

Universidad de los Andes
Facultad de Economía
Escuela Internacional de Verano 2006
Curso: Topics in Political Economy
Reading List

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Fecha: Junio 14 -23 y 27, 28, 30

Nota: La fecha límite para retirarse del curso será el viernes 30 de junio. Si el examen final se programa para ese día, el retiro deberá hacerse a más tardar el 29 de junio.

Pendiente: Sistema de evaluación

1. Introduction

Drazen (2000), *Political Economy in Macroeconomics*, Princeton (**PEM**), chapter 1.

Riker (1982), *Liberalism Against Populism*, Waveland Press (**R**), chapter 1

2. Elections, Voting, and Voting Rules

R, chapter 3

Persson and Tabellini (2000). *Political Economics*, MIT Press.(**PT**), p. 19-58

PEM, chapter 3, p.70-85

Ferejohn (1986), "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control," *Public Choice* 50, 5-26.

3. Strategic Voting, Voter Participation, Agenda Setting

R, chapter 6, 7

Grossman and Helpman (2001), *Special Interest Politics*, MIT Press. (**GH**), sections 2.1,2.2, 3.1

Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty," *APSR* 79, 62-78

Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996), "The Swing Voter's Curse," *AER* 86, 408-24

4. Legislatures and Government Systems

GH, section 2.3

Baron and Ferejohn (1989), "Bargaining in Legislatures," *American Political Science Review* 83, 1181-1206

Baron, D. (1991), "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems," *APSR* 85, 137-164.

Baron, D. (1993), "Government Formation and Endogenous Parties," *APSR* 87, 34-47.

- Diermeier, D. and T. Feddersen (1998), "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure," *APSR* 92, 611-621.
- Baron, D. and D. Diermeier (2001), "Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems." *QJE* 116, 933-967.
- Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997), "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," *QJE* 112, 1163-1202
- Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (2000), "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," *JPE* 108, 1121-1161.

5. Special Interest Groups

GH, various sections

- Drazen and Limao (2006), "A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution," NBER working paper

6. Redistribution

PEM, chapter 8

7. Reform

PEM, chapter 10

- Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), "Political Losers as a Barrier to Economic Development," *AER* 90, 126-30
- Jain and Mukand (2003), "Redistributive Promises and the Promise of Economic Reform,' Analysis," *AER* 93, 256-64

8. Political Budget Cycles

PEM, chapter 7

- Brender, A. and A. Drazen (2005), "Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies," *Journal of Monetary Economics* 52, 1271-95.
- Brender, A. and A. Drazen (2005), "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Cross-Section of Countries," NBER working paper 11862.
- Rogoff, K. (1990), "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," *AER* 80, 21-36
- Drazen and Eslava (2005), "Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER" working paper 11085
- Drazen and Eslava (2006), "Pork Barrel Cycles," NBER" working paper 12190