

1. Información del equipo pedagógico y horarios de atención a estudiantes

Profesora magistral: María del Pilar López Uribe

Correo electrónico: m.lopezu@uniandes.edu.co

Horario de atención a estudiantes: Cita previa por correo electrónico

Profesora Complementaria: Laura Ortiz Alvarado

Correo electrónico: lc.ortiza1@uniandes.edu.co

Horario de atención a estudiantes: Cita previa por correo electrónico

Salón de clase: SD-801

2. Descripción del curso

La economía social comprende y aborda los comportamientos individuales y colectivos de las personas, las instituciones y las organizaciones a través de una perspectiva interdisciplinaria que combina las ciencias sociales y la teoría económica. Su propósito es interpretar las evidencias empíricas para identificar las oportunidades, preferencias y problemas subyacentes, formulando preguntas de investigación relevantes y evaluando diversas aproximaciones conceptuales y prácticas. Esto permite no solo entender y discutir estas dinámicas, sino también proponer soluciones que se adapten a contextos específicos, con un enfoque particular en el diseño y la implementación de políticas públicas estatales, comunitarias y privadas.

Este enfoque tiene una dimensión aplicada que integra el análisis teórico y práctico para responder a los retos sociales y económicos, especialmente en contextos como el latinoamericano o colombiano. En este sentido, promueve estrategias, programas o políticas que combinen lo mejor de los sectores público y privado, buscando maximizar la eficacia, calidad e impacto de las iniciativas mediante una gestión eficiente y una evaluación constante.

Se espera que los estudiantes adquieran un dominio integral de conceptos y herramientas relacionados con el desarrollo social, humano y económico, así como, la equidad, la justicia, la gobernanza, la ética y los valores. También abarca temas esenciales como la pobreza, la distribución de la riqueza, la acción colectiva, la democracia, la violencia, los indicadores de bienestar, y la medición y evaluación de proyectos.

Los módulos del programa incluyen áreas clave como pobreza, democracia, inclusión financiera, educación, salud, economía política, género, vivienda y mercado laboral. Este enfoque integrado tiene como objetivo capacitar a los estudiantes para analizar, diseñar y ejecutar soluciones innovadoras y sostenibles frente a los principales desafíos sociales y económicos, promoviendo un impacto positivo y duradero en las comunidades.

3. Resultados de aprendizaje

Este curso tiene como objetivo lograr que los estudiantes se inicien en el análisis y la discusión teórica y práctica sobre la economía social - entendida como el desarrollo de la sociedad, a través de la capitalización individual y colectiva, en las personas por el cumplimiento de los derechos - y en la valoración crítica de su aplicación en el diseño y ejecución de políticas y programas públicos en Colombia, América Latina y la sociedad universal. Profundizar la comprensión interdisciplinar de los conceptos y su aplicación a la realidad del entorno colombiano, latinoamericano y universal a través del análisis, discusión e interacción con los compañeros en las sesiones de clase, los debates y los trabajos.

Este curso busca que los estudiantes del programa de pregrado y de posgrado de Economía desarrollen cuatro competencias transversales:

- Pensamiento crítico: Extraer claramente las ideas y marcos conceptuales de los diferentes teóricos contrastando y evaluando sus ventajas y limitaciones para el diseño y aplicación de políticas sociales y económicas, desarrollando así la capacidad para identificar sus alcances y limitaciones, tanto teóricos como prácticos.
- Desarrollar la capacidad de aprender de otros y contribuir a su aprendizaje en la interacción, la discusión en los debates de cada uno de los módulos, los trabajos en grupo y el trabajo final elegido para el semestre.
- Comunicación oral y escrita: Desarrollar la capacidad de expresar sus ideas oralmente y por escrito de manera precisa y clara, en la discusión propia de la participación en cada clase; en las respuestas a problemas planteados desde las lecturas elegidas; y en los debates por módulos.
- Discernimiento ético: Desarrollar la capacidad de juzgar la realidad de los programas colombianos desde la idea de justicia, el juicio valorativo propio de los diferentes criterios en una sociedad donde se dan múltiples convicciones, religiosas, políticas y culturales, propias de la heterogeneidad de una sociedad moderna.
- Plantear y aplicar evaluaciones conceptual y empíricamente válidas de sus resultados e impactos, desde una mirada multidisciplinar donde se analizan cuidadosamente los contextos sociales específicos. Utilizando las técnicas cuantitativas como instrumentos útiles pero complementando con interpretación cualitativa de los contextos sociales.

4. Organización del curso

22 de enero: Presentación del curso: Objetivos, método, sistema de evaluación y programa.

27 y 29 de enero, 3 de febrero POBREZA, DESARROLLO Y DESIGUALDAD.

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5 y 10 de febrero y 12 : POLÍTICA, DEMOCRACIA Y CONFLICTO.

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17, 19, 24 y 26 de febrero: EDUCACIÓN.

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3 y 5 de marzo: SALUD.

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10 y 12 de marzo: VIVIENDA.

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12 de mayo: PARCIAL.

14, 19 y 21 de mayo: Presentaciones Trabajo Final

5. Metodología y Evaluaciones.

Presentación de Artículos Académicos (30%): En grupos de 2 estudiantes deberán realizar dos presentaciones a lo largo del semestre sobre artículos académicos seleccionados.

Estas presentaciones serán evaluadas en función de:

- La claridad en la explicación del contenido del artículo.
- La capacidad para relacionar el tema del artículo con los objetivos del curso.
- El nivel de análisis y crítica del artículo presentado.

Parcial (20%): Se realizará un examen escrito al finalizar el semestre, en el que se evaluarán los temas desarrollados en clase, desde una perspectiva crítica y analítica.

Participación en clase (15%):

- Participación activa en clase: Se evaluará la participación de los estudiantes durante las sesiones de clase, enfocándose en la calidad de sus aportes, preguntas y discusiones.
- Participación en presentaciones: Cada estudiante deberá participar activamente comentando los trabajos de sus compañeros durante las presentaciones realizadas en clase.

Trabajo de Investigación (35%):

Durante el semestre se elaborará un trabajo de investigación en grupos de 2 personas, cuyo objetivo es analizar una pregunta relevante en alguno de los módulos del curso con datos y/o métodos cuantitativos; más allá de una simple revisión bibliográfica. El análisis puede incluir análisis econométrico, pero esto no es obligatorio, **excepto para los estudiantes de maestría, que inscribieron 4 créditos, quienes sí deben desarrollar una metodología causal.**

El trabajo de investigación se desarrollará en tres etapas principales:

- Discusión inicial y definición del tema: Presentación del tema elegido.
- Primera entrega (5%): Planteamiento de hipótesis y metodología: Planteamiento de la hipótesis de investigación. Descripción del diseño de trabajo empírico que se llevará a cabo.

- Presentación del trabajo final (15%): Presentación en clase de resultados obtenidos.
- Entrega final (15%): Resultados y conclusiones del trabajo de investigación.

6. Asistencia

Aquellos que no asistan al 20% de las clases, según lo establecido en los artículos 43 y 44 del Reglamento General de Estudiantes de Pregrado (RGEPr), reprobarán la materia.

7. Políticas generales de los cursos de Economía y fechas importantes

Reclamos y fraude académico

Según los artículos 64, 65 y 66 del Reglamento General de Estudiantes de Pregrado, el estudiante tendrá cuatro días hábiles después de la entrega de la evaluación calificada para presentar un reclamo. El profesor magistral responderá al reclamo en los cinco días hábiles siguientes. Si el estudiante considera que la respuesta no concuerda con los criterios de evaluación, podrá solicitar un segundo calificador al Consejo de la Facultad de Economía dentro de los cuatro días hábiles siguientes a la recepción de la decisión del profesor.

Fraude académico: las conductas que se consideran fraude académico se encuentran en el artículo 4 del Régimen Disciplinario.

Cláusula de respeto por la diversidad

Todos debemos respetar los derechos de quienes integran esta comunidad académica. Consideramos inaceptable cualquier situación de acoso, acoso sexual, discriminación, matoneo, o amenaza. Cualquier persona que se sienta víctima de estas conductas puede denunciar su ocurrencia y buscar orientación o apoyo ante alguna de las siguientes instancias: el equipo pedagógico del curso, la Coordinación o la Dirección del programa, la Decanatura de Estudiantes, la Ombudsperson o el Comité MAAD. Si requiere más información sobre el protocolo MAAD establecido para estos casos, puede acudir a Nancy García (n.garcia@uniandes.edu.co) en la Facultad de Economía. Más información sobre el protocolo MAAD: <https://agora.uniandes.edu.co/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ruta-maad.pdf>

Sistema de aproximación de notas definitivas

Las notas definitivas obtenidas por el estudiante serán numéricas de uno punto cinco (1.5) a cinco punto cero (5.0) en unidades, décimas y centésimas de acuerdo a lo establecido por el Concejo Académico de la Universidad a partir del segundo semestre de 2013. No se harán aproximaciones de notas definitivas o parciales.

Fechas importantes

Actividad	Fecha
Fecha límite para informar la calificación del 30%	28 de marzo
Semana de Receso	17 al 22 de marzo
Último día para retirar cursos	11 de abril
Primera entrega proyecto de investigación	12 de marzo
Presentación final proyecto de investigación	14 al 21 de mayo

