

1. **Horario atención a estudiantes, correos electrónicos y nombres de los profesores complementarios**

Clase magistral

Profesor: Leopoldo Fergusson (lfergusson@uniandes.edu.co)

Horario de clase: Martes de 5:00pm - 6:50pm

Salón: B 203

Horario de Atención: Martes y Jueves, 10.00am a 12pm. Oficina W-812

Para reservar una cita conmigo, siga las instrucciones de la sección “Atención a Estudiantes”, en: <http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/fergusson>

Profesor Asistente

Profesor: Juan Felipe Riaño R (jf.riano48@uniandes.edu.co)

Horario de atención: Jueves 1:00pm - 2:00pm, Oficina W-815

2. **Objetivos de la materia**

La economía y la política están estrechamente relacionadas en la realidad, y como tal deben ser analizadas. Este curso estudia, en campos variados, cómo las instituciones y procesos políticos influyen en la economía así como la forma en que la economía influye en la política. El curso se concentra exclusivamente en aplicaciones empíricas, aunque muchas de ellas estén motivadas por los avances teóricos de la (nueva) economía política.

El objetivo principal es presentar las investigaciones recientes más significativas sobre la relación entre economía y política, en un amplio conjunto de tópicos.

Un objetivo complementario del curso es hacer énfasis en las diferentes estrategias empíricas que con mucha astucia deben diseñar los investigadores en esta rama de la economía para resolver los enormes problemas de endogeneidad que se enfrentan. Así, las aplicaciones empíricas estudiadas variarán no sólo en temas sino en metodología, incluyendo desde experimentos naturales, hasta el uso de encuestas especialmente diseñadas y los experimentos en laboratorios y de “campo”.

Un tema que será dejado de lado en este curso será el de la ‘economía política del desarrollo’. Esto, porque típicamente durante la Escuela Internacional de Verano, estos tópicos son discutidos en el curso “Desarrollo de América Latina en el Largo Plazo” del Profesor James Robinson y secuaces.

3. Contenido

El contenido del curso, con las lecturas respectivas, se encuentra detallado semana por semana en la [lista de lecturas](#).

Se deben tener en cuenta las siguientes fechas importantes:

Marzo 22: Fecha límite de entrega del 30 %¹.

Marzo 25 - 29: Semana de trabajo individual.

Abril 5: Fecha límite de retiro de materias.

Mayo 13 - 27: Semanas de exámenes finales

Mayo 14: Fecha de entrega de su propuesta de proyecto.

4. Metodología

No hay libro de texto, en cada sesión se discutirán una serie de lecturas asignadas obligatorias que *deben leerse antes de clase* y algunas lecturas adicionales complementarias. En la clase se busca fomentar la participación activa de los estudiantes.

El curso está abierto a estudiantes de Maestría y de Pregrado.

5. Competencias

Aprender a identificar preguntas relevantes de investigación en economía política, conociendo además los grandes temas de debate en los tópicos estudiados.

Aprender los alcances y limitaciones de las posibles estrategias empíricas que pueden plantearse para contestar dichas preguntas.

Desarrollar la capacidad de formular una pregunta válida de investigación junto con una estrategia para contestarla.

Leer críticamente un artículo de investigación, identificando sus fortalezas y debilidades tanto de forma como de fondo.

6. Criterios de evaluación (Porcentajes de cada evaluación)

- Participación en clase (15 %).
- Comprobaciones de lectura (30 %).
- Un “referee report” de un ‘paper’ elegido, entre las lecturas obligatorias, de común acuerdo entre el estudiante y el profesor (30 %). El “referee report” debe ser expuesto por el estudiante en no más de 10 minutos de clase. 20 % por el informe escrito a entregar el día de la presentación al comienzo de clase, y 10 % por la presentación. El primer día de clases se asignarán fechas para presentación de referee reports y se explicará qué se espera del referee report.
- **Mayo 14:** Presentación de un proyecto de investigación (motivación, literatura relacionada, fuentes de datos, estrategia empírica). NO se trata de culminar un proyecto de investigación, sólo de plantearlo coherente y claramente (25 %).

¹Para el 22 de marzo, todos los estudiantes tendrán como mínimo el 30 % de su nota, correspondiente a: 15 % por las comprobaciones de lectura realizadas hasta la fecha, y 15 % por una nota de participación preliminar. Es decir, comunicaremos a cada estudiante su nota de participación hasta el momento, la cual puede cambiar según lo sucedido en la segunda mitad del semestre. Adicionalmente, los estudiantes que ya hayan presentado referee reports, tendrán definido un 30 % adicional de su nota

7. Sistema de aproximación de notas definitiva

Se aproximará la nota definitiva al múltiplo de 0.5 más cercano, siguiendo la regla:

- $[2,75, 3,25) = 3,0$
- $[3,25, 3,75) = 3,5$
- etc.

Política de Reclamos (Artículo 62 del Reglamento de Estudiantes) Todo estudiante que desee formular un reclamo sobre las calificaciones de cualquier evaluación o sobre la nota definitiva del curso, deberá dirigirlo por escrito y debidamente sustentado al profesor responsable de la materia, dentro de los ocho (8) días hábiles siguientes a aquel en que se dan a conocer las calificaciones en cuestión. El profesor dispone de diez (10) días hábiles para resolver el reclamo formulado; vencido el término informará al estudiante la decisión correspondiente.

8. Bibliografía

La bibliografía puede consultarse en la [lista de lecturas](#).

Aplicaciones Empíricas en Economía Política

Lista de lecturas

Temario del curso con lecturas obligatorias (*) y complementarias (●):

A continuación el temario del curso organizado por sesiones. Como es indispensable la lectura de los artículos previo a cada sesión, la primera reunión será una introducción magistral, y la primera sesión propiamente dicha corresponde a la segunda semana de clases, para un total de 14 sesiones. **Lea con detenimiento**, note que no todas las lecturas obligatorias están al comienzo de cada tema, y que algunas sesiones cubren más de un tema.

Siendo este el primer semestre en que se dicta este curso, me reservo el derecho de modificar algunas de las lecturas obligatorias acá listadas. Cualquier cambio será notificado con una semana de anticipación. Pueden consultar mi página web para tener siempre la versión más actualizada de esta lista de lecturas. De hecho, conviene considerar la lista a continuación más o menos definitiva para las primeras 2 o 3 sesiones, pero aún muy preliminar para sesiones siguientes. (De hecho, aún debemos eliminar dos de las sesiones).

1. Métodos (Algunas referencias para tener en cuenta a lo largo del semestre)

- * Daron Acemoglu. Theory, general equilibrium and political economy in development economics. (April), 2010. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w15944>
- * Robert J LaLonde. Evaluating the econometric evaluations of training programs with experimental data. *American Economic Review*, 76(4):604–20, September 1986. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v76y1986i4p604-20.html>
- * Jeffrey A. Smith and Petra E. Todd. Does matching overcome lalonde’s critique of nonexperimental estimators? *Journal of Econometrics*, 125(1-2):305–353, March 2005. URL <http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S030440760400082X>
- * Kosuke Imai and Graeme Blair. Statistical analysis of list experiments. *Political Analysis*, 20, 2012. URL <http://imai.princeton.edu/research/files/listP.pdf>
- * Benjamin Edelman. Using internet data for economic research. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 26(2):189–206, May 2012. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41495310>
- * Adam. J. Berinsky, Gregory. A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk. *Political Analysis*, 20(3):351–368, March 2012. URL <http://goo.gl/bIciQ>
- D. W. Gingerich. Understanding Off-the-Books Politics: Conducting Inference on the Determinants of Sensitive Behavior with Randomized Response Surveys. *Political Analysis*, 18(3): 349–380, June 2010
- DS Karlan and Jonathan Zinman. List Randomization for Sensitive Behavior: An Application for Measuring Use of Loan Proceeds. *Journal of Development Economics*, 2012. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387811000873>
- Columbia Center for the Study of Development Strategies & the Harriman Institute. Workshop on Experiments in Political Economy. (May), 2011
- Shane Greenstein and Feng Zhu. Is Wikipedia Biased? *American Economic Review*, 102(3): 343–348, May 2012

2. Instituciones y políticas (Sesiones #1-2)

a) **Constituciones, democracia, y formas de la democracia (Sesión # 1)**

- * Daron Acemoglu. Constitutions, politics, and economics: A review essay on persson and tabellini's the economic effects of constitutions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43(4): 1025–1048, December 2005. URL <http://economics.mit.edu/files/4468>
- * T Persson and G Tabellini. Constitutional rules and fiscal policy outcomes. *American Economic Review*, 2004. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3592767>
- T Person and G Tabellini. Constitutions and Economic Policy. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(1):75–98, 2004. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/3216876>
- Casey B. Mulligan, Ricard Gil, and Xavier Sala i Martin. Do democracies have different public policies than nondemocracies? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 18(1):51–74, Winter 2004. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jecper/v18y2004i1p51-74.html>
- T Persson. Forms of Democracy, Policy and Economic Development. 2005. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w11171>
- * Masayuki Kudamatsu. Has democratization reduced infant mortality in Sub-Saharan Africa? evidence from micro data. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 2006. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/dpr/wpaper/0685.html>
- Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu. Health and democracy. *American Economic Review*, pages 313–318, 2006. URL <http://econ.lse.ac.uk/~tbesley/papers/healthanddemocracy.pdf>
- Paul Novosad and Sam Asher. Politics and Local Economic Growth: Evidence from India. 2012
- X Meng, Nancy Qian, and Pierre Yared. The Institutional Causes of China's Great Famine , 1959-1961. pages 1959–1961, 2010. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16361>

b) **Elecciones y reglas electorales (Sesión # 1)**

- * A Eggers. Opposition representation and policy moderation: Evidence from french municipalities. (August), 2010a. URL http://andy.egge.rs/papers/opp_rep_france.pdf
- Monica Martinez-Bravo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. The effects of democratization on public goods and redistribution: Evidence from china. Working Paper 18101, National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18101>
- S Coate and T Besley. Elected versus appointed regulators: Theory and evidence. 2000. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7579>
- F Trebbi, P Aghion, and A Alesina. Electoral Rules And Minority Representation in US Cities. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*..., (February):325–357, 2008. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/1/325.short>
- Gerard Padro-i Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. Voter Heterogeneity and Public Goods: Evidence from Religious Fragmentation and Elections in China. 2012

c) **Los efectos de las fronteras políticas (Sesión # 2)**

- * Maxim L Pinkovskiy. Economic Discontinuities at Borders: Evidence from Satellite Data on Lights at Night. 2011. URL <http://economics.mit.edu/files/7271>
- * Ryan Bubb. States, law, and property rights in West Africa. Unpublished, Harvard, 2009. URL http://www.econ.yale.edu/conference/neudc11/papers/paper_250.pdf

d) **Derechos de propiedad (Sesión # 2)**

* Richard Hornbeck. Barbed wire: Property rights and agricultural development. 125(2): 767–810, 2010. URL <http://goo.gl/xvK9l>

* Markus Goldstein and Christopher Udry. The profits of power: Land rights and agricultural investment in Ghana. *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(6):981–1022, 2008. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v116y2008i6p981-1022.html>

e) **Instituciones presupuestales**

• JM Poterba. State responses to fiscal crises: the effects of budgetary institutions and politics. *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(4):799–821, 1994. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2138765>

3. **Política Redistributiva (Sesión # 3)**

a) **El tamaño del gobierno (Sesión # 3)**

• T Romer and H Rosenthal. The Elusive Median Voter. *Journal of Public Economics*, 12:143–170, 1979. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0047272779900100>

* TA Husted and LW Kenny. The effect of the expansion of the voting franchise on the size of government. *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1):54–82, 1997. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2138871>

* BT Hinnerich and P Pettersson-Lidbom. Democracy , redistribution , and political participation : Evidence from sweden 1919-1950. 2010. URL <http://www.econ.upf.edu/docs/seminars/pettersson.pdf>

• PH Lindert. The Rise of Social Spending, 1880-1930. *Explorations in Economic History*, 1994. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014498384710011>

• Valentino Larcinese. Voting over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State: The Role of Turnout. *Political Studies*, 55(3):568–585, October 2007b

• TC Bergstrom and RP Goodman. Private Demands for Public Goods. *The American Economic Review*, 63(3):280–296, 1973. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1914361>

b) **Niveles de gobierno (Sesión # 3)**

* Valentino Larcinese, J Snyder, and Cecilia Testa. Testing Models of Distributive Politics Using Exit Polls to Measure Voters’ Preferences and Partisanship. *Centro Studi Luca d’Aglia* . . . , pages 1–31, November 2009b. URL http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3605/1/Testing_models_of_distributive_politics_using_exit_polls_to_measure.pdf

• S Ansolabehere. Equal votes, equal money: Court-ordered redistricting and public expenditures in the american states. *American Political Science Review*, 96(4):767–777, 2002. URL <http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/I0/4760/equalVotesEqualMoney.pdf>

* Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder. Party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures. *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 108(4):547–569, December 2006. URL <http://goo.gl/onQpK>

• Gabriel S. Lenz. The Consequences of Income Inequality for Redistributive Policy in the United States

• Valentino Larcinese, Leonzio Rizzo, and Cecilia Testa. Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: The Impact of the President. *The Journal of Politics*, 68(02):447–456, July 2008. URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022381600003510

- Leonzio Rizzo, Valentino Larcinese, and Cecilia Testa. Why Do Small States Receive More Federal Money? US Senate Representation and the Allocation of Federal Budget. (October), 2012. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/udf/wpaper/201215.html>
- SD Levitt and JM Poterba. Congressional distributive politics and state economic performance. *Public Choice*, pages 185–216, 1994. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w4721>
- Valentino Larcinese, James Snyder, and Cecilia Testa. The Political Economy of Public Spending: Evidence from the US States! 2010. URL <http://goo.gl/VQZOS>
- Valentino Larcinese, Leonzio Rizzo, and Cecilia Testa. Changing Needs, Sticky Budget: Evidence from the Geographic Distribution of US Federal Grants. *Unpublished manuscript, London ...*, 2009a. URL http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LARCINES/ChangingNeeds272011_LRT.pdf
- Toke S Aidt and Julia Shvets. Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 4(3): 1–29, August 2012

4. Clientelismo, compra de votos, el Estado, y todo eso (Sesiones #4-5)

a) El funcionamiento del Estado (Sesión # 4)

- * B Eifert, E Miguel, and DN Posner. Political competition and ethnic identification in africa. *American Journal of Political ...*, 54(89):494–510, 2010. URL http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_pceaia.pdf
- * Marco Manacorda, E Miguel, and A Vigorito. Government transfers and political support. 2009. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14702>
- Rafael J Santos. To Share Is To Keep: Politicians, Property Rights and Firm Ownership in Post-Apartheid South Africa. 2012. URL http://www.dartmouth.edu/~neudc2012/docs/paper_238.pdf
- E Dal Bó, Frederico Finan, and MA Rossi. Strengthening state capabilities : The role of financial incentives in the call to public service. *UC Berkeley*, 2011. URL <http://businessinnovation.berkeley.edu/williamsonseminar/finan101311.pdf>
- Ruixue Jia and Huihua Nie. Decentralization, collusion and coalmine deaths. *APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper*, 2012. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2104749

b) Clientelism and vote buying (Sesión # 4)

- * Horacio Larreguy. Monitoring Political Brokers: Evidence from Clientelistic Networks in Mexico. 2012(November), 2012. URL <http://economics.mit.edu/files/8456>
- * Daniel Corstange. Vote buying under competition and monopsony: Evidence from a list experiment in lebanon. *Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American ...*, 2010. URL <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/corstange/doc/corstange-vb.pdf>
- * Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio, and David W. Nickerson. Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from nicaragua. *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(1):202–217, January 2012. URL <http://www.yale.edu/leitner/resources/PMF-papers/Nicaragua.VoteBuying.pdf>
- Alain De Janvry, M Gonzalez-Navarro, and Elisabeth Sadoulet. Can a populist political party bear the risk of granting complete property rights ? Electoral outcomes of Mexico

Ö's second land reform. 2011. URL <https://opus.zbw-kiel.de/dspace/handle/10419/53985>

c) **Collective action and social capital (Sesión # 5)**

- * Edward Miguel, Rachel Glennerster, and Alexander Rothenberg. Collective Action in Diverse Sierra Leone Communities. 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16196>
- * Edward Miguel and MK Gugerty. Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya. *Journal of Public Economics*, 2005. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272704001562>
- Pelle Ahlerup, Ola Olsson, and David Yanagizawa. Social capital vs institutions in the growth process. *European Journal of Political ...*, 2009. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268008000815>
- Masayuki Kudamatsu. Ethnic favoritism: Micro evidence from Guinea. 2009
- T Nannicini, A Stella, G Tabellini, and U Troiano. Social Capital and Political Accountability. 2010. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1622136
- John Bellows and Edward Miguel. War and local collective action in Sierra Leone. *Journal of Public Economics*, (December), 2009. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272709000942>

d) **Aid (Sesión # 5)**

- * Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian. Aiding Conflict: The Impact of US Food Aid on Civil War. 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17794>
- * Michael Faye and Paul Niehaus. Political aid cycles. *American Economic Review*, 102(7): 3516–30, 2012. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v102y2012i7p3516-30.html>
- * K Casey, R Glennerster, and Edward Miguel. Reshaping institutions: Evidence on aid impacts using a preanalysis plan. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pages 1755–1812, 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17012>

5. **Elecciones (Sesión #6)**

a) **Efectos de gastos de campaña (Sesión # 6)**

- * Steven D. Levitt. Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effect of Campaign Spending on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House. *Journal of Political Economy*, 102(4):777, January 1994. URL <http://rangevoting.org/Levitt94.pdf>
- * Steven D. Levitt and James M. Snyder. The impact of federal spending on House election outcomes. *Journal of Political Economy*, 105(1):30–53, 1997. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/5002.html>
- BS Da Silveira and JMP De Mello. Campaign advertising and election outcomes: Quasi-natural experiment evidence from gubernatorial elections in Brazil. *The Review of ...*, pages 1–33, 2011. URL <http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/78/2/590.short>

b) **Rendición de cuentas y efectos en política de las elecciones (Sesión # 6)**

- * T Besley and A Case. Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices ? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110(3): 769–798, 1995. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/110/3/769.short>
- * Monica Martinez-Bravo and Gerard Padro-i Miquel. Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability ? Evidence from Rural China. 2011. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16948>

- Ernesto Dal Bó and Martín A Rossi. Term length and political performance. 2008. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14511>
- JG Matsusaka. Fiscal effects of the voter initiative: Evidence from the last 30 years. *Journal of Political Economy*, 103(3):587–623, 1995. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2138700>
- Valentino Larcinese. Enfranchisement and representation: Italy 1909-1913. *London School of Economics*, (November), 2011. URL http://personal.lse.ac.uk/LARCINES/enfranchisement_nov11.pdf

c) **Otras causas de éxito (o fracaso) electoral**

- David Karol and Edward Miguel. The electoral cost of war: Iraq casualties and the 2004 us presidential election. *Journal of Politics*, 69(03):633–648, July 2007. URL http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~emiguel/pdfs/miguel_iraq.pdf

d) **Ventaja del gobernante de turno o incumbency effects**

- SD Levitt and CD Wolfram. Decomposing the sources of incumbency advantage in the US House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 22(1):45, February 1997. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/440290>
- Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder. The incumbency advantage in U.S. elections: An analysis of state and federal offices, 1942-2000. *Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy*, 1(3):315–338, 2002

e) **Efectos de frac o ‘Coattails’**

- David E. Broockman. Do congressional candidates have reverse coattails? evidence from a regression discontinuity design. *Political Analysis*, 17(4):418–434, 2009. URL <http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/17/4/418.abstract>

6. **Votantes (Sesiones #7-8)**

a) **Efectos de los votantes (Sesión # 7)**

- * David S Lee, Enrico Moretti, and Matthew Butler. Do voters affect or elect policies? Evidence from the US House. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(3):807–859, August 2004. URL <http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~moretti/final.pdf>

b) **Sesgos de los votantes y porqué votan como votan los votantes (Sesión # 7-8)**

- * Andrew Healy and Gabriel S Lenz. Substituting the end for the whole: Why voters respond primarily to the electio-year economy. 2012. URL http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2108085
- * GA HUBER, SJ HILL, and GS LENZ. Sources of bias in retrospective decision making: Experimental evidence on voters’ limitations in controlling incumbents. 2011. URL http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0003055412000391
- * Chappell Lawson, Gabriel S. Lenz, Andy Baker, and Michael Myers. Looking Like a Winner: Candidate Appearance and Electoral Success in New Democracies. *World Politics*, 62(04):561–593, October 2010. URL http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887110000195
- * Sendhil Mullainathan and Ebonya Washington. Sticking with your vote: Cognitive dissonance and political attitudes. (December), 2007. URL <http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/aea/aejae/2009/00000001/00000001/art00005>

* Eric Brunner, Stephen L Ross, and Ebonya Washington. Economics and policy preferences: Causal evidence of the impact of economic conditions on support for redistribution and other bailout proposals. 2010. URL <http://www.econ.yale.edu/faculty1/washington/causal-evidence.pdf>

* Willa Friedman, Michael Kremer, E Miguel, and R Thornton. Education as liberation? 2011. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16939>

• JMD Ladd and GS Lenz. Reassessing the role of anxiety in vote choice. *Political Psychology*, 29(2):275–296, April 2008

• Thomas a. Husted, Lawrence W. Kenny, and Rebecca B. Morton. Constituent errors in assessing their Senators. *Public Choice*, 83(3-4):251–271, June 1995. URL <http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/BF01047746>

c) **Qué pueden hacer los electores, aparte de votar (Sesión # 8)**

* D Chor and FR Campante. “the people want the fall of the regime”: Schooling , political protest , and the economy. 2011. URL <http://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4876868>

* Andreas Madestam and D Yanagizawa-Drott. Shaping the Nation: The Effect of Fourth of July on Political Preferences and Behavior in the United States. (November), 2011. URL http://didattica.unibocconi.it/mypage/upload/49949_20111122_122438_FOURTH_OF_JULY.PDF

• Andreas Madestam, Daniel Shoag, Stan Veuger, and David Yanagizawa-Drott. DO POLITICAL PROTESTS MATTER ? EVIDENCE FROM THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT. 2011

7. Grupos de interés (Sesión # 9)

a) **Resúmenes generales (Sesión # 9)**

* Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. De Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder. Why is there so little money in us politics? *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(1):105–130, 2003. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/9409.html>

• Thomas Stratmann. Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature. *Public Choice*, 124(1-2):135–156, July 2005. URL <http://www.springerlink.com/index/10.1007/s11127-005-4750-3>

b) **Lobbying (Sesión # 9)**

* Sungmun Choi. Do interest groups reward politicians for their votes in the legislature? evidence from the recent financial crisis. 2012a. URL http://www.princeton.edu/~sungmunc/Research_files/s_choi_JMP.pdf

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