Sergio Clavijo - Seminario de políticas públicas - "Implicaciones de los servicios financieros digitales (FINTECH)"

Lugar Webex
Conferencista Sergio Clavijo
Coautores Nelson Vera, Daniel Beltran, Juan Diego Londoño
Archivo https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3334198
Fecha 06/07/2020
Hora 10:00 a 11:30 am.

Ivan Werning - Macroeconomic Implications of COVID-19: Can Negative Supply Shocks Cause Demand Shortages?

Lugar Webex
Conferencista Ivan Werning, Professor of Economics, MIT
Coautores Veronica Guerrieri (Chicago Booth), Guido Lorenzoni (Northwestern) Ludwig Straub (Harvard)
Abstract We present a theory ofKeynesian supply shocks: supply shocks that trigger changes inaggregate demand larger than the shocks themselves.  We argue that the economicshocks associated to the COVID-19 epidemic—shutdowns, layoffs, and firm exits—mayhave this feature.  In one-sector economies supply shocks are never Keynesian.  Weshow that this is a general result that extend to economies with incomplete marketsand liquidity constrained consumers. In economies with multiple sectors Keynesiansupply shocks are possible, under some conditions. A 50% shock that hits all sectorsis not the same as a 100% shock that hits half the economy. Incomplete markets makethe conditions for Keynesian supply shocks more likely to be met. Firm exit and jobdestruction can amplify the initial effect, aggravating the recession.  We discuss theeffects of various policies.  Standard fiscal stimulus can be less effective than usualbecause the fact that some sectors are shut down mutes the Keynesian multiplierfeedback. Monetary policy, as long as it is unimpeded by the zero lower bound, canhave magnified effects, by preventing firm exits.  Turning to optimal policy, closingdown contact-intensive sectors and providing full insurance payments to affectedworkers can achieve the first-best allocation, despite the lower per-dollar potency offiscal policy.
Archivo https://economics.mit.edu/files/19351
Fecha 26/06/2020
Hora 10:00 a 11:30 am.

Daron Acemoglu - Optimal Targeted Lockdowns in a Multi-Group SIR Model

Lugar Webex
Conferencista Daron Acemoglu, MIT
Coautores Iván Werning, Victor Chernozhukov, Michael D. Whinston (MIT)
Abstract We study targeted lockdowns in a multi-group SIR model where infection, hospitalization and fatality rates vary between groups—in particular between the “young”, “the middle-aged” and the “old”. Our model enables a tractable quantitative analysis of optimal policy. For baseline parameter values for the COVID-19 pandemic applied to the US, we find that optimal policies differentially targeting risk/age groups significantly outperform optimal uniform policies and most of the gains can be realized by having stricter lockdown policies on the oldest group. Intuitively, a strict and long lockdown for the most vulnerable group both reduces infections and enables less strict lockdowns for the lower-risk groups. We also study the impacts of group distancing, testing and contract tracing, the matching technology and the expected arrival time of a vaccine on optimal policies. Overall, targeted policies that are combined with measures that reduce interactions between groups and increase testing and isolation of the infected can minimize both economic losses and deaths in our model.
Archivo https://www.nber.org/papers/w27102
Fecha 19/06/2020
Hora 10:00 a 11:30 am.

Eduardo Lora - Seminario de políticas públicas - Cómo Recuperar el Empleo

Lugar Webex
Conferencista Eduardo Lora, Center for International Development (CID), Harvard University

Para volver a tener las tasas de ocupación de la fuerza laboral que se tenían antes de la crisis, el sector privado debe crear 2,7 millones de empleos formales. Para alcanzar una tasa de formalidad por encima de 60% y una tasa de desempleo del orden de 7% hay que ir aún más lejos: se necesita crear 5 millones de empleos formales en los próximos cuatro años. Esto no podrá lograrse con políticas keynesianas de demanda mediante mayor gasto público o menores impuestos, porque las arcas públicas están vacías. Tampoco mediante recortes al salario mínimo, porque ello contribuiría a elevar la pobreza y posiblemente deprimiría aun más la demanda agregada.

Una estrategia ambiciosa de generación de empleo formal debe combinar políticas nacionales y sub-nacionales. Las dos piezas clave a nivel nacional deben ser las reformas pensional y tributaria. La reforma pensional debe abaratar el trabajo formal, hacerlo más atractivo para los trabajadores y estimular la demanda masiva de bienes de consumo de las clases trabajadoras, sin desconocer los derechos adquiridos por los trabajadores que están cerca a las edades de jubilación. Una forma de conseguir esos objetivos consiste en eliminar completamente los regímenes de contribución obligatoria para los trabajadores menores de cierta edad. En lugar de garantizar una pensión igual o superior al salario mínimo a los trabajadores que han tenido una vida laboral formal estable, el Estado se enfocaría en el futuro en ofrecer una pensión básica universal equivalente a la línea de pobreza a todo el que no tenga ya una pensión subsidiada por el Estado.

Fecha 16/06/2020
Hora 11:30 am. a 1:00 pm.

Oscar Becerra - Valuing personal safety and the gender earnings gap

Lugar Webex
Conferencista Oscar Becerra, Universidad de los Andes
Coautor José Alberto Guerra (Universidad de los Andes)
Abstract Can personal traits and safety perception determine gender differences in willingness to pay (WTP) for safer jobs? Using a lab experiment, we elicit person's WTP for an early (perceived safer) shift, and study the role of risk preferences, safety concerns and information provision about crime on explaining gender gaps. We find that women are more willing to forego earnings for personal safety than men. The most relevant factor in explaining the earnings gap is gender differences in safety perception, and giving objective information did not change WTP. Thus, policies focused on reducing gender disparities in safety concerns may have a potential effect on women labor supply decisions.
Fecha 14/05/2020
Hora 5:00 a 6:30 pm.

Juan Pablo Posada - Truth and Absolution in Colombia: For FARC's sake

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Juan Pablo Posada, University of Western Australia
Coautores Michael Jetter y Christopher Parsons (University of Western Australia)
Abstract How can a state demobilize militants during a civil war? We study the effects of an information campaign to demobilize FARC rebels, when the Colombian government aired short information segments during games of the national football team between 2007 and 2016. Exploiting the quasi-random assignment of matches, we isolate the causal e ect on demobilizations across all 1,122 Colombian municipalities. Exploring quasi-exogenous variation in kick-o times and rain across municipalities, our results reveal sizeable e ffects of these messages that reached out to rebels, offering them the opportunity to reintegrate into the Colombian society.
Thousands of FARC rebels demobilized without the need to re a bullet.
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Fecha 10/03/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Marcela Eslava - Seminario de Políticas Públicas - “Reformulación de los subsidios al servicio de energía residencial en la Misión de Transformación Energética”

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Marcela Eslava, Universidad de los Andes
Abstract Colombia tiene un sistema de subsidios al servicio de energía residencial, focalizado a través de los estratos residenciales. Esta forma de focalización está llevando copiosos recursos a hogares en los deciles más altos de ingreso y riqueza. Al año se invierten más de dos billones de pesos, cifra cercana al tamaño del programa Familias en Acción, en subsidios a hogares por encima de la línea de pobreza. Este position paper propone una forma de focalización alternativa.
Fecha 27/02/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Adriana Cobas - Coordinating in the haircut A model of sovereign debt restructuring in secondary markets

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Adriana Cobas, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Abstract Over the last two decades, countries that default on their debts increasingly have had to confront mostly atomistic unconnected bondholders when engaging on restructuring negotiations. According to data, the nature of creditors impacts on restructuring results, reducing investors concession to the government in default. This paper, proposes a model to study the determination of the haircut for defaulted debt when bondholders play a coordination game. The Resulting multiplicity is solved with a global games approach. I find that this new market setting introduces an additional constraint to the government which end up compressing the asked concession in order to increase the probability of program's acceptance. For illustrative purposes I run simulations with calibrated parameters and find that coordination costs account for a significant portion of the haircut reduction (up to 25%) after sovereign debt disintermediation process.
Fecha 25/02/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Mateo Montenegro - Monitoring the Vote or Voting to Monitor? Evidence from Two Large Scale Field Experiments in Colombia

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Mateo Montenegro, MIT
Coautor Natalia Garbiras-Díaz (U. C. Berkeley)
Abstract Can crowdsourcing technologies aimed at augmenting civil oversight of elections increase electoral integrity? We report the results of two large-scale field experiments designed to assess the effectiveness of online crowdsourcing technologies in increasing the engagement of civil society in electoral monitoring around elections in Colombia. We leveraged Facebook advertisements to encourage citizen reporting of electoral irregularities through official websites, and also varied whether candidates were informed about the campaign in a subset of municipalities. In addition to the expected informational effects – whereby citizen reports increased, and politicians reduced their engagement in electoral irregularities – the results highlight powerful salience effects, which operated by making electoral irregularities more top-of-mind to citizens. Specifically, the advertisements generated a large shift in the vote share of candidates perceived to be less corrupt and away from those perceived to be more corrupt. We argue that these salience effects are driven by a shift in voter preferences towards candidates they perceived as ‘cleaner’. We formally test this hypothesis in a follow-up experiment around the 2019 mayoral elections in which we vary the salience of electoral irregularities in the advertisements sent through Facebook. As expected, we find that the advertisements featuring messages emphasizing the salience of electoral misdeeds generate a larger shift in the votes for ‘cleaner’ candidates than the ones only providing information about the reporting website.
Fecha 20/02/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Román David Zárate - Factor Allocation, Informality, and Transit Improvements: Evidence from Mexico City

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Román David Zárate, University of California, Berkeley
Abstract The presence of the informal sector in the developing world creates wedges across firms that lower Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This paper examines the impact of transit improvements on aggregate efficiency by studying the relationship between commuting, trade, and informality. To do so, I combine a rich collection of administrative microdata and exploit the construction of new subway lines in Mexico City. I find that transit improvements lead to a reduction in informality rates by four percentage points in nearby areas to the new stations. This result indicates that workers reallocate to firms with higher total factor revenue productivity (formal firms). I develop a spatial general equilibrium model considering both the direct effects under perfectly efficient economies and the allocative efficiency margin. From a first-order approximation, I provide a formula that decomposes the welfare impact of commuting/trade shocks into a “direct” effect and an allocative efficiency term. I quantify and decompose the welfare gains of the new infrastructure after estimating the key elasticities of the model. Changes in allocative efficiency driven by the reallocation of workers to the formal sector explain approximately 13-23% of the total gains, and average real income per every dollar spent on infrastructure increases by 15% relative to a perfectly efficient economy.
Fecha 18/02/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Ignacio Sarmiento Bavieri - Can't Stop the One-Armed Bandits The Effects of Access to Gambling on Crime

Lugar W-101
Conferencista Ignacio Sarmiento Bavieri, University of Illinois
Coautores Nicolas L. Bottan (Cornell University) and Andrés Ham (Universidad de los Andes)
Abstract We estimate the effects on criminal activity due to the approval of state legislation in Illinois that legalized video gambling. The bill gave municipalities discretion over whether to allow video gambling within their local boundaries. Many jurisdictions adjacent to Chicago opted in, while the City of Chicago opted out. These decisions create a natural experiment that allows studying the effects of increasing access to gambling on crime. Using detailed incident-level crime data and a difference-indiferences strategy, we nd that (i) access to gambling increases violent and property crimes; (ii) these crimes represent \new" rather than displaced incidents; and (iii) effects are persistent over time. We further study downstream effects on property values,  finding that properties adjacent to gambling establishments sell on average at a three percent discount.
Fecha 12/02/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

David Green - "The Minimum Wage, Turnover, and the Shape of the Wage Distribution"

Lugar W-102
Conferencista David Green, (UBC)
Coautores Pierre Brochu (University of Ottawa), Thomas Lemieux (UBC), and James Townsend (University of Winnipeg)
Abstract In this paper, we propose an empirical approach for jointly modelling the impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution, and on movements in and out of the workforce. We estimate the effects of the minimum wage on the hazard rate for wages, which provides a convenient way of re-scaling the wage distribution in the presence of employment effects linked to the minimum wage. We use the estimates to decompose the distributional effects of minimum wages into effects for workers moving out of employment, workers moving into employment, and workers continuing in employment. We find substantial spillover effects of the minimum wage, and significant differences across the three groups. We use those differences to delineate among the main models of the impact of the minimum wage on the wage distribution.
Fecha 11/02/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Alain Naef - Blowing against the Wind? A Narrative Approach to Central Bank Foreign Exchange Intervention

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Alain Naef, University of California, Berkeley
Abstract Studies on the effectiveness of central bank intervention yield mixed results and poorly deal with endogeneity. By using a narrative approach, this paper is the first to deal with intraday changes in market conditions to show the real effect of central bank foreign exchange intervention on exchange rates. Some studies find that intervention works in up to 80% of cases. By accounting for intraday market moving news, I find that in adverse conditions, the Bank of England only managed to influence the exchange rate in 8% of cases. I use both machine learning and human assessment to confirm the validity of the narrative assessment.
Fecha 04/02/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Rubén Poblete-Cazenave - Crime and Punishment: Do politicians in power receive special treatment in courts? Evidence from India

Lugar W-101
Conferencista Rubén Poblete-Cazenave, University College London
Abstract An independent and impartial judicial system is essential for a well-functioning democracy and the economy. Despite constitutional guarantees, elected politicians may substantially influence the legal system. This paper studies whether politicians in power get special treatment in courts when facing criminal accusations. I construct a unique panel of over 1,300 criminal cases for candidates for state legislative assemblies in India from 2004 to 2013. Using a regression discontinuity design, I compare the probability of a pending criminal case being closed without conviction at the end of a legislature for politicians who marginally won the election against those who marginally lost it. This paper uncovers significant opposite effects of winning office, depending on the political alignment with the state ruling party. Winners from the state ruling party are 17 percent more likely to get their pending criminal cases closed without conviction during their period in office. In contrast, winners from other parties are 15 percent less likely to get their pending cases closed without conviction during the same time-frame. The result is consistent with the misuse of attributions vested on those in power within the executive to affect the career of legal officials.
Fecha 03/02/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Juan Herreño - The Aggregate Effects of Bank Lending Cuts

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Juan Herreño, Columbia University
Abstract A large body of cross-sectional evidence has established that cuts in the supply of bank lending affect firm outcomes and the allocation of credit. However, it is unclear what these results imply for the effect on aggregate output of a cut in aggregate bank lending. I estimate this aggregate effect using a new general equilibrium model that incorporates multibank firms, relationship banking, endogenous credit dependence, and bank market power. I use a set of cross-sectional patterns to estimate the key structural parameters of the model. The effect of an aggregate lending cut on aggregate output is large: a 1 percent decline in aggregate bank lending supply reduces aggregate output by 0.2 percent. The structure of labor and credit markets is important in reaching this answer. Under an alternative parametrization of the model that ignores input market frictions, the response of aggregate output is three times smaller. Under my preferred parametrization, the cross-sectional effects survive aggregation in general equilibrium. Instead, with frictionless input markets the cross-sectional patterns over-estimate the aggregate response by a factor of five.
Fecha 31/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Alejandro G. Graziano - Trade Liberalization and Industrial Concentration

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Alejandro G. Graziano, University of Maryland
Abstract I examine the interrelationship between industrial concentration and trade liberalization. I develop a hybrid model that augments the standard monopolistic competition approach in trade to include an oligopolistic margin: a set of heterogeneous granular firms competing in quantities. This margin predicts novel effects of trade liberalization on trade, consumer welfare, and industrial concentration.
Specically, trade liberalization generates (i) lower imports when the foreign oligopoly margin is larger, (ii) lower consumer gains when foreign firms are more concentrated than domestic, and (iii) higher domestic industrial concentration of granular firms. I derive a gravity equation where the trade cost elasticity is attenuated by foreign firm concentration and find support for this prediction using detailed data from Colombia. Foreign concentration heterogeneity across origin countries suggests that there is a fundamental heterogeneity in the first-order impact of trade liberalization: imports from countries in the top decile of concentration had 13 log points lower growth on average than imports from countries in the bottom decile during a period in which average imports growth was 36 log points.
Fecha 30/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Mariana Laverde - Unequal Assignments to Public Schools and the Limits of School Choice

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Mariana Laverde, University of Chicago Harris School of Public Policy
Abstract This paper studies the limits of school choice policies in the presence of residential sorting. Using data from the Boston Public Schools choice system, I show that white pre-kindergarteners are assigned to higher-achieving schools than minority students, and that cross-race school achievement gaps under choice are no lower than would be generated by a neighborhood assignment rule. To understand why choice-based assignments do not reduce gaps in school achievement, I use rich data on applicants' rank-order choices to estimate preferences over schools, and consider a series of counterfactual assignments. I find that between 60% and 70% of the gap in achievement at the schools assigned to black and hispanic students relative to those assigned to white students is explained by travel costs to high-performing schools. Differences in preferences for schools explain about 30% of the gap, while algorithm rules have no significant effect. Importantly, if black and hispanic parents faced the average travel costs of white parents, the improvement in school achievement for minority students would be coupled with school assignments that are on average preferred to these students.
Fecha 28/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Andre Victor Doherty Luduvice - The Macroeconomic Effects of Universal Basic Income Programs

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Andre Victor Doherty Luduvice, University of Pennsylvania
Abstract What are the consequences of a nationwide reform of a transfer system based on means-testing towards one of unconditional transfers? I answer this question with a quantitative model to assess the general equilibrium, inequality, and welfare effects of substituting the current U.S. income security system with a Universal Basic Income (UBI) policy. To do so, I develop an overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic income risk that incorporates intensive and extensive margins of labor supply, on-the-job learning, and child-bearing costs. The tax-transfer system closely mimics the U.S. design. I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy and conduct counterfactual analyses that implement reforms towards a UBI. I find that an expenditure-neutral reform has moderate impacts on the labor supply response of agents but induces aggregate capital and output to grow due to larger precautionary savings. A UBI of $ 1,000 monthly requires a substantial increase in the tax rate of consumption used to clear the government budget and leads to an overall decrease of the macroeconomic aggregates, stemming from a sharp drop in labor. In both cases, the economy has more disposable income but less consumption at the bottom of their distributions. The UBI economy constitutes a welfare loss at the transition if expenditure-neutral and results in a gain in the second scenario. Despite relative losses, a majority of newborn households supports both UBI reforms.
Fecha 23/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Fernanda Sobrino - Mexican Cartel Wars: Fighting for the U.S. Opioid Market

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Fernanda Sobrino, Princeton University
Abstract The number of major Drug Trafficking Organizations (known as cartels) in Mexico increased from four to nine over the last two decades. This was accompanied by an increase in drug trade related violence. This paper examines the relationship between violence and competition for market share among cartels. To measure cartel presence, a difficult to measure phenomenon, I construct a novel data set of cartel presence across Mexican municipalities by scraping Google News and using natural language processing. To study how market size and structure interact with violence, I exploit two empirical strategies using within municipality variation. First, I interact heroin prices with agro-climatic conditions to grow opium poppy, using exogenous variation in demand for heroin from the 2010 OxyContin reformulation. This reformulation made OxyContin harder to abuse and led some opioid abusers to switch to heroin. Second, I exploit variation in the timing of cartel entry in a municipality. Cartel presence increases substantially after 2010 in municipalities well-suited to grow opium poppy. As more cartels enter a market, homicide rates increase. These results suggest that substantial part of the increase in violence that Mexico experienced in the last fifteen years is due to criminal groups fighting for market share of heroin, not only due to changes in government enforcement.
Fecha 21/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Juliana Helo Sarmiento - Into the Tropics: Temperature and Mortality in Colombia

Lugar W-101
Conferencista Juliana Helo Sarmiento, University of California, Santa Barbara
Abstract This paper studies the relationship between temperature and mortality in a tropical country. Tropical countries host almost 40% of the world’s population, and populations face inherently different conditions in terms of environmental, demographic, and socio-economic conditions than their counterparts in temperate areas. Using data from over 1000 Colombian municipalities, I show that even at narrow temperature ranges, which are characteristic of the tropics, anomalously hot or cold days increase mortality. An additional day with mean temperature above 27◦C (80.6◦F) increases mortality rates by approximately 0.24 deaths per 100,000, equivalent to almost 0.7% of monthly death rates. Unlike temperate locations, I find that deaths attributed to infectious diseases and respiratory illnesses drive this relationship in the hot part of the distribution, affecting children aged 0-5 primarily. These findings uncover new factors and populations at risk after the occurrence of hot temperature shocks. These findings imply that the average person who dies after a hot temperature shock loses approximately 30 years of life.
Fecha 20/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Tatiana Rosa - Cooperation, Competition and Patents: Understanding Innovation in the Telecommunication Sector

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Tatiana Rosa, CEMFI
Fecha 16/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Diego Ramos Toro - Social Exclusion and Social Preferences: Evidence From Colombia’s Leper Colony

Lugar W-101
Conferencista Diego Ramos Toro, Brown University
Fecha 15/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Juan Sebastian Muñoz - Entering the Major Leagues: The Effect of Import Competition from the United States on Workers and Firms in an Emerging Economy

Lugar W-102
Conferencista Juan Sebastian Muñoz, University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign
Coautor Leonardo Bonilla (Banco de la República)
Fecha 14/01/2020
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

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