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### **Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: July 5-23, 2004**

This course will discuss one of the key issues in comparative politics and political economy: why are some countries democracies while others are dictatorships? We follow the unpublished book manuscript *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. We refer to this below as AR (2003).

**Lecture 1 Monday July 5:** Facts and questions about democracy and dictatorship.

**AR (2003)** Preface and Chapter 1.

**Lecture 2 Tuesday July 6:** A conceptual approach.

**AR (2003)** Chapter 2.

**Lecture 3 Wednesday July 7:** Conceptualizing politics. Individual and collective choice. Condorcet's Paradox. Arrow's Theorem.

**AR (2003)** Chapter 4.

**Lecture 4 Thursday July 8:** Approaches to voting cycles. Agenda setting, restricting preferences. The Median Voter Theorem. Applications of the MVT, redistributive politics.

**AR (2003)** Chapter 4.

**Lecture 5 Friday July 9:** Beyond the MVT. Multidimensional policy spaces. The Probabilistic Voting Model. Notions of political power. Lobbying. Commitment.

**AR (2003)** Appendix.

**Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (2000)** *Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy*, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, Chapter 2, sections 2.3, Chapter 3, sections 3.4, 3.5, 3.6.

**Dixit, Avinash K. and John B. Londregan (1996)** "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 58, 1132-1155.

**Lecture 6 Monday July 12:** Dictatorship and commitment.

**AR (2003)** Chapter 5.

**Lecture 7 Tuesday July 13:** Solving problems of commitment by making credible promises.



**AR (2003)** Chapter 5.

**Lecture 8 Wednesday July 14:** An approach to Democratization.

**AR (2003)** Chapters 6.

**Lecture 9 Thursday July 15:** Extensions.

**AR (2003)** Chapter 6.

**Boix, Carles (1999)** “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies,” *American Political Science Review*, 93, 609-624.

**Mazucca, Sebastián and James Robinson (2003)** “Power and Proportionality.”

**Lecture 10 Friday July 16:** Democratization or Repression.

**AR (2003)** Chapter 7.

**Lecture 11 Monday July 19:** An approach to Consolidation and Coups.

**AR (2003)** Chapter 8.

**Lecture 12 Tuesday July 20:** Political Development.

**AR (2003)** Chapter 10.

**Lecture 13 Wednesday July 21:** Evidence?

**AR (2003)** Chapter 3.

**Lecture 14 Thursday July 22:** Other Political Institutions

**Gibson, Edward L. (1997)** “The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina,” *World Politics* 49.3, 339-370.

**Samuels, David and Richard Snyder (2001)** “Devaluing the Vote in Latin America,” *Journal of Democracy* 12.1, 146-159.

**Guillermo O'Donnell (1993)** “On the State, Democratization, and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries,” *World Development* 21, 1355-70. (Spanish version included in O'Donnell, *Contrapuntos*, Buenos Aires, Paidós, 1997)

**Jones, Mark P., Pablo Sanguinetti, and Mariano Tommasi (2000)** “Politics, Institutions, and Fiscal Performance in a Federal System: an analysis of the Argentine provinces,” *Journal of Econometrics*, 96.2, 305-29.

**Mazucca, Sebastián (2003)** “The Emergence of National States in 19<sup>th</sup> century Latin America,” manuscript, Political Science Department, UC Berkeley.

**Lecture 15 Friday July 23:** Implications for Colombia.



**Archer, Ronald P. and Matthew S. Shugart (1997)** “The Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia,” in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart eds. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, Cambridge University Press, New York NY.

**Archer, Ronald P. (1995)** “Party Strength and Weakness in Colombia’s Besieged Democracy,” in Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully eds. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, Stanford University Press, Stanford CA.

**Oquist, Paul (1980)** “Explanations of *La Violencia*,” Chapter 4 of his *Violence, Conflict and Politics in Colombia*, Academic Press, San Diego CA.

**Sánchez, Gonzalo (1992)** “The Violence: An Interpretative Synthesis,” in Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda and Gonzalo Sánchez eds. *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, SR Books, Wilmington DW.