

Words versus Bullets: Media and Democracy with Coercion

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October, 2012

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- 2 A simple model
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 - Distribution of support for parapoliticians
 - The media scandal and the distribution of support
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Media and accountability

- A free and active media is amply recognized as essential for political accountability.
- Thomas Jefferson: free media is *sufficient* for political accountability:

The functionaries of every government have propensities to command at will the liberty and property of their constituents. There is no safe deposit for these but with the people themselves, nor can they be safe with them without information. Where the press is free, and every man able to read, all is safe.

(To Charles Yancey, 1816. ME 14:384)

- This paper: Jefferson was wrong.

Why isn't it sufficient?

Another famous quote: Louis Brandeis (US Supreme Court, 1916-1939)

- Brandeis, who championed many of the Progressive ideas of President Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), wrote in 1913:

Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman. And publicity has already played an important part in the struggle against the Money Trust.

(In Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It. Chapter V: What Publicity Can Do., 1912)

- A key historical example of the power of the press and transparency.
- But also a cautionary note: **what if there is some shade?**

Our main argument


A weak institutional environment is the shade

- If the media is free and active but operates in a weak institutional environment, then:
 - ① Its provision of information about politicians may not increase political accountability:
 - Politicians exposed as corrupt/incompetent/etc. may hide in the shade.
 - Consider coercion (or any form of manipulating elections): if politicians are exposed but coercion or fraud are rampant, their effective votes may remain unaltered.
 - ② Disclosure of information by the media may even have unintended negative consequences:
 - Consider coercion or fraud again: exposed politicians may have to *increase* coercion or fraud to compensate for the loss of popularity following exposure!

A preview of what comes next

- Explore these ideas in a model of political competition and media exposure:
 - Some (types of) politicians collude with armed groups to coerce voters into voting in a particular way.
 - Such collusion may be exposed by the media.
- Test theoretical implications using Colombia's legislative elections from 2002 to 2010:
 - 'Parapolitica' (para-politics) scandal.
 - The national media denounced how politicians made deals with illegal armed paramilitary groups to obtain votes by exerting violent coercion.

Figure: Percent of 'parapolítica' news, out of all recorded news about Congress candidates



Related Literature

- Huge literature on role of media in democracy, this work especially attune with political economy of mass media (surveyed by Prat and Strömberg (2011))
 - A key message is that power of the media is a double-edged sword: e.g., biases for political or commercial reasons.
 - We emphasize the limits of mass media, but a different mechanism: even if mass media provides information, it may not promote political accountability in a weakly-institutionalized environment.
- 'Parapolitica' has been amply studied (for a review, see Barrera and Nieto Matiz (2010)).
 - But effects of the media scandal specifically have been largely overlooked.

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Environment

- $j = 1, \dots, N$ municipalities, each with a mass of voters of size 1.
- Coercion by paramilitaries occurs in the first $N_P < N$ municipalities.
- Politicians A and B compete, but A colludes with paramilitaries.
- Where there is coercion, a share λ of the population votes for A (\sim Acemoglu, Robinson, and Santos (2009)).
- Share $1 - \lambda$ vote freely. When A and B offer policies q^A and q^B , (free) voter i in municipality j votes for A if:

$$u^j(q^A) + \sigma^{ij} > u^j(q^B),$$

where $\sigma^{ij} \sim U \left[-\frac{1}{2\phi}, \frac{1}{2\phi} \right]$.

Incorporating the media scandal and coercion effort

- Media scandal:

- Newspapers publish the collusion of illegal armed groups with party A:

$$\sigma_{ij} \sim U \left[-\frac{1}{2\phi} - \mu, \frac{1}{2\phi} - \mu \right]$$

- New Π^A :

$$\Pi^A = \Pi_{\text{no scandal}}^A - \phi\mu(N - \lambda N_P)$$

- Endogenous coercion:

- λ decided by party A directly, at a cost $c(\lambda) = \psi\lambda^2/2$.
- ψ is the overall quality of institutions, especially the enforcement of electoral law.
- Now A chooses q^A and λ to maximize $\Pi^A - c(\lambda)$ and B q^B to maximize $\Pi^B = N - \Pi^A$.

Summarizing the empirical implications

Some of which we (can) test

- Areas with coercion are those with paramilitary presence and weak institutions.
- Other things equal, parapoliticians have an edge, and votes concentrated in areas with coercion.
- Paramilitary-controlled areas receive less policy attention.
- Impact of the media scandal:
 - 1 Coercion increases, exacerbating the lack of policy attention in paramilitary-controlled areas.
 - 2 Support for parapoliticians in municipalities without coercion falls.
 - 3 Support for parapoliticians in controlled areas may increase or decrease.
 - 4 Overall support may increase or decrease.
- Notice two key unintended consequences of media scandal:
 - 1 Coerced municipalities become more coerced and neglected.
 - 2 Tainted politicians may not be hurt overall, and tend to get their votes from places that are more immune to publicity.

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News searches on El Tiempo electronic archive

- Every news story (and op-ed) from Jan. 1, 1997 - Aug. 1, 2011.
- Record: date, newspaper section, whether it links the politician with “parapolitica” activity, other corruption practices or an electoral crime (like fraud or vote-buying).
- Focus on senators, elected since 1991 Constitution on a single nationwide district.
 - Capture more national attention and votes than candidates to the (Lower) House of Representatives (elected on regional and special districts).
 - Table 1: includes relatively well known candidates that had previously served as either senators or representatives. Still, clear difference in coverage.
- To have a set of more comparable and visible candidates, focus on senators with previous experience as members of the Senate or the House of Representatives.

Table: Coverage of Senate vs House candidates

	Senate Candidates	House Candidates
Number of "incumbent" candidates	356	322
Average stories per candidate	362	109
Std. Dev.	625	231
Average stories before the election	183	55
Std. Dev.	298	77
Average stories during the electoral period	93	28
Std. Dev.	163	46

Three measures of “parapolitician”

- 1 *Parapolitician dummy*: equals 1 if there are any news connecting the candidate to paramilitaries at any point in time.
- 2 *Percent parapolitica news*: percentage of total news of the candidate that relate him with the parapolitica scandal.
- 3 *News before elections*: equals 1 if the candidate was linked to paramilitaries before the election.

Other data

- 1 Four alternative measures of paramilitary presence.
- 2 Judicial efficiency: use cases that entered the criminal justice system from 2008 to 2010 (information availability and comparable justice system):

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Efficiency Index}_m &= \frac{\text{Cases Evacuated}_m}{\text{Total Cases}_m} \times \frac{\text{Total Cases Evacuated not in Impunity}_m}{\text{Cases Evacuated}_m} \\
 &= \frac{\text{Total Cases Evacuated not in Impunity}_m}{\text{Total Cases}_m}
 \end{aligned}$$

- 3 State presence: principal component for number of judges, attorneys and general prosecutors in each municipality.
- 4 Others: Candidate's vote share, measures of guerrilla activity as placebo, politician controls (total number of news about the politician from our own press search, gender, profession, whether the politician is a former member of the house or the senate, his years in politics, periods in office, and a dummy variable that equals one if the senator did not complete his last term).

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Measuring vote distribution

- We construct:

$$\bar{y}_{ct} = \sum_m vs_{cmt} \tilde{y}_m. \quad (1)$$

where \tilde{y}_m is any key dimension affecting distribution of votes for parapoliticians, vs_{cmt} is vote share of candidate c in m at time t .

→ \bar{y}_{ct} summarizes the characteristics of municipalities where c got his votes.

- (Note: Every \tilde{y}_m varies between 0 and 100: $\tilde{y}_m = 100 \frac{y_m - \min_m y_m}{\max_m y_m - \min_m y_m}$.)
- For reference (Tables 19-21: descriptive statistics.)

Main specifications

- For all candidates:

$$\bar{y}_{ct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Paract}_{ct} + \beta_2^T \mathbf{X}_c + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ct}. \quad (2)$$

- Only for parapoliticians:

$$\bar{y}_{ct} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{Exposed before elections}_{ct}) + \beta_2^T \mathbf{X}_c + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ct}, \quad (3)$$

- Test implications for distribution (2) and effects of scandal (3):
 - When \bar{y}_{ct} is average paramilitary presence, expect $\beta_1 > 0$.
 - When \bar{y}_{ct} is average quality local institutions, expect $\beta_1 < 0$.
- To test implications for parapoliticians support, run (2) and (3) for candidates' vote share as lhs variable.

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Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration in paramilitary areas I

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: paramilitary presence (ARS measure) weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	1.036*** (0.267)			1.056*** (0.266)		
Perc. parapolitica news		4.582*** (0.874)			4.625*** (0.896)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			1.134*** (0.385)			1.163*** (0.364)
Constant	2.120*** (0.158)	2.146*** (0.144)	2.412*** (0.152)	2.016*** (0.513)	2.044*** (0.459)	2.391*** (0.512)
R-squared	0.069	0.109	0.056	0.091	0.129	0.079
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration in paramilitary areas I

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: dummy for high paramilitary presence (ARS measure) weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	8.427*** (1.764)			8.606*** (1.739)		
Perc. parapolitica news		33.50*** (7.298)			33.37*** (7.228)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			8.217*** (2.314)			8.453*** (2.267)
Constant	17.54*** (1.310)	17.98*** (1.282)	19.93*** (1.421)	17.15*** (4.004)	17.75*** (3.870)	20.26*** (4.319)
R-squared	0.084	0.113	0.055	0.100	0.123	0.071
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration in paramilitary areas II

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: paramilitary attacks per capita weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	0.798*** (0.213)			0.793*** (0.213)		
Perc. parapolitica news		3.622*** (0.883)			3.643*** (0.885)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			0.814*** (0.265)			0.850*** (0.266)
Constant	2.164*** (0.169)	2.178*** (0.160)	2.389*** (0.162)	2.262*** (0.477)	2.268*** (0.459)	2.544*** (0.482)
R-squared	0.051	0.082	0.039	0.060	0.091	0.051
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration in paramilitary areas II

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: dummy for high paramilitary attacks per capita weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	11.72*** (2.029)			12.01*** (2.037)		
Perc. parapolitica news		37.43*** (7.239)			38.72*** (7.349)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			11.34*** (2.431)			12.16*** (2.420)
Constant	41.23*** (1.906)	42.40*** (1.881)	44.55*** (1.902)	42.13*** (4.757)	43.65*** (4.809)	46.45*** (4.844)
R-squared	0.099	0.091	0.066	0.120	0.112	0.091
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Comments: votes from paramilitary areas

- In panel A of Table 3, the estimated coefficient (1.036) implies that, after controlling for time fixed effects, politicians connected to the parapolitica scandal have on average a paramilitary presence index that is one-half of a standard deviation larger and more than 30% larger than the mean (2.79) of the sample.
 - Robust to using alternative measures for identifying a candidate as a parapolitician.
 - Robust to candidate controls, highly significant and coefficients are remarkably stable:
- β_1 is not spuriously capturing other differences between parapoliticians and non-parapoliticians.
- True for all measures of paramilitary presence.

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration areas with inefficient judiciary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: efficiency index index (total) weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	-0.100 (0.0674)			-0.0893 (0.0671)		
Perc. parapolitica news		-0.603*** (0.174)			-0.585*** (0.188)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			-0.148** (0.0728)			-0.127* (0.0733)
Constant	10.18*** (0.0650)	10.19*** (0.0630)	10.15*** (0.0612)	10.03*** (0.144)	10.04*** (0.143)	9.995*** (0.144)
R-squared	0.009	0.023	0.012	0.042	0.055	0.044
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration areas with inefficient judiciary

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: efficiency index (only electoral crimes) weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	-1.143** (0.562)			-1.165** (0.551)		
Perc. parapolitica news		-3.239* (1.737)			-3.768** (1.754)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			-1.115* (0.673)			-1.283** (0.648)
Constant	42.04*** (0.552)	41.90*** (0.535)	41.72*** (0.524)	43.02*** (1.244)	42.87*** (1.222)	42.60*** (1.205)
R-squared	0.022	0.018	0.017	0.092	0.091	0.089
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration areas with weak state presence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: state presence index (total) weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	-8.817*** (1.585)			-9.028*** (1.501)		
Perc. parapolitica news		-29.10*** (3.233)			-29.83*** (3.232)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			-8.009*** (1.848)			-8.712*** (1.783)
Constant	22.23*** (1.713)	21.41*** (1.674)	19.73*** (1.651)	25.51*** (3.762)	24.43*** (3.714)	22.25*** (3.724)
R-squared	0.080	0.078	0.049	0.185	0.181	0.157
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration areas with weak state presence

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: state presence index (only main offices) weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	-8.963*** (1.593)			-9.180*** (1.508)		
Perc. parapolitica news		-29.57*** (3.270)			-30.31*** (3.251)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			-8.111*** (1.864)			-8.817*** (1.796)
Constant	22.97*** (1.716)	22.14*** (1.678)	20.43*** (1.657)	26.50*** (3.781)	25.39*** (3.733)	23.17*** (3.751)
R-squared	0.082	0.079	0.050	0.188	0.184	0.159
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Wrapping up: Vote distribution of parapoliticians

- In short: politicians that have colluded with paramilitaries get disproportionate support from areas with significant paramilitary activity and weak institutions.
- But could be that such areas are also places with ideological leanings that both create a favorable environment for paramilitary activity and increase support for parapoliticians.
- To be more confident about coercion being the key channel, we need a set of more comparable candidates sharing, for instance, similar ideological leanings.
- Do that next and, moreover, we focus on the implications of media exposure, the main focus of our theory.

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Within parapoliticians and the effect of the scandal

- Now keep the set of (more comparable) parapoliticians only.
- Examine the impact of exposure: compare exposed before with exposed after the elections.
- Control for set of candidate controls \mathbf{X}_c , but also check if there are observable significant differences between these two sets of parapoliticians (Table 10).
 - Largely no, except total news but this is driven by para news themselves.
- Hence now look for evidence if exposed: Moved to para places? Moved to weakly institutionalized places? Did worse?

Table: Comparability of Exposed and Unexposed Parapoliticians

<i>Dependent variable: candidate is exposed as parapolitician before elections</i>		
	(1)	(2)
Replaced Candidate	0.0252 (0.129)	0.0544 (0.114)
College Degree	-0.1000 (0.0928)	-0.108 (0.0931)
Male	0.146 (0.0988)	0.155 (0.100)
Change of House	0.0431 (0.0710)	0.0264 (0.0726)
Average Years in Politics	-0.000743 (0.00600)	0.000621 (0.00626)
Average Periods in Congress	0.0381* (0.0211)	0.0366* (0.0217)
Total news in El Tiempo	0.000223** (9.89e-05)	
Non-paramilitary news in El Tiempo		0.000112 (0.000103)
Observations	119	119
R-squared	0.803	0.797

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration in paramilitary areas after the scandal

<i>Dependent variable: characteristic weighted by vote share</i>				
	Presence index (ARS)	Dummy high presence (ARS)	Paramilitary attacks per capita	Dummy high para. attacks per capita
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel A: No candidate controls</i>				
News before elections (Yes=1)	1.016** (0.501)	7.265* (4.099)	0.619 (0.588)	9.317** (4.592)
Constant	3.205*** (0.317)	27.94*** (3.377)	2.948*** (0.303)	54.37*** (3.268)
R-squared	0.023	0.024	0.024	0.050
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	119	119	119	119
Number of candidates	77	77	77	77

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration in paramilitary areas after the scandal

<i>Dependent variable: characteristic weighted by vote share</i>				
	Presence index (ARS)	Dummy high presence (ARS)	Paramilitary attacks per capita	Dummy high para. attacks per capita
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel B: Including candidate controls</i>				
News before elections (Yes=1)	1.065** (0.513)	6.748 (4.160)	0.729 (0.579)	13.64*** (4.661)
Constant	5.039*** (1.011)	40.66*** (8.374)	3.714*** (0.933)	59.20*** (7.929)
R-squared	0.238	0.236	0.179	0.191
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	119	119	119	119
Number of candidates	77	77	77	77

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration in weak state and inefficient institutions areas after the scandal

<i>Dependent variable: weak state and inefficient institutions areas weighted by vote share</i>				
	Judicial efficiency (electoral crimes)	Judicial efficiency (all crimes)	State presence index (all offices)	State presence index (main offices)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Panel B: Including candidate controls</i>				
News before elections (Yes=1)	-0.911 (1.136)	-0.281* (0.150)	-4.239* (2.402)	-4.269* (2.477)
Constant	41.81*** (1.944)	9.694*** (0.261)	12.23*** (4.236)	12.80*** (4.351)
R-squared	0.125	0.090	0.293	0.287
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	119	119	119	119
Number of candidates	77	77	77	77

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Parapoliticians do well, and the scandal didn't hurt them

- Our theory:
 - Vote share of parapoliticians should be larger than that of non-parapoliticians.
 - Effect of exposure need not be negative, since coercion response may avoid electoral cost of the scandal.
- Run (2) and (3) for candidate vote share.

Table: Parapoliticians: Relative success and effects of the scandal

<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: candidate vote share</i>								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Parapolitician Dummy	0.000931*** (0.000271)			0.00101*** (0.000244)				
Perc. parapolitica news		0.00319*** (0.000949)			0.00385*** (0.000861)			
News before elections (Yes=1)			0.000874*** (0.000326)			0.000849*** (0.000326)	0.000734 (0.000518)	0.000563 (0.000522)
Constant	0.00521*** (0.000335)	0.00529*** (0.000318)	0.00547*** (0.000307)	0.00300*** (0.000577)	0.00307*** (0.000577)	0.00337*** (0.000602)	0.00633*** (0.000300)	0.00602*** (0.000895)
R-squared	0.133	0.134	0.123	0.331	0.339	0.315	0.217	0.282
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356	119	119
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254	77	77

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Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration guerrilla areas (placebo)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A: Dependent variable: dummy for municipality captured by guerrilla weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	-0.393 (0.667)			-0.255 (0.668)		
Perc. parapolitica news		-3.650*** (1.000)			-3.093*** (0.938)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			-1.545*** (0.588)			-1.460*** (0.563)
Constant	2.121*** (0.675)	2.227*** (0.663)	2.021*** (0.630)	-0.779 (0.766)	-0.613 (0.708)	-0.813 (0.723)
R-squared	0.002	0.008	0.010	0.029	0.033	0.036
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration guerrilla areas (placebo)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel B: Dependent variable: dummy for high guerrilla attacks per capita weighted by vote share</i>						
Parapolitician Dummy	-0.781 (0.495)			-0.688 (0.491)		
Perc. parapolitica news		-5.601*** (1.227)			-5.089*** (1.248)	
News before elections (Yes=1)			-1.281** (0.582)			-1.170** (0.580)
Constant	4.139*** (0.447)	4.249*** (0.424)	3.923*** (0.422)	0.886 (0.913)	1.050 (0.893)	0.662 (0.901)
R-squared	0.008	0.030	0.013	0.049	0.067	0.053
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Candidate controls				Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356
Number of candidates	254	254	254	254	254	254

Table: Parapoliticians: Vote concentration in guerrilla areas after the scandal (placebo)

<i>Dependent variable: guerrilla area measure weighted by vote share</i>				
	Dummy captured by guerrilla	Dummy high guerrilla attacks	Dummy captured by guerrilla	Dummy high guerrilla attacks
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
News before elections (Yes=1)	-2.857 (2.121)	-2.171** (1.087)	-3.630 (2.192)	-2.839*** (1.006)
Constant	2.131** (1.034)	3.496*** (0.777)	-4.454 (2.728)	-4.173** (1.598)
R-squared	0.031	0.038	0.100	0.211
Candidate controls			Yes	Yes
Time fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	119	119	119	119
Number of candidates	77	77	77	77

Is El Tiempo biased?

- El Tiempo: traditionally pro-government, bought in 2007 by right-wing editorial group planeta. Biases?
- Verify with El Espectador, available since 2005, strong reputation as independent (think Escobar).
- No evidence of bias:
 - 1 84% of politicians in the same quintile of scandal intensity. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject equal distributions.
 - 2 Less than 5% of exposed by El Tiempo as parapoliticians not exposed by El Espectador. Less than 5% exposed by El Espectador not exposed by El Tiempo.
 - 3 Table 18: if anything El Tiempo *underestimates* the extent of concentration of paramilitary votes.

Table: Verifying media bias: Parapoliticians vote shares and distribution using El Espectador

Dependent variable:	Vote share	Municipal characteristic ... weighted by vote share					State presence index (only main offices) (7)
		Paramilitary presence (ARS) (2)	Param. attacks per capita (3)	Judicial efficiency (elect. crimes) (4)	Judicial efficiency (all crimes) (5)	State presence index (6)	
	(1)						
<i>Panel A: Parapolitician Dummy based on El Espectador news searches</i>							
Parapolitician dummy	0.00104*** (0.000244)	1.038*** (0.200)	1.015*** (0.215)	-1.670*** (0.544)	-0.165** (0.0659)	-10.52*** (1.299)	-10.59*** (1.316)
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356	356
R-squared	0.332	0.088	0.082	0.104	0.054	0.206	0.208
<i>Panel A: Parapolitician Dummy based on El Tiempo news searches</i>							
Parapolitician dummy	0.00101*** (0.000260)	1.186*** (0.295)	0.929*** (0.222)	-0.991* (0.575)	-0.0818 (0.0715)	-8.650*** (1.543)	-8.788*** (1.551)
Observations	356	356	356	356	356	356	356
R-squared	0.329	0.100	0.070	0.088	0.041	0.174	0.176

Contents

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 - Distribution of support for parapoliticians
 - The media scandal and the distribution of support
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 - Further robustness
- 6 Final remarks**

The dark side of free media in weakly institutionalized environments

- Much of the discussion on media in weakly-institutionalized environments concerns the situations where an active and free media is missing from the political stage.
- However, even when weak institutions predominate, the media sometimes play an active and unbiased role of providing useful information about political corruption or other wrongdoings by politicians.
- In such circumstance the cleansing role of media can be limited and even have unintended negative consequences.

Extra Slides

Table: Municipal level variables, descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Unscaled variables				
Paramilitary presence (ARS measure)	.009	1.163	-.648	11.516
Dummy for high paramilitary presence (ARS measure)	.403	.49	0	1
Paramilitary attacks per capita	2.0e-06	4.0e-06	0	.000038
Dummy for high paramilitary attacks per capita	.411	.492	0	1
State presence index	.025	1.813	-.238	47.474
Sate presence index (only main offices)	.027	1.815	-.267	45.261
Judicial efficiency index (only electoral crimes)	.336	.996	-4	5
Judicial efficiency index (total)	.384	.8260	-1.76	19
Dummy for municipality captured by guerrilla	.032	.175	0	1
Dummy for high guerrilla attacks per capita	.13	.336	0	1

Table: Municipal level variables, descriptive statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max
Scaled variables				
Paramilitary presence (ARS measure)	5.4	9.559	0	100
Dummy for high paramilitary presence (ARS measure)	40.259	49.042	0	100
Paramilitary attacks per capita	5.412	10.898	0	100
Dummy for high paramilitary attacks per capita	41.126	49.206	0	100
State presence index	.551	3.799	0	100
Sate presence index (only main offices)	.645	3.986	0	100
Judicial efficiency index (only electoral crimes)	48.183	11.072	0	100
Judicial efficiency index (total)	10.329	3.98	0	100
Dummy for municipality captured by guerrilla	3.163	17.502	0	100
Dummy for high guerrilla attacks per capita	12.98	33.608	0	100

Table: Candidate level variables, descriptive statistics

Variable	All politicians				Parapoliticians		Non-parapoliticians	
	mean	std. dev.	min	max	mean	std. dev.	mean	std. dev.
Involvement with parapolitica scandal								
Parapolitician Dummy	.34	.47	0	1	1	0	0	0
Perc. parapolitica news	.06	.14	0	.86	.17	.2	0	0
News before elections (Yes=1)	.19	.39	0	1	.55	.5	0	0
Municipality characteristics, weighted by municipal candidate vote share								
Paramilitary presence (ARS measure)	2.79	2.05	0	22.21	3.45	2.53	2.46	1.66
Dummy for high paramilitary presence (ARS measure)	22.2	14.4	0	81.430	27.6	16.92	19.47	12.09
Paramilitary attacks per capita	2.74	1.92	0	14.69	3.26	1.98	2.48	1.83
Dummy for high paramilitary attacks per capita	48.26	19.15	0	90.28	55.86	18.15	44.41	18.51
Judicial efficiency index (total)	10.13	.8	0	13.34	10.01	1.06	10.18	.63
Judicial efficiency index (only electoral crimes)	41.87	5.36	0	53.9	40.82	5.98	42.4	4.95
State presence index	19.03	15.97	0	79.07	12.83	11.89	22.18	16.85
Sate presence index (only main offices)	19.8	16.03	0	79.22	13.5	12.01	22.99	16.87
Dummy for municipality captured by guerrilla	2.28	6.23	0	54.65	1.99	6.1400	2.43	6.28
Dummy for high guerrilla attacks per capita	4.23	4.61	0	27.57	3.72	4.07	4.48	4.85
Candidate level outcomes and controls								
Candidate vote share	.0041	.0028	.0001	.0209	.00466	.00225	.00378	.00294
Average News in El Tiempo	361.9	624.88	1	4769	355.13	336.78	365.29	728.44
Male	.88	.32	0	1	.87	.34	.89	.31
College Degree	.9	.3	0	1	.89	.31	.91	.29
Replaced Candidate	.04	.2	0	1	.04	.2	.04	.2
Average Years in Politics	13.18	8.71	2	46	12.29	8.18	13.63	8.94
Average Periods in Congress	2.1	1.37	1	11	2.08	1.52	2.12	1.29