Liquidity constraints, opportunity cost and post-secondary education. Evidence from Colombia
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## Do liquidity constraints matter in higher education?

- Evidence from developed countries:
- Yes: Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2011); Brown et al. (2011)
- No: Carneiro and Heckman (2002); Cameron and Taber (2004)
- Evidence from developing countries:
- Yes: Solis (2017); Rau et al. (2013); Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009); Londono-Velez et al. (2017)
- No: Alfonso (2009)
- Other Factors: Debt Aversion, Opportunity cost of studying!!!
- Low enrollment rates even when the tuition fees are close to zero.
- Opportunity cost can be observed in the probability of completion of studies and labor participation.


## Our contribution

- What do we do? We use two discontinuities to identify the effects of reducing liquidity constraints to studying tertiary vocational education in low income individuals in Colombia.
- Two discontinuities?
i Access to monetary support via poverty score.
ii Access to free vocational education via an entry exam.


## JeA and vocational education in Sena

Youth in Action (JeA), is a national program for poor youths who finished secondary school and want to enter into public tertiary education (IES and SENA).

1 Sena

- Two types of courses: Technical (1 year) and technological (2 years).
- No tuition fees.
- Includes an internship program.
- In case of excess of demand, selection is done using an entry exam.

II JeA for Sena

- Period of analysis: Applicants from 2014-II to 2015-I
- Grant: \$ 200.000 per month conditional on being enrolled
- Preferential entry: Reserves $30 \%$ of total places when a course is over demanded

III JeA selection process.

- Age: 16 to 24 with Completed secondary
- Vulnerable population:

Sisben score lower than a cutoff (by type of municipality) (87\%)

## Data

We use the following administrative data:

- The program (JeA): Registry of beneficiaries and payments.
- Vocational education (Sena): Applicants to all courses since January 2013.
- Poverty score (Sisben): All individuals 16 to 24 y.o. in JeA municipalities.
- Social security registry (PILA): we matched Sena's data with the national registry -2014/06-2017/12


## Sisben's discontinuity and enrollment in Sena

Figure 1: Effect on enrollment - Sisben's discontinuity


## Exam's discontinuity and enrollment in Sena

Figure 2: Effect on enrollment - TEST's discontinuity

(a) 1 year course

(b) 2 year course

## Estimation strategy

We use a double discontinuity approach to estimate the effect of entering into Sena's education with and without financial aid.

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i}=\alpha_{0}+\alpha_{1} D_{i}+\alpha_{2} A_{i}+\alpha_{3} D_{i} \times A_{i}+g\left(s_{i}\right)+f\left(e_{i}\right)+X_{i}+\mu_{i} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where :

- $D_{i}=1$ if Sisben $\leq$ JeA cutoff.
- $A_{i}=1$ if Exam $\geq$ course cutoff.
- $g\left(s_{i}\right)$ and $f\left(e_{i}\right)$ are polynomials of distance in Sisben and Test, respectively Both discontinuities apply only when:
- Course is over-demanded
- There is an entry exam
- There is no second exam


## Enrollment in Sena

Table 1: Double discontinuity on Enrollment - 1 year course

|  | All | Female |  |  | Male |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | 0.058 | 0.050 | 0.029 | 0.035 | 0.085 | 0.078 |  |
|  | $(0.036)$ | $(0.034)$ | $(0.043)$ | $(0.042)$ | $(0.054)$ | $(0.050)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | $0.106^{*}$ | $0.095^{* *}$ | $0.118^{*}$ | $0.135^{*}$ | $0.101^{+}$ | 0.091 |  |
|  | $(0.041)$ | $(0.035)$ | $(0.057)$ | $(0.054)$ | $(0.060)$ | $(0.055)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{3}$ | $0.063^{* *}$ | $0.062^{* *}$ | $0.093^{* *}$ | $0.078^{* *}$ | 0.030 | 0.034 |  |
|  | $(0.019)$ | $(0.017)$ | $(0.027)$ | $(0.024)$ | $(0.024)$ | $(0.022)$ |  |
| Constant | $0.283^{* *}$ | -0.221 | $0.300^{* *}$ | -0.321 | $0.268^{* *}$ | $1.448^{* *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.050)$ | $(0.161)$ | $(0.075)$ | $(0.201)$ | $(0.071)$ | $(0.102)$ |  |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.019 | 0.015 | 0.020 | 0.017 |  |
| $\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.010 | 0.007 |  |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0.010 |  |
| Controls |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.21 | 0.34 | 0.25 | 0.38 | 0.19 | 0.35 |  |
| Observations | 7244 | 7244 | 3329 | 3329 | 3915 | 3915 |  |

Notes: Standard errors clustered at municipality level. $+0.1^{*} 0.05^{* *} 0.01$. Controls include gender, age, participation in FeA, application year, number of applications and course takeout rate. Also include Sisben's area, Sena centre and Sena program fixed effects.

## Enrollment in Sena

Table 2: Double discontinuity on Enrollment - 2 year course

|  | All | Female |  |  | Male |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | $0.084^{* *}$ | $0.078^{* *}$ | $0.073^{*}$ | $0.061^{*}$ | $0.092^{* *}$ | $0.092^{* *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.024)$ | $(0.018)$ | $(0.035)$ | $(0.025)$ | $(0.022)$ | $(0.025)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | 0.035 | 0.039 | 0.099 | 0.085 | -0.019 | -0.006 |  |
|  | $(0.047)$ | $(0.044)$ | $(0.070)$ | $(0.068)$ | $(0.040)$ | $(0.039)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{3}$ | $0.094^{* *}$ | $0.069^{* *}$ | $0.074^{*}$ | 0.053 | $0.109^{* *}$ | $0.076^{* *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.023)$ | $(0.020)$ | $(0.037)$ | $(0.037)$ | $(0.021)$ | $(0.018)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $0.263^{* *}$ | $0.314^{* *}$ | $0.210^{* *}$ | $0.279^{* *}$ | $0.310^{* *}$ | $0.360^{* *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.031)$ | $(0.068)$ | $(0.049)$ | $(0.072)$ | $(0.034)$ | $(0.096)$ |  |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.000 | 0.000 |  |
| $\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.021 | 0.063 |  |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 |  |
| Controls |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.16 | 0.32 | 0.17 | 0.35 | 0.16 | 0.31 |  |
| Observations | 12056 | 12056 | 5551 | 5551 | 6505 | 6505 |  |

## Labor market outcomes

To obtain an intuition of the importance of the financial aid for people in the labor markets, we check some outcomes:

- Proportion of periods working
- Longest employment spell
- Longest unemployment spell


## Labor market participation and enrollment in Sena

Figure 3: Formal labor market participation by enrollment in Sena


## Labor market participation - post studying

Table 3: Double discontinuity on proportion of periods with a formal job

|  | 1y. course |  |  | All | Female | Male |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $0.055^{*}$ | 0.019 | 0.070 | $\mathbf{0 . 1 0 1}$ | Female | Male |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | $(0.026)$ | $(0.053)$ | $(0.053)$ | $(0.038)$ | $(0.052)$ | $(0.041)$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | $0.139^{* *}$ |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | -0.009 | -0.066 | 0.028 | 0.001 | -0.021 | 0.023 |
|  | $(0.030)$ | $(0.051)$ | $(0.022)$ | $(0.017)$ | $(0.026)$ | $(0.029)$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{3}$ | $0.050^{*}$ | $0.077^{* *}$ | 0.031 | -0.002 | -0.011 | 0.004 |
|  | $(0.023)$ | $(0.028)$ | $(0.028)$ | $(0.017)$ | $(0.033)$ | $(0.014)$ |
| Constant | $-0.552^{* *}$ | $-0.706^{* *}$ | $-0.894^{* *}$ | $-0.149^{+}$ | 0.117 | $-0.338^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.061)$ | $(0.131)$ | $(0.131)$ | $(0.084)$ | $(0.138)$ | $(0.071)$ |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.004 | 0.053 | 0.166 | 0.002 | 0.279 | 0.001 |
| $\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.027 | 0.834 | 0.061 | 0.971 | 0.269 | 0.352 |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.000 | 0.731 | 0.086 | 0.007 | 0.545 | 0.001 |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.19 |
| Observations | 7244 | 3329 | 3915 | 12056 | 5551 | 6505 |

## Labor market participation - post studying

Table 4: Double discontinuity on longest employment spell

|  | 1y. course <br>  <br>  <br>  <br> All |  |  | Female | Male | All |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | $1.218^{*}$ | 0.105 | 1.662 | $\mathbf{1 . 7 7 7}^{*}$ | $1.124^{+}$ | $2.459^{*}$ |
|  | $(0.556)$ | $(1.282)$ | $(1.007)$ | $(0.704)$ | $(0.584)$ | $(0.979)$ |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | 0.327 | -0.793 | $1.094^{+}$ | 0.014 | -0.381 | 0.396 |
|  | $(0.606)$ | $(1.060)$ | $(0.594)$ | $(0.360)$ | $(0.474)$ | $(0.432)$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{3}$ | 0.647 | $1.172^{+}$ | 0.205 | -0.189 | -0.233 | -0.129 |
|  | $(0.517)$ | $(0.653)$ | $(0.622)$ | $(0.296)$ | $(0.423)$ | $(0.271)$ |
| Constant | $-10.160^{* *}$ | $-12.964^{* *}$ | $-7.446^{* *}$ | $-4.190^{* *}$ | 0.177 | $-7.745^{* *}$ |
|  | $(1.384)$ | $(3.514)$ | $(2.180)$ | $(1.425)$ | $(1.600)$ | $(1.479)$ |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.005 | 0.266 | 0.192 | 0.004 | 0.088 | 0.013 |
| $\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.039 | 0.737 | 0.129 | 0.686 | 0.150 | 0.625 |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.000 | 0.802 | 0.059 | 0.041 | 0.467 | 0.012 |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.19 | 0.22 |
| Observations | 7244 | 3329 | 3915 | 12056 | 5551 | 6505 |

## Labor market participation - post studying

Table 5: Double discontinuity on longest unemployment spell

|  | 1y. course |  |  | $2 y$. course |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All | Female | Male | All | Female | Male |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | -1.081 | 0.087 | -1.672 | -1.812* | -1.488 | -2.071** |
|  | (0.734) | (1.535) | (1.167) | (0.707) | (0.990) | (0.759) |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | 0.432 | 1.698 | -0.391 | 0.122 | 0.618 | -0.400 |
|  | (0.614) | (1.318) | (0.700) | (0.295) | (0.655) | (0.557) |
| $\alpha_{3}$ | -1.344* | -2.167** | -0.717 | 0.022 | 0.181 | -0.079 |
|  | (0.593) | (0.782) | (0.677) | (0.334) | (0.672) | (0.239) |
| Constant | 38.619** | 44.807** | 52.780** | 15.741** | 11.065** | 19.298** |
|  | (1.853) | (4.124) | (4.559) | (1.381) | (2.651) | (1.100) |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.006 | 0.147 | 0.138 | 0.003 | 0.132 | 0.010 |
| $\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.032 | 0.719 | 0.265 | 0.720 | 0.072 | 0.407 |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.008 | 0.868 | 0.146 | 0.018 | 0.465 | 0.003 |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 0.16 |
| Observations | 7244 | 3329 | 3915 | 12056 | 5551 | 6505 |

## Instrumenting enrollment

We can use each discontinuity to show the effect that enrollment in Sena has on labor market participation for different type of compliers.

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i}=\pi_{0}+\pi_{1}\left(E_{i} \mid D_{i}\right)+g\left(s_{i}\right)+f\left(e_{i}\right)+X_{i}+\mu_{i} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

and

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y_{i}=\lambda_{0}+\lambda_{1}\left(E_{i} \mid A_{i}\right)+g\left(s_{i}\right)+f\left(e_{i}\right)+X_{i}+\mu_{i} \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $E_{i}=1$ if the individual is enrolled at Sena.

- $\pi_{1}$ captures the effect of Sena's enrollment on $Y$, for those who enrolled because they where eligible for financial aid.
- $\lambda_{1}$ captures the effect of Sena's enrollment on $Y$, for those who enrolled because they got the first offer to enroll.
- $g\left(s_{i}\right)$ and $f\left(e_{i}\right)$ are polynomials of distance in Sisben and Test, respectively


## Sena enrollment on labor market participation

Table 6: IV - Enrollment on proportion of periods working

|  | 1y. course <br>  <br>  <br>  <br>  <br>  <br> Femall |  |  | Male | All | 2y. course <br> Female |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Instrumenting with $D_{i}$ |  |  |  |  | Male |  |
| $\pi_{1}$ | 1.019 | 0.781 | 0.886 | $\mathbf{0 . 9 5 6 ^ { * * }}$ | 0.672 | $\mathbf{1 . 1 5 8 ^ { * * }}$ |
|  | $(0.703)$ | $(1.100)$ | $(0.903)$ | $(0.289)$ | $(0.585)$ | $(0.344)$ |
| Constant | $-0.718^{* *}$ | $-0.537^{* *}$ | $-0.790^{*}$ | $-0.484^{*}$ | -0.124 | $-0.750^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.246)$ | $(0.190)$ | $(0.339)$ | $(0.208)$ | $(0.324)$ | $(0.214)$ |
| F Test | 4.09 | 1.55 | 3.60 | 39.24 | 12.16 | 21.82 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Instrumenting with $A_{i}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\lambda_{1}$ | 0.172 | -0.064 | 0.427 | -0.003 | -0.229 | 0.640 |
|  | $(0.138)$ | $(0.241)$ | $(0.304)$ | $(0.237)$ | $(0.195)$ | $(0.997)$ |
| Constant | $-0.509^{* *}$ | $-0.461^{* *}$ | $-0.651^{* *}$ | -0.088 | 0.230 | -0.527 |
|  | $(0.071)$ | $(0.104)$ | $(0.148)$ | $(0.099)$ | $(0.146)$ | $(0.429)$ |
| F Test | 21.31 | 15.77 | 5.61 | 5.21 | 5.77 | 1.13 |
| Observations | 7244 | 3329 | 3915 | 12056 | 5551 | 6505 |

## Sena enrollment on labor market participation

Table 7: IV - Enrollment on longest employment spell

|  | 1y. course |  |  |  | 2y. course |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All | Female | Male | All | Female | Male |  |
| Instrumenting with $D_{i}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\pi_{1}$ | 20.437 | 8.433 | 18.988 | $\mathbf{1 6 . 2 5 8 ^ { * * }}$ | $12.511^{+}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 . 8 7 4 ^ { * * }}$ |  |
|  | $(12.777)$ | $(22.651)$ | $(17.794)$ | $(5.570)$ | $(6.948)$ | $(7.324)$ |  |
| Constant | $-14.562^{* *}$ | $-10.349^{* *}$ | $-16.588^{* *}$ | $-9.921^{* *}$ | -4.313 | $-14.842^{* *}$ |  |
|  | $(4.513)$ | $(3.695)$ | $(6.173)$ | $(3.591)$ | $(3.506)$ | $(4.420)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| F Test | 4.09 | 1.55 | 3.60 | 39.24 | 12.16 | 21.82 |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Instrumenting with $A_{i}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\lambda_{1}$ | 5.496 | 0.171 | 11.060 | -1.308 | -4.434 | 7.906 |  |
|  | $(3.477)$ | $(5.258)$ | $(8.130)$ | $(4.404)$ | $(3.520)$ | $(15.403)$ |  |
| Constant | $-10.871^{* *}$ | $-9.610^{* *}$ | $-14.188^{* *}$ | -2.666 | 2.348 | -9.709 |  |
|  | $(1.925)$ | $(2.603)$ | $(3.347)$ | $(1.975)$ | $(2.075)$ | $(6.615)$ |  |
| F Test | 21.31 | 15.77 | 5.61 | 5.21 | 5.77 | 1.13 |  |
| Observations | 7244 | 3329 | 3915 | 12056 | 5551 | 6505 |  |

## Sena enrollment on labor market participation

Table 8: IV - Enrollment on longest unemployment spell

| 1y. course |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | All | Female | Male | All | 2y. course |  |  |  |  |
|  | Female | Male |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Instrumenting with $D_{i}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\pi_{1}$ | -21.595 | -10.347 | -20.850 | $\mathbf{- 1 7 . 2 1 1 ^ { * * }}$ | -17.175 | $\mathbf{- 1 7 . 3 1 0 ^ { * * }}$ |  |  |  |
|  | $(15.857)$ | $(28.877)$ | $(20.216)$ | $(5.456)$ | $(11.918)$ | $(5.845)$ |  |  |  |
| Constant | $43.451^{* *}$ | $37.520^{* *}$ | $47.785^{* *}$ | $21.856^{* *}$ | $17.254^{* *}$ | $25.413^{* *}$ |  |  |  |
|  | $(5.808)$ | $(4.605)$ | $(8.595)$ | $(3.765)$ | $(6.569)$ | $(3.656)$ |  |  |  |
| F Test | 4.09 | 1.55 | 3.60 | 39.24 | 12.16 | 21.82 |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Instrumenting with $A_{i}$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\lambda_{1}$ | -3.171 | 0.884 | -7.551 | 1.707 | 6.128 | -11.310 |  |  |  |
|  | $(2.884)$ | $(6.139)$ | $(8.907)$ | $(3.702)$ | $(4.619)$ | $(20.315)$ |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $38.900^{* *}$ | $36.516^{* *}$ | $43.760^{* *}$ | $14.043^{* *}$ | $8.095^{*}$ | $22.839^{*}$ |  |  |  |
|  | $(1.697)$ | $(3.227)$ | $(5.143)$ | $(1.567)$ | $(3.259)$ | $(8.992)$ |  |  |  |
| F Test | 21.31 | 15.77 | 5.61 | 5.21 | 5.77 | 1.13 |  |  |  |
| Observations | 7244 | 3329 | 3915 | 12056 | 5551 | 6505 |  |  |  |

## Wrapping up!

## Initial results:

- Financial aid benefits Sena students in the Labor markets
- Labor market outcomes exhibit better results for longer courses. It suggest that opportunity cost does not matters in short courses.
- Opportunity costs are heterogeneous between women and men

Ongoing research:

- Survival analysis.
- Job quality?


## Thanks

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Table 9: Sena applicants 2014-II to 2015-I. Descriptive statistics Without JeA JeA beneficiaries Mean S.D Mean S.D

## All individuals

| Individuals | 1380926 | . | 89350 | . |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| In Sample | 0.71 | 0.45 | 0.94 | 0.24 |

## Sample with Sisben score

| Individuals | 977263 | . | 84020 | . |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Enrolled | 0.19 | 0.40 | 1 | 0 |
| Area 1 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.39 | 0.49 |
| Area 2 | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.50 |
| Area 3 | 0.07 | 0.25 | 0.09 | 0.29 |
| Male | 0.46 | 0.50 | 0.43 | 0.50 |
| Age | 19.54 | 2.39 | 19.05 | 2.13 |
| Technical | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.48 |
| Entry exam score | 39.11 | 17.19 | 49.31 | 8.29 |
| Eligible FeA | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.61 | 0.49 |
| Second test taker | 0.17 | 0.38 | 0.46 | 0.50 |
| Other support | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0 | 0.03 |


| Courses | 14876 |  | 9404 | . |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Seats | 37.02 | 20.01 | 38.09 | 23.78 |
| Demand | 102.83 | 171.33 | 155.04 | 212.71 |
| \% excess of demand | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.76 | 0.4 |
| \% second test | 0.25 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.49 |

Notes: Authors' calculations using data from Sena and Sisben. Only includes Sena centers where JeA beneficiaries applied.

Figure 4: Sisben's manipulation test - density around the cutoff


Figure 5: Sena exam's manipulation test - density around the cutoff


Figure 6: Continuity in observables around the Sisben's cutoff - 1y. course


Figure 7: Continuity in observables around the Sisben's cutoff - 2 y . course


Figure 8: Continuity in observables around the Sena exam's cutoff - 1y. course


Figure 9: Continuity in observables around the Sena exam's cutoff - 2 y . course


Figure 10: Impact of JeA on enrollment in Sena. Reduced form estimates by enrollment semester)

(a) Unconditional

(b) Controlling by the effect of JeA

Figure 11: Probability of formal employment by entry exam's score


| Table 10: JeA's indirect impact on formal employment |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | Via enrollment | Via certification |
| 1st stage (D) | $0.102^{* *}$ | $0.102^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.005)$ | $(0.005)$ |
|  |  |  |
| 2nd stage (T) | $0.749^{* *}$ | $0.161^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.045)$ | $(0.028)$ |
|  |  |  |
| 3rd stage | $0.491^{* *}$ | $2.284^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.143)$ | $(0.761)$ |
| R2 |  |  |
| Observations | 137409 | 137409 |

Figure 12: Enrollment by distance to entry exam's cutoff - JeA


Figure 13: Enrollment by distance to entry exam's cutoff - No JeA

(a) With pref. entry

(b) Without pref. entry

## Affirmative action - JeA's preferential entry

Table 11: Preferential entry's effect on Sena's composition

|  | Never <br> admitted | Admitted <br> by PE | Exclude <br> by PE | Always <br> admitted |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Observations | 815356 | 23875 | 25982 | 204471 |
| Entry exam's score | 42.681 | 45.608 | 51.317 | 53.415 |
|  | $(0.323)$ | $(0.433)$ | $(0.534)$ | $(0.384)$ |
| \% Enrolled | 0.060 | 0.464 | 0.231 | 0.332 |
|  | $(0.004)$ | $(0.014)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.009)$ |

Notes: Authors' calculations using data from Sena.

Figure 14: Preferential entry's composition effect

(a) Applicants

_— Applicant to JeA
----- No applicant to JeA


Figure 15: Enrollment and certification by entry exam's score


|  | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | RF | IV | RF | IV |
| EnrolIment |  |  |  |  |
| Eligible | $0.050^{* *}$ |  | $0.119^{* *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.008)$ |  | $(0.019)$ |  |
| JeA beneficiary |  | $0.868^{* *}$ |  | $0.673^{* *}$ |
|  |  | $(0.145)$ |  | $(0.054)$ |
| Constant | $0.047^{* *}$ | $0.047^{* *}$ | $0.209^{* *}$ | $0.209^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.012)$ | $(0.012)$ | $(0.011)$ | $(0.011)$ |
| F Test |  | 99.62 |  | 36.45 |
| R2 | 0.00 | 0.40 | 0.01 | 0.32 |

Certification

| Eligible | $0.012^{* *}$ | $0.026^{* *}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $(0.003)$ | $(0.006)$ |  |


| JeA beneficiary |  | $0.210^{* *}$ |  | $0.149^{* *}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $(0.049)$ |  | $(0.030)$ |
| Constant | $0.008^{* *}$ | $0.008^{* *}$ | $0.031^{* *}$ | $0.031^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.002)$ | $(0.002)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.004)$ |
| F Test |  | 99.62 |  | 36.45 |
| R2 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.05 |


| Observations | 72051 | 72051 | 65547 | 65547 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

Table 13: Enrollment and Certification by excess of demand before JeA

| Under demanded |  | Over demanded |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| RF | IV | RF | IV |

Enrollment

| Eligible | $\begin{gathered} 0.100^{* *} \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.085^{* *} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| JeA beneficiary |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.643^{* *} \\ (0.119) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.694^{* *} \\ (0.052) \end{gathered}$ |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} 0.221^{* *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.221^{* *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.201^{* *} \\ (0.016) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.201^{* *} \\ & (0.016) \end{aligned}$ |
| F Test |  | 86.34 |  | 47.84 |
| R2 | 0.01 | 0.27 | 0.01 | 0.24 |

Certification

| Eligible | $0.026^{* *}$ | $0.019^{* *}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(0.009)$ | $(0.004)$ |


| JeA beneficiary |  | $0.165^{* *}$ |  | $0.157^{* *}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $(0.057)$ |  | $(0.023)$ |
| Constant | $0.021^{* *}$ | $0.021^{* *}$ | $0.029^{* *}$ | $0.029^{* *}$ |
|  | $(0.006)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.006)$ |
| F Test |  | 86.34 |  | 47.84 |
| R2 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.04 |

Observations
26122
26122180084
180084
As table ??

Figure 16: Estimated JeA impact by bandwidth of analysis

(a) Enrollment

(b) Certification

(c) Formal employment

## Certification from Sena

Table 14: Double discontinuity on Certification-1 year course

|  | All | Female |  |  | Male |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | 0.037 | $0.043^{*}$ | 0.028 | 0.023 | $0.046^{+}$ | $0.050^{+}$ |  |
|  | $(0.024)$ | $(0.021)$ | $(0.052)$ | $(0.046)$ | $(0.024)$ | $(0.027)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | 0.002 | 0.006 | -0.030 | -0.010 | 0.033 | 0.037 |  |
|  | $(0.040)$ | $(0.037)$ | $(0.054)$ | $(0.051)$ | $(0.030)$ | $(0.029)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{3}$ | 0.020 | 0.019 | $0.040^{+}$ | 0.030 | -0.002 | 0.001 |  |
|  | $(0.016)$ | $(0.015)$ | $(0.023)$ | $(0.023)$ | $(0.015)$ | $(0.013)$ |  |
| Constant | $0.105^{* *}$ | $0.155^{* *}$ | $0.170^{* *}$ | 0.062 | $0.049^{+}$ | $1.032^{* *}$ |  |
|  | $(0.030)$ | $(0.059)$ | $(0.047)$ | $(0.163)$ | $(0.025)$ | $(0.060)$ |  |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.072 | 0.035 | 0.277 | 0.331 | 0.090 | 0.081 |  |
| $\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.503 | 0.415 | 0.830 | 0.646 | 0.264 | 0.172 |  |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.099 | 0.052 | 0.444 | 0.357 | 0.079 | 0.057 |  |
| Controls |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.05 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 0.03 | 0.15 |  |
| Observations | 7244 | 7244 | 3329 | 3329 | 3915 | 3915 |  |

## Certification from Sena

Table 15: Double discontinuity on Certification-2 year course

|  | All | Female |  |  | Male |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\alpha_{1}$ | 0.012 | 0.011 | 0.020 | 0.012 | 0.004 | 0.011 |  |
|  | $(0.009)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.013)$ | $(0.013)$ | $(0.009)$ | $(0.010)$ |  |
| $\alpha_{2}$ | -0.003 | -0.002 | -0.003 | -0.003 | -0.002 | -0.000 |  |
|  | $(0.004)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.005)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\alpha_{3}$ | $0.012^{* *}$ | $0.011^{* *}$ | $0.011^{*}$ | $0.009^{+}$ | $0.013^{*}$ | $0.011^{+}$ |  |
|  | $(0.003)$ | $(0.003)$ | $(0.005)$ | $(0.005)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.006)$ |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $0.007^{+}$ | $0.046^{* *}$ | 0.010 | $0.051^{* *}$ | 0.003 | 0.041 |  |
|  | $(0.004)$ | $(0.014)$ | $(0.006)$ | $(0.014)$ | $(0.004)$ | $(0.029)$ |  |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.026 | 0.056 | 0.010 | 0.085 | 0.205 | 0.139 |  |
| $\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.010 | 0.008 | 0.318 | 0.378 | 0.008 | 0.020 |  |
| $\alpha_{1}+\alpha_{2}+\alpha_{3}$ | 0.030 | 0.063 | 0.057 | 0.162 | 0.146 | 0.072 |  |
| Controls |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  | $\checkmark$ |  |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.07 |  |
| Observations | 12056 | 12056 | 5551 | 5551 | 6505 | 6505 |  |

