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Institutions influence preferences: evidence from a common pool resource experiment
Abstract

We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation.

Autores:
Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos; Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés; Cárdenas, Juan Camilo.
Palabras clave:
C93, D01, D64, D83, H3, H4, Q28
Archivo:
Año:
2006
Mes:
Julio
Número:
24