, and Michael Myers. Looking Like a Winner: Candidate Appearance and Electoral Success in New Democracies. *World Politics*, 62(04):561–593, October 2010. URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887110000195
- Sendhil Mullainathan and Ebonya Washington. Sticking with your vote: Cognitive dissonance and political attitudes. (December), 2007. URL <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/aea/aejae/2009/00000001/00000001/art00005>
- * Eric Brunner, Stephen L Ross, and Ebonya Washington. Economics and policy preferences: Causal evidence of the impact of economic conditions on support for redistribution and other ballot proposals. 2010. URL <http://www.econ.yale.edu/faculty1/washington/causal-evidence.pdf>
- Willa Friedman, Michael Kremer, E Miguel, and R Thornton. Education as libertation? 2011. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16939>
- JMD Ladd and GS Lenz. Reassessing the role of anxiety in vote choice. *Political Psychology*, 29(2):275–296, April 2008
- Thomas a. Husted, Lawrence W. Kenny, and Rebecca B. Morton. Constituent errors in assessing their Senators. *Public Choice*, 83(3-4):251–271, June 1995. URL <http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/BF01047746>
- John List, Ulrike Malmendier, and Gautam Rao Stephano Della Vigna. Voting to tell others. *Unpublished manuscript*, 2013. URL <http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~sdellavi/>

c) **Qué pueden hacer los electores, aparte de votar (Sesión # 10)**

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7. **Economía Política de los Medios (Sesiones # 12-13)**

a) **Una visión general (Sesión # 12)**

Nota: El siguiente documento no lo discutiremos ni evaluaremos en clase, pero es muy recomendado.

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9. Raza y Género (Sesión # 15)

a) Minorías (Sesión # 15)

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Más temas que quedan por fuera:

El tiempo es limitado, a continuación algunos temas adicionales, que aunque no podremos cubrir pueden generar ideas.

1. Crimen

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