

Summer Course
Universidad de los Andes
Junio 2004

INSTITUCIONES POLÍTICAS Y POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA

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Este curso es una introducción a algunos temas del área conocida actualmente en inglés como **Political Economy**. Es un área fronteriza entre la economía, la ciencia política y algunas otras disciplinas. En particular, trabajaremos dentro de un paradigma que toma varios postulados metodológicos de la economía (incluyendo varios avances en teoría de juegos, teoría de la información, y la nueva economía institucional) y los utiliza para estudiar comportamientos políticos y los procesos de decisión e implementación de políticas públicas.

El curso está pensado para aproximadamente 10 sesiones de aproximadamente 4 horas cada una. La bibliografía aquí descripta es más amplia que lo que se cubrirá en clase, lo cual será parcialmente endógeno a los intereses y formación previa de los estudiantes.

Pre-requisitos:

Microeconomía.

Algunas nociones de teoría de juegos.

Algunas nociones de finanzas públicas.

Predisposición para interactuar con material proveniente de otras disciplinas (ciencia política)

PARTE I
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS & POLICY
UNA VISIÓN GENERAL

1. INTRODUCCIÓN

(*:Material a ser leído antes del curso)

*Pritchett, Lant (2004) “Reform is Like a Box of Chocolates: Understanding the Growth Disappointments and Surprises” Mimeo.

*Tommasi, Mariano (2004) “Crisis, Political Institutions, and Policy Reform: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly” forthcoming in Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics – Europe 2003.

*Saiegh, Sebastián y Mariano Tommasi (1998) La Nueva Economía Política. Racionalidad e Instituciones. EUDEBA, Editorial de la Universidad de Buenos Aires.¹

Spiller, Stein and Tommasi (2003) “Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes. An Intertemporal Transactions Framework” Mimeo, Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank.

Scartascini and Olivera (2003) “Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes: A Guide to Theoretical Modules and Possible Empirics” Mimeo, Research Department, Inter-American Development Bank.

Haggard S. and M. McCubbins (2001) Presidents, Parliaments and Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 (Haggard and McCubbins), 2 (Cox and McCubbins) and 3 (Shugart and Haggard).

Tsebelis, George (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press

Diermeier, Dan and Keith Krehbiel (2003) “Institutionalism as a Methodology” Journal of Politics.

2. TRANSACTION COST ANALYSIS

Williamson, Oliver (2000) “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.” Journal of Economic Literature, Volume 38, N° 3: 595-613. September.

¹ Introducción y Primera Parte.

Williamson, Oliver (1999) "Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective" Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 15, N° 1 306-342.

North, D. (1990) "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics" Journal of Theoretical Politics 2(4).

Dixit, Avinash (1996) The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. MIT Press.

3. INTERTEMPORAL POLITICS

Dixit, Avinash, Gene Grossman and Faruk Gul (2000) "The Dynamics of Political Compromise" Journal of Political Economy 108(3): 531-68.

Alesina, A. (1988) "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters" American Economic Review 78 (4), 796-805.

de Figueiredo, Rui (2002) "Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty and Policy Insulation." 96 American Political Science Review 321-333.

Wachtekon, Leonard (2002) "Power-sharing Agreements as Political Risk-sharing Contracts" Mimeo, NYU.

4. POLICY, POLITICS and INSTITUTIONS "IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM". Algunos países latinoamericanos.

Spiller and Tommasi (2003) "The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina." Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Volume 19, N° 2: 281-306. October.

Otros países a ser seleccionados del proyecto del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo: Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes and Policy Outcomes. (Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, México, Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay, Venezuela)
Los drafts de los papers se encuentran en <http://www.iadb.org/RES/>

PARTE II **INSTITUCIONES POLÍTICAS**

5. REGLAS ELECTORALES Y CARRERAS POLÍTICAS

Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions. Norton, Cap. 7.

Carey, John M., and Shugart, Matthew Soberg (1995) “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4: 417-439.

Ames, Barry (1995) “Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation,” in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 2: 406-433.

Crisp, Brian F., and Scott W. Desposato (2004). Constituency Building in Multimember Districts: Collusion or Conflict?, forthcoming. Journal of Politics.

Roland, Gerard, and Juan Gonzalo Zapata (2002). “Sistema Electoral y de Partidos en Colombia: Prpuestas de Reforma”, in Alberto Alesina (ed.) Reformas Institucionales en Colombia. Fedesarrollo.

Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2002) “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers” Mimeo.

Escobar-Lemmon, Maria and Erika Moreno (2004) “Political Entrepreneurs in Colombia”, Mimeo.

Mark P. Jones, Sebastian M. Saiegh, Pablo Spiller and Mariano Tommasi (2003) “Keeping A Seat in Congress: Provincial Party Bosses and the Survival of Argentine Legislators”, Mimeo.

Groseclose, Tim and Jeffrey Milyo (2004) “Buying the Bums Out”, Stanford GSB, Mimeo.

6. EL CONGRESO Y EL PROCESO LEGISLATIVO

Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions. Norton, Cap. 12.

Steven D. Levitt. (1996) “How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Party Affiliation, Voter Preferences, and Senator Ideology”, American Economic Review 86:425-441.

Londregan, John (2002). “Appointment, Reelection, and Autonomy in the Senate of Chile”, in Benito Nacif and Scott Morgensten (eds.). Latin American Legislatures. Cambridge UP.

Weingast, Barry R. and Marshall, William J. (1988) "The Industrial Organization of Congress," in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 11. Traducido al español en Saiegh, Sebastián y Mariano Tommasi (1998) La Nueva Economía Política. Racionalidad e Instituciones. EUDEBA. Buenos Aires.

Jones, Mark P., Saiegh, Sebastian, Spiller, Pablo and Tommasi, Mariano (2002) "Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians," in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 3: 656-669.

Tim Groseclose and James Snyder (1996) "Buying Supermajorities", in American Political Science Review, 90, June.

7. SEPARACIÓN DE PODERES

RELACIONES EJECUTIVO-LEGISLATIVO

Tsebelis, George (1995) "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," in British Journal of Political Science, 25: 289-325.

Moe, Terry, and Michael Caldwell (1994) "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems", in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150/1.

Austen-Smith, David and Banks, Jeffrey (1988) "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," in American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2: 405-422.

Cheibub, Jose, Przeworski, Adam and Saiegh, Sebastian (2004) "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism," in British Journal of Political Science, forthcoming.

Kugler, Maurice, and Howard Rosenthal (2002) "Poderes y Contrapoderes: Una estimación de la separación institucional de los poderes políticos en Colombia", in Alberto Alesina (ed.) Reformas Institucionales en Colombia. Fedesarrollo.

AGENCIAS BUROCRATICAS Y PODER JUDICIAL

Ferejohn, John and Charles Shipan. 1990. "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy", in Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 1-21.

John D. Huber and Charles Shipan (2002) Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy in Modern Democracies. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 4.

Ferejohn, John and Barry Weingast (1992) “Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation”, in International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 12, pp. 263-279.

Iaryczower, M., P. Spiller and M. Tommasi (2002) “Judicial Decision-Making in Unstable Environments: The Argentine Supreme Court, 1936-1998.” in American Journal of Political Science.

8. FEDERALISMO

Oates, Wallace (1999) “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism,” in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 3: 1120-1149.

Weingast, Barry R., Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Johnsen, Christopher (1981) “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs,” in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89, No. 5.

Tommasi (2002) “Federalism in Argentina and the Reforms of the 1990’s” Working Paper 147, Center for Research on Economic Development and Policy Reform, Stanford University. August.

Rodden, Jonathan and Erik Wibbels (2002) “Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multi-tiered Systems”, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3, July.