

Professor James A. Robinson
Harvard University
jrobinson@gov.harvard.edu
Professor Sebastián Mazzuca
The Harvard Academy
and University of California at Berkeley
smazzuca@wcfia.harvard.edu

Latin American Development in the Long-Run: June 15-July 3 2009

The main topic of this course is to discuss the factors that have shaped the long-run economic and political development of Latin America with a special emphasis on Colombia. We focus on both cross-country and within-country differences. After discussing various types of hypotheses the main focus will be on the political economy of institutions.

Evaluation: The grade for the course will be determined by a take home examination over the final weekend of the course to be handed in on Monday July 6. We will hand out some previous exam questions in advance to give an idea of the things you are supposed to understand.

Lecture 1 Tuesday June 16: Facts and questions about economic and political development in the long-run. Investigating the causal effects of institutions in the long-run.

Tables from the World Development Report 2004. Tables from **Angus Maddison (2001)** *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*, OECD, Paris.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2001) “Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” *American Economic Review*, 91, 1369-1401.

Acemoglu, Daron Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2002) “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 118, 1231-1294.

Lecture 2 Wednesday June 17: The short-run. Macroeconomic policy as a proximate cause. The possible role of culture.

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson and Yunyong Thaicharoen (2003) “Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth,” *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 50, 49-123.

Tabellini, Guido (2005) “Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe,” Search for his web page on google you can download the paper.

Lecture 3 Thursday June 18: Towards a theory of Institutions.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2005) “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth,” in Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf eds. *Handbook of Economic Growth*, Amsterdam; North-Holland.

Lecture 4 Friday June 19: Introduction to political economy. Some basics of collective choice. The role of institutions. De facto and de jure power.

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2006) *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4.

Lecture 5 Tuesday June 23: Fundamental political concepts: State, Regime, Government, Political Institutions. Political Institutions and Economic Growth. State Formation I: two sociological visions.

Tilly, Charles (1990) *Coercion and Capital in Europe*. Introduction, Chapters 1-2.

Lecture 6 Wednesday June 24: State Formation II: two economic visions.

Skaperdas, Stergios (2007) "Anarchy." *Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

Goyal, Sanjeev Goyal and Staal, Klaas (2004) "The Political Economy of Regionalism." *European Economic Review*, 48, 563-593.

Lecture 7 Thursday June 25: State Formation in Latin America. Long-term political consequences.

Mazucca, Sebastian (2009) (*forthcoming*).

Edward L. Gibson, Ernesto Calvo, and Tulia Falletti (1999) "Reallocative Federalism: Territorial Overrepresentation and Public Spending in the Western Hemisphere," manuscript, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University.

Samuels, David and Richard Snyder (2001) "Devaluing the Vote in Latin America," *Journal of Democracy* 12.1, 146-159.

Guillermo O'Donnell (1993) "On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries," *World Development* 21, 1355-70. (Spanish version included in O'Donnell, *Contrapuntos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 1997)

Jones, Mark P., Pablo Sanguinetti, and Mariano Tommasi (2000) "Politics, Institutions, and Fiscal Performance in a Federal System: an analysis of the Argentine provinces," *Journal of Econometrics*, 96.2, 305-29.

Lecture 8 Friday June 26: Causes of Electoral Institutions. Origins of Proportional Representation in Colombia.

Boix, Carles (1999) "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," *American Political Science Review*, 93, 609-624.

Benoit, Kenneth (2004) "Models of electoral system change," *Electoral Studies* 23, 363-389.

Mazucca, Sebastián and James Robinson (2003) "Power and Proportionality."

Mazucca, Sebastián and James Robinson (2009) "Political Conflict and Power Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 89, 285-325.

Lecture 9 Saturday June 27: Probabilistic Model of Electoral Competition. Effects of Electoral Institutions.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, Chapter 3.

Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000) *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, Chapter 8.

Carey, John M. and Mathew S. Shugart (1995) “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank-Ordering of Electoral Formulas,” *Electoral Studies*, 14, 417-439.

Lecture 10 Tuesday June 30: Institutional origins in Latin America.

Coatsworth, John H. (2008) “[Inequality, Institutions and Economic Growth in Latin America](#),” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 40, 545–569, 2008.

Engerman Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (1997) “Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies,” in Stephen H. Haber ed. *How Latin America Fell Behind*, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA.

Haber, Stephen H. (2002) “Political Institutions and Economic Development: Lessons from the Economic Histories of Mexico and the United States, 1790-1914,”

<http://www.stanford.edu/~haber/papers/Haber,%20Political%20Institutions%20and%20Economic%20Developmen--ver.pdf>

Dell, Melissa (2007) “The Persistent Effects of Peru’s Mining *Mita*,” Unpublished, Department of Economics, MIT, <http://econ-www.mit.edu/grad/mdell/papers>

Lecture 11 Wednesday July 1: Institutional persistence and change.

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson (2008) “Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions,” *American Economic Review*, 98, 267-293.

Acemoglu, Daron, María Angélica Bautista, Pablo Querubín and James A. Robinson (2008) “Economic and Political Inequality: The Case of Cundinamarca, Colombia,” forthcoming in Elhanan Helpman ed. *The Political Economy of Institutions*, Harvard University Press.

Bobonis, Gustavo (2007) “Coercion, Conflict, and Constraints to the Emergence of Public Schooling: Evidence from the 19th Century Coffee Boom,” Unpublished, available at <http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~bobonis/research.htm>

Lecture 12 Thursday July 2: 100 years of Colombian history and some comparisons too.

Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Rafael Santos-Villagran (2008) “The Formation of the State: Evidence from Colombia,” Unpublished.

Chaves, Isaías, Leopoldo Fergusson and James A. Robinson (2008) “He who Counts Elects: The Determinants of Fraud in the 1922 Colombian Presidential Election,” Unpublished.

Lecture 13 Friday July 3: Clientelism, populism and the form of redistribution with an application to Colombia.

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, Pablo Querubín and James A. Robinson (2008) “When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence,” *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Spring 2008, 351-417.

Meisel, Adolfo (1996) “Why no Hyperinflation in Colombia? On the Determinants of Stable Economic Policies,” [Borradores de Economía](#) 000708, Banco de la República.

Urrutia, Miguel (1991) “The Absence of Populism in Colombia,” in Sebastián Edwards and Rudiger Dornbusch eds. *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America*, Chicago; University of Chicago Press.

Robinson, James A. (2005) “A Normal Latin American Country? A Perspective on Colombian Development” on my web site.