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2011

Factores Comunes de los Ciclos Económicos en Economías Emergentes. Un Enfoque de Equilibrio General.

Lugar W-102
A cargo Andrés Fernández, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes
Descripción

Coautor: Diego Zamora

Abstract:

Recent research on aggregate fluctuations in emerging economies has paid little attention to the strong comovement of output and interest rates across countries observed in panel data at business cycle frequencies. We fill this gap by building a multi-country, emerging economy, DSGE model where country risk is correlated across countries by a common regional trend. A Monte Carlo-type of experiment shows this new driving force reduces the link between internal domestic conditions and country risk emphasized in the literature while improving the overall fit of the model, particularly the comovement between business cycles across emerging economies. We also empirically assess our model by calibrating it to Latin American economies. The results show that in most of these economies, but not all, the role of a common risk factor is central for business cycle dynamics while simultaneously downplaying the role of internal conditions in country risk fluctuations.

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Archivo logo pdfAndrfern_FZ_v14_with_Tables.pdf 381,62 kB
Fecha 29/11/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S.. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia."

Lugar W-102
A cargo Suresh Naidu, Profesor Asistente, Columbia University
Descripción

Abstract:

Does foreign military assistance strengthen or further weaken fragile states facing internal conflict? We address this question by estimating how U.S. military aid affects violence and electoral participation in Colombia. We exploit the allocation of U.S. military aid to Colombian military bases, and compare how aid affects municipalities with and without bases. Using detailed political violence data, we find that U.S. military aid leads to differential increases in attacks by paramilitaries (who collude with the military), but has no effect on guerilla attacks. Aid increases also result in more paramilitary (but not guerrilla) homicides during election years. Moreover, when military aid rises, voter turnout falls more in base municipalities, especially those that are politically contested.
Our results are robust to an instrument based on worldwide increases in U.S. military aid (excluding Latin America). The findings suggest that foreign military assistance may strengthen armed non-state actors, undermining domestic political institutions.

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Archivo logo pdfbases_bullets_nov_4_2011_fulldraft.pdf 632,45 kB
Fecha 22/11/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

En busca de las principales fuentes de aumento en la desigualdad de los ingresos laborales entre 1996 y 2009 en Colombia: un ejercicio de microsimulaciones

Lugar Hemiciclo 002
A cargo Alexis Munari, Estudiante de Doctorado en Economía - Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Abstract:
En un contexto caracterizado por una tendencia hacia la disminución de la desigualdad en el ingreso en América Latina, la persistencia del coeficiente de Gini a un nivel alto en Colombia cuestiona sobre las fuentes de variación del ingreso que contribuyeron a tal persistencia en los últimos quince años.
En este artículo se consideran tres factores generadores de desigualdad en el ingreso laboral en Colombia identificados por la literatura. En primer lugar, la composición sectorial de la fuerza laboral por industria y las primas en salario específicas a cada industria; en segundo lugar, el fenómeno de la informalidad; y en tercer lugar, la convexidad de la tasa de retorno a la educación. Para identificar los efectos regresivos de esos diferentes factores sobre la desigualdad, se estima la ecuación de ingreso laboral a partir de los datos de la encuesta de hogares en 1996, 2002 y 2009, teniendo en cuenta la presencia de endogeneidad por variable omitida y por sesgo de selección. Posteriormente, se realizan ejercicios de microsimulaciones contrafactuales para deducir cuáles fueron las fuentes de variación en la desigualdad que más afectaron la dispersión del ingreso laboral en el periodo de observación.

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Fecha 17/11/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Optimal Unemployment Insurance in Presence of Informal Sector

Lugar W-102
A cargo David Bardey, Universidad del Rosario
Descripción

Coautor: Fernando Jaramillo

Abstract:
Using a two-period model, we investigate the consequences generated by the introduction of an UI program in an economy characterized by a dual labor market. More precisely, we adopt an optimal UI contract approach in a general equilibrium set-up (matching technology, wage bargaining in the formal sector, taxes to finance UI program) and we compare the different economic variables values (social welfare, GDP, size of informal sector, unemployment, etc...) taken in a situation of autarky and in presence of an optimal UI contract, in both cases assuming a steady state. We are able to identify different mechanisms at work and to point out the relevant parameters of the economy that crucially influence the results, especially concerning the size of the informal sector. According to the efficiency of the search technology, results obtained can be very different. When search efficiency is low, sub-employed workers prefer to devote more time in the informal sector. On the contrary, for higher value of the search efficiency technology, sub-employed workers have incentives to devote more time to secure a new formal job. In such a case, the unemployment increase is associated to a decrease of the size of the informal sector and an increase of the GDP in the economy. Finally, in line with papers dealing with moral hazard issue in optimal UI, our results confirm that the slope of the replacement rate must be decreasing over time. Moreover, higher is the productivity of the informal sector and stronger must be this slope. For values of this productivity superior to 50% of the formal sector productivity, it appears that UI programs that consist in giving all the benefits during the first period may be optimal.

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Fecha 08/11/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Endogenous Presidentialism

Lugar ML-513
A cargo Ragnar Torvik, Department of Economics - Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Descripción

Coautor: James A. Robinson.

Abstract:

We develop a model to understand the incidence of presidential and parliamentary institutions. Our analysis is predicated on two ideas: first, that minorities are relatively powerful in a parliamentary system compared to a presidential system, and second, that presidents have more power with respect to their own coalition than prime ministers do. These assumptions imply that while presidentialism has separation of powers, it does not necessarily have more checks and balances than parliamentarism. We show that presidentialism implies greater rent extraction and lower provision of public goods than parliamentarism. Moreover, political leaders who prefer presidentialism may be supported by their own coalition if they fear losing agenda setting power to another group. We argue that the model is consistent with a great deal of qualitative information about presidentialism in Africa and Latin America.

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Archivo logo pdfpresidentialism12.pdf 314,68 kB
Fecha 03/11/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"The Cyclical Behavior of Bank Capital Buffers in an Emerging Economy: Size Does Matter".

Lugar W-102
A cargo Andrés Murcia, Banco de la República.
Descripción

Coautores: Andrés García-Suaza, Jose Eduardo Gómez-González y Fernando Tenjo Galarza.

Abstract:

Using a panel of Colombian banks and quarterly data between 1996:1 and 2010:3, we study the relationship between short-run adjustments in bank capital buffers and the business cycle. We follow a partial adjustment framework and control for several variables that have been identified as important determinants of bank capital buffers in previous studies, and find that bank capital buffers vary over the business cycle. We are able to identify a negative co-movement of capital buffers and the business cycle. However, we also find that capital buffers of small and large banks behave asymmetrically during the business cycle. While the former appear to be constant over time, once the appropriate set of control variables is used, the latter present a countercyclical behavior. Our results suggest the possible need of the implementation of regulatory policy measures in developing countries.

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Archivo logo pdfbuffers2.pdf 562,07 kB
Fecha 01/11/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"Media Markets, Special Interests, and Voters."

Lugar W-102
A cargo Leopoldo Fergusson, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes
Descripción

This paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence by studying county-level support for candidates to the US Senate from 1980 to 2002 as a function of media exposure and campaign finance profiles. I use the concentration of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy capture of politicians by special interests, and compare the reaction of incumbent vote margins to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets – in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets. Unlike in-state media markets, out-of-state markets focus on neighboring states’ politics and elections. Thus, if citizens punish political capture, increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties, where the candidate receives less coverage. I find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share in about 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties. Results are similar in specifications that rely solely on variation in concentration across time within the same county, and when the sample is limited to in-state counties that are contiguous to out-of-state counties and have similar demographic structures. A placebo test where in-state counties bordering out-of-state ones are compared to other in-state counties shows no effects, confirming the identification hypothesis that the results are not driven by geographic characteristics or distance from the media center of the state.

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Archivo logo pdfLFergusson6656.pdf 642,99 kB
Fecha 25/10/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Do Bans on Carrying Firearms Work for Violence Reduction? Evidence from a Department-level Ban in Colombia

Lugar W-102
A cargo Edgar Villa, Facultad de Economía - Universidad Javeriana
Descripción

Coautor: Jorge A. Restrepo

Abstract:

This paper develops a theoretical setting that models gun interactions between workers and delinquents under a rational expectations equilibrium. We show that a gun ban increases the gun carrying costs of both workers and delinquents, decreasing unambiguously the fraction of armed delinquents while weakly lowering (not necessarily) the fraction of armed workers. We then evaluate the impact of a temporary ban on gun-carrying licenses in Colombia during December of 2009 up to February of 2010 at the department level to verify our theoretical prediction. The gun control intervention operated by extending law enforcement activities that target gun carriers across territories and periods, thus increasing gun costs for all gun carriers especially for illegal guns. Under a common trend assumption between treated and untreated departments, which is then empirically veri…ed, we exploit regional and temporal variations of the gun ban finding a large and significant violence reduction impact, both in terms of fatal (gun homicides drop by approximately a 23% on average) as well as non-fatal gun related intentional injuries (gun injuries drop a 53% on average). Moreover, we do not find evidence of an increase in homicides and injuries with non-firearms, suggesting that the gun ban did not generate a substitution of weapons by potential attackers. Nonetheless, e¤ects for only gun homicides seem to diminish as time passes by since the e¤ect starts to deteriorate after 40 days after the implementation of the ban even though the enforcement of the ban did not diminish over time.

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Archivo logo pdfEVilla_Gun_Ban110801.pdf 602,62 kB
Fecha 18/10/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"Health and Educational Impacts of In Utero Rainfall: The Case of the Brazilian Semiarid"

Lugar W-101
A cargo Rodrigo R. Soares, PUC-Río
Descripción

Coautor: Rudi Rocha

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the impact of rainfall fluctuations during the time in utero on health at birth and later educational outcomes. We concentrate on the semiarid region of Northeastern Brazil to highlight the role of water scarcity on early life health, and the link of the latter to future human capital accumulation. We find that negative rainfall shocks are robustly correlated with higher infant mortality, lower birth weight, and shorter gestation periods. Mortality effects are concentrated on intestinal infections and malnutrition, and seem to be greatly minimized when the local infrastructure of access to water is sufficiently developed (municipality coverage of piped water). We also find robust evidence that negative rainfall shocks before birth are associated with lower academic test scores at early grades and higher drop out rates at later grades.

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Fecha 13/10/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

How to share sequential liability: a cooperative game approach

Lugar W-102
A cargo Samuel Ferey, Université de Nancy 2
Descripción

Coautor: Pierre Dehez

Abstract:

Sharing a damage that has been caused by several individuals is a difficult problem that courts often face. Even if there exist basic principles and rules to apportion damages among them (like for instance in the third Restatement of Torts promulgated in May 1999), legal scholars are still looking for a systematic method. The present paper aims at analyzing these issues from a cooperative game perspective. Assuming that a monetary value has been attached to the additional injury caused by each actor, that problem is modelled as a transferable utility game to which standard solution concepts are applied. The resulting game is convex implying that its core is nonempty. Its vertices are potential judgments that coherently exempt some actors from paying a compensation. The Shapley value is a natural compromise between these various judgments that dominates other core selections like the nucleolus. As a by-product, this paper illustrates how the cooperative approach may bring useful insights into legal questions. Furthermore, it shows that the Shapley value is of particular interest in a legal context because it is founded on axioms that are in line with fundamental principles of private law.

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Fecha 11/10/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Programatic Special Interest Politics

Lugar W-102
A cargo Marcela Eslava, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes
Descripción

Coautor: Allan Drazen

Abstract:
We present a model of electoral politics in which incumbents gain votes by targeting government spending to specific groups of voters at the expense of other voters or other expenditures. Targeting serves the purpose of signaling the policies the incumbent would enact if re-elected, in absence of credible platforms. Each rational voter faces a signal extraction problem: being targeted with expenditure before the election may reflect opportunistic manipulation, but may also reflect a sincere preference of the incumbent for the types of spending that voter prefers. We show the existence of a political equilibrium in which rational voters support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though they know this targeting is electorally motivated. In choosing which groups to target, the incumbent trades-off mobilizing its core voters to turn out to vote with targeting swing voters who are willing to shift their candidate preferences. The paper contributes to the literature by proposing the use of pre-electoral spending as a programmatic tool; by studying the trade-off between targeting core voters who are unsure of whether to show up to vote and targeting swing voters; and by providing a framework that accommodates at once programmatic targeting and clientelism, as well as special interest political budget cycles.

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Fecha 04/10/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"Cambios en las Acciones Ofensivas de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia a partir de la desmovilización masiva de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia”

Lugar W-101
A cargo David Monroy, Estudiante de Doctorado en Economía - Universidad de los Andes
Descripción

Abstract:
Este trabajo analiza los cambios en las acciones ofensivas de las Fuerzas Armadas revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) después del proceso de desarme, desmovilización y reinserción (DDR) que comenzó en 2003, donde los participantes oficiales de las desmovilizaciones masivas (DM) fueron las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). De lo anterior surge una hipótesis que sugiere que las FARC podrían haber tratado de recuperar territorio donde hubo desmovilizaciones masivas de las AUC y que podrían representar corredores estratégicos de tropas, armamento o droga. Esta hipótesis se evalúa utilizando un panel de datos desde 1995 hasta 2007 con 1100 municipios con información de acciones ofensivas de los grupos armados más importantes y cifras de desmovilizaciones. Se encuentra que manteniendo lo demás constante, las acciones ofensivas de las FARC aumentaron a partir del proceso de DDR de las AUC.

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Fecha 22/09/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Family firms and debt: Risk aversion versus risk of losing control

Lugar W-102
A cargo Carlos Pombo Vejarano, Facultad de Administración – Universidad de los Andes
Descripción

Coautores: Maximiliano González, Alexander Guzmán y María-Andrea Trujillo

Abstract:
This study examines the effect of family management, ownership, and control on capital structure for 523 listed and unlisted Colombian firms between 1996 and 2006 (5,094 firm-year observations). The study finds that when families are involved in management, debt levels tend to be lower for younger firms when the founder is still present or when heirs act as managers, but trends higher as the firm ages. When families’ involvement derives from direct and indirect ownership, the family/debt relationship is positive, consistent with the idea that external supervision accompanies higher debt levels and reduces the risk of losing control. When families are present on the board of directors (but are not in management), debt levels tend to be lower, suggesting that family directors are more risk-averse. The results stress the tradeoff between two distinct motivations that determine the capital structure of family firms: Risk aversion pushes firms toward lower debt levels, but the need to finance growth and the risk of losing control make family firms prefer higher debt levels.

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Fecha 20/09/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Los salarios reales a lo largo del ciclo económico en Colombia”

Lugar W-102
A cargo Luis Eduardo Arango, Banco de la República
Descripción

Coautores: Carlos Esteban Posada y Nataly Obando.

Abstract:

Utilizando encuestas de hogares (DANE) del período 1984 – 2010 presentamos evidencia empírica de que los salarios reales son flexibles en algunos sectores económicos, grupos poblacionales y coberturas geográficas, mientras que en otros sectores, grupos y coberturas la evidencia sugiere que los salarios reales son rígidos. Con todo, la evidencia también indica que el comportamiento de los salarios reales a lo largo del ciclo económico es, en términos generales, flexible. Esta investigación propone la existencia de una equivalencia observacional entre un mercado laboral con rigideces y uno con salarios flexibles en el que los choques a la oferta de trabajo reducen la prociclicidad de los salarios. La evidencia se interpreta con un modelo de equilibrio general con salarios flexibles sometido a choques aleatorios de productividad y choques al salario de reserva (remesas del exterior). Del contraste entre las predicciones del modelo y la evidencia colombiana se deduce que no es posible rechazar la hipótesis de un salario real flexible en Colombia; en particular, la baja correlación entre los salarios reales y el empleo que se observa en la economía colombiana es similar a la predicha por el modelo.

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Archivo logo pdfSalarios_en_el_ciclo_9.pdf 659,12 kB
Fecha 13/09/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Culturomics: una aplicación al caso colombiano

Lugar W-102
A cargo Alejandro Gaviria, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Este artículo analiza más de seis millones de artículos publicados por los principales medios escritos en Colombia durante los últimos 20 años. El análisis está basado en la evolución de la frecuencia de aparición de algunas palabras que denotan fenómenos de interés: “corrupción”, “revaluación”, desplazados”, “sequías”, etc. Esta evolución muestra de manera clara, algunas veces sorprendente, cómo la realidad es proyectada y distorsionada por los medios de comunicación. Varias hipótesis e incontables preguntas se desprenden de la primera aplicación de culturomics al caso colombiano.

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Archivo logo pdfCulturomics_Agaviria.pdf 850,12 kB
Fecha 06/09/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Formalizando la informalidad empresarial en Colombia”

Lugar W-102
A cargo Franz Hamann, Banco de la República
Descripción

Coautor: Luis Fernando Mejía, Banco de la República

Abstract:

“El trabajo presenta un modelo de equilibrio dinámico de emprendedores que deciden endógenamente en qué sector operar, en el sector formal o en el informal. Esta decisión es el resultado de un análisis de los costos y beneficios estáticos y dinámicos asociados a operar en cada uno de los dos sectores que incluyen, entre otros, los costos salariales, las tasas impositivas y la posibilidad de acceder al sistema financiero. El modelo es calibrado para replicar el tamaño relativo promedio en términos de activos y el valor agregado relativo promedio del sector formal versus el sector informal en Colombia. Posteriormente, se investiga el impacto de diversas políticas de formalización sobre el tamaño relativo del sector formal. Los ejercicios de calibración encuentran que reducciones relativamente pequeñas en los costos asociados a operar en el sector formal, como el impuesto sobre las utilidades, los costos salariales o el costo de montar una empresa pueden conducir a aumentos considerables, de dos y hasta tres veces, en el tamaño relativo del sector formal. Los resultados sugieren, entonces, que la actual estructura reguladora del sector formal en Colombia actúa como una barrera importante para la entrada de las empresas hacia el sector formal.”

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Archivo logo pdfinformalidad.pdf 569,67 kB
Fecha 30/08/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

¿Qué hacen los países petroleros y mineros con sus rentas?

Lugar W-101
A cargo Guillermo Perry, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes
Descripción

This paper examines three sets of questions related to the use of non-renewable natural resource rents: (1) To what extent countries rich in non-renewable natural resources use such rents to increase present consumption or investment or save them through net increases in foreign assets (or reduction of net foreign liabilities) (2) To what extent countries tax them and how do they use such fiscal revenues: whether to increase public expenditures (and in particular public investment in infrastructure and human capital formation), reduce taxes on other activities (and become fiscally dependent on their natural resource wealth) or net public debt (3) To what extent countries rich in non-renewable natural resources have less efficient and transparent and more volatile and pro cyclical public expenditures and weaker institutions. Additionally, we examine if these effects on macro and fiscal performance depend on the countries level of development and quality of institutions, as theory suggests. The empirical results contribute to clarify the channels through which natural resource wealth can become a curse or a blessing. We end up with a set of policy recommendations according to the countries level of development and intensity of oil and mineral wealth.

Archivo logo pdfWHAT_DO_NON_RENEWABLE_NATURAL_RESOURCE.pdf 452,73 kB
Fecha 25/08/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“A market approach to fractional matching”

Lugar W-102
A cargo Vikram Manjunath, University of Montreal - Department of Economics
Descripción

We propose a general fractional matching model. Each person has a set of potential partners and consumes a bundle of partnerships with them. A feasible allocation is one where each person consumes the same quantity of a particular partnership as his partner does. Each person's preferences are defined over partnership bundles.
This model has several natural applications: probability distributions over deterministic matchings for marriage problems, school choice, scheduling different workers at various work sites, organizing paired activities among a group, and so on.
For this novel model, we define a price based solution. We show that the core of each problem is non-empty. We show that our solution selects a subset of the core. We also show that if the number of people involved increases--in a way that there is a fixed number of “kinds" of people--the gains from misreporting preferences diminish.

Archivo logo pdfManjunathWP2011.pdf 490,73 kB
Fecha 23/08/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Retomando el Dilema de los Prisioneros: El papel de la desigualdad redistributiva en la evolución de la cooperación.

Lugar W-102
A cargo César Andrés Mantilla, Estudiante de Doctorado en Economía, Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Este trabajo ofrece un el análisis del Dilema de los Prisioneros resaltando el rol de la diferencia entre los pagos de los jugadores. La manipulación de esta diferencia da origen a dos variaciones del juego estándar, sujetas a un mayor nivel de desigualdad. Utilizando herramientas de la teoría de juegos clásica y de la teoría de juegos evolutiva se muestra que la desigualdad tiene un efecto, por su magnitud y dirección, sobre las decisiones de cooperación.

Fecha 16/08/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Platforms with Heterogeneous Externalities

Lugar W-102
A cargo Glen Weyl, Profesor Asistente - Universidad de Chicago.
Descripción

A monopoly platform chooses price and non-price instruments to maximize private or social surplus by attracting users. Participating users generate heterogeneous consumption externalities which endogenously determine platform characteristics. Analyzing a model with flexible user heterogeneity, we develop a smooth analog of the logic of Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976) in which the key parameter is the covariance, within the set of marginal users, between marginal utility from a characteristic and marginal contribution made to other, endogenous characteristics. The marginal value of a user is her direct costs, revenues and relevant externalities, in addition to the value of the externalities she generates in sorting for value generated by other users, which defines a recursive sorting multiplier. Optimal allocations may be implemented robustly by an extension of Weyl (2010)’s insulating tariffs when instruments are of sufficient rank with respect to the endogenous characteristics. We discuss applications to media, payment card, college admissions, internet and insurance markets.

Archivo logo pdfGlen_UniAndes.pdf 263,23 kB
Fecha 09/08/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Gasoline Prices, Fuel Economy, and the Energy Paradox”

Lugar W-102
A cargo Hunt Allcott, Assistant Professor of Economics, New York University
Descripción

It is often asserted that consumers undervalue future gasoline costs relative to purchase prices when they choose between automobiles, or equivalently that they have high "implied discount rates" for these future energy costs. We test this by examining how time series variation in gasoline prices affects the relative prices of vehicles with different fuel economy ratings, using a remarkable dataset based on 86 million transactions at auto dealerships and wholesale auctions between 1999 and 2008. Our preferred empirical estimate is that vehicle prices move as if consumers are indifferent between one dollar in purchase price and 72 cents in discounted future gas costs, although we document how plausible alternative assumptions can affect this result. We introduce a new approach to behavioral welfare analysis in a discrete choice setting which generates two stark results. First, even if consumers undervalue gasoline prices by a relatively small amount, this distorts vehicle markets more than the failure to impose a Pigouvian carbon price. Second, even if consumers undervalue gas prices by a relatively large amount, CAFE standards increase average fuel economy by much more than can be justified by undervaluation.

Archivo logo pdfAllcott_and_Wozny2011.pdf 1,35 MB
Fecha 02/08/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“To be or not to be": Conformity, Social Interactions and the Transmission of Preferences

Lugar W-404
A cargo Daniel Vaughan, PhD. in Economics, New York University
Descripción

I develop a tractable model of transmission of culture and preferences. At each time t a three-partite cultural game takes place, with children playing a conformity game with each other, parents playing a socialization game with each other, and children and parents playing an intergenerational, sequential game. I find suffcient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium, that allows me to characterize the transition to a unique cultural steady-state where all cultures blend with each other. Using the Add Health and National Educational Longitudinal Study surveys, I test the main predictions of the model, and show that there is convincing evidence of convergence across four ethnic groups for a battery of variables that include religion, alcohol consumption and education outcomes and expectations. As an important by-product I show a method to estimate social interaction effects residually, by consistently estimating parental effects.

Fecha 19/07/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Books and Guns: The Quality of Schools in Conflict Zones”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Catherine Rodríguez, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Coautor: Fabio Sánchez

Fecha 07/06/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"Deserción escolar (muy) temprana: determinantes y alternativas de política".

Lugar W-404
A cargo Sandra García Jaramillo, Escuela de Gobierno-Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Coautores: Fabio Sanchez (CEDE), Camila Fernández (Dpto. de Psicología) y Tatiana Velasco (Escuela de Gobierno).

Fecha 31/05/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"La estructura a plazos como indicador líder de la actividad económica: revisión y extensión a economías emergentes."

Lugar W-404
A cargo Jaime Rodríguez, Estudiante de Doctorado en Economía - Universidad de los Andes
Fecha 26/05/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

More than You Can Handle: Decentralization and Spending Ability of Peruvian Municipalities.

Lugar W-404
A cargo Norman Loayza, World Bank.
Descripción

Coautores: J. Rigolini y O.Calvo

Fecha 24/05/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Ley de reparación de tierras: Una aproximación axiomática.

Lugar W-102
A cargo Paula Jaramillo, Facultad de Economía-Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Coautores: Cagatay Kayi y Flip Klijn.

Fecha 19/05/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Adjusting the Labor Supply to Mitigate Violent Shocks: Evidence from Rural Colombia

Lugar W-404
A cargo Ana María Ibáñez y Ximena Peña, Facultad de Economía-Universidad de los Andes
Archivo logo pdfConflict_and_gender_Colombia_edited_version.pdf 353,50 kB
Fecha 17/05/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"Productivity Heterogeneity in Plant Level Data: Evidence from the Gross Output Production Function"

Lugar W-404
A cargo Salvador Navarro, Assistant Professor Department of Economics - University of Wisconsin-Madison
Descripción

Coautores: Amit Gandhi - Universidad de Wisconsin-Madison y David Rivers - Universidad de Western Ontario.

Archivo logo pdfSalvadorNavarro_newpaper6.pdf 384,35 kB
Fecha 10/05/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"On the Endogeneity of Inflation Targeting: Preferences Over Inflation”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Nicolás De Roux, Facutad de Economía-Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Coautor: Marc Hofstetter

Archivo logo pdfdcede2011-06.pdf 338,35 kB
Fecha 03/05/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“La Economía Política del sistema monetario de Banca Libre en Colombia (1865-1885)”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Andrés Álvarez, Facultad de Economía-Universidad de los Andes
Descripción

Coautora: Jennifer Timoté

Fecha 26/04/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Global, Regional and Country Specific Risk in Currency Returns”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Jairo Andrés Rendón, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes.
Fecha 12/04/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Decaimiento Electoral de los Partidos Políticos Tradicionales Latinoamericanos (1978-2006)”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Laura Wills, Ciencia Política - Universidad de los Andes.
Fecha 05/04/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"Sobre el Impacto Macroeconómico de los Beneficios Tributarios al Capital"

Lugar W-404
A cargo Luis Fernando Mejía, Banco de la República.
Descripción

Coautores: Franz Hamann e Ignacio Lozano.

Archivo logo pdfslides_Luis_Fernando_Mejia.pdf 1,11 MB
Fecha 29/03/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Crecimiento, mestizaje y presión fiscal en el virreinato de la Nueva Granada, 1761-1800”

Lugar AU-203
A cargo Adolfo Meisel, Gerente Sucursal Cartagena, Banco de la República.
Archivo logo pdfCHEC_28_AMeisel.pdf 795,53 kB
Fecha 24/03/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Two hundred years of Colombian economic growth: The role of total factor productivity

Lugar W-404
A cargo Alvaro Riascos, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Coautores: Alejandro Gaviria y Miguel Urrutia

Fecha 22/03/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“The Cauca Valley Corporation and the Practice of State Decentralization, 1954-1957”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Amy Offner, PhD (C) Department of History-Columbia University.
Fecha 15/03/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

"Aggregate Matchings"

Lugar W-404
A cargo Federico Echenique, Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology.
Descripción

Coautores: SangMok Lee, Matthew Shum

Archivo logo pdfaggregate_matchings.pdf 407,63 kB
Fecha 10/03/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Scarring Recessions and Credit Constraints: Evidence from Colombian Plant Dynamics”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Marcela Eslava y Marc Hofstetter, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes.
Archivo logo pdfCEDE_2010-27.pdf 464,66 kB
Fecha 08/03/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm

“Longevity, Genes and Efforts: An Optimal Taxation Approach to Prevention”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Pierre Pestieau, University of Liege, CREPP, CORE, PSE and CEPR.
Archivo logo pdfMLLPPGPNONLINEAR.pdf 291,16 kB
Fecha 01/03/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“Expectativas de la Inflación Colombiana con Aprendizaje en un Modelo de Economía Abierta”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Luis Edgar Basto, Estudiante de Doctorado en Economía - Universidad de los Andes
Fecha 24/02/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

“El efecto riqueza de la vivienda en Colombia”

Lugar W-404
A cargo Enrique Antonio López Enciso, Banco de la República.
Descripción

Coautor: Andrés Salamanca.

Archivo logo pdfELopez_borra551.pdf 2,11 MB
Fecha 22/02/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

A Model of Formation of Profit Expectations of Theodore Judah and the Expected Private Profitability of the First Transcontinental Railroad.

Lugar W-404
A cargo Xavier Durán, Facultad de Administración - Universidad de los Andes.
Archivo logo pdfA_model_of_formation_of_profit-paperv1.pdf 728,05 kB
Fecha 15/02/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Revealed Preference Tests of The Cournot Model

Lugar W-404
A cargo Andrés Carvajal, Profesor Asociado de la Universidad de Warwick , CORE y Universite Catholique de Louvain.
Descripción

Coautores: Rahul Deb, Universidad de Toronto; James Fenske, Universidad de Oxford y John K.-H. Quah, Universidad de Oxford.

logo pdfver presentación | 162,38 kB
Archivo logo pdfAndresCarvajal_hlp32.pdf 314,94 kB
Fecha 08/02/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Anti-poverty programs and Presidential election outcomes: Familias en Acción in Colombia

Lugar W-404
A cargo Oskar Nupia, Facultad de Economía-Universidad de los Andes
Fecha 01/02/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

Risk Attitudes and Well-Being in Latin America

Lugar W-404
A cargo Juan Camilo Cárdenas, Facultad de Economía - Universidad de los Andes.
Descripción

Coautor: Jeffrey Carpenter, Middlebury College.

El documento está disponible en el siguiente link

Fecha 25/01/2011
Hora 12:30 a 1:45 pm.

end faq