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Cárdenas Juan Camilo - Publicaciones
Gender differences in competitiveness and risk taking: Comparing children in Colombia and Sweden01/08/2011
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We explore gender differences in preferences for competition and risk among children aged 9–12 in Colombia and Sweden, two countries differing in gender equality according to macro indices. We include four types of tasks that vary in gender stereotyping when looking at competitiveness: running, skipping rope, math and word search. We find that boys and girls are equally competitive in all tasks and all measures in Colombia. Unlike the consistent results in Colombia, the results in Sweden are mixed, with some indication of girls being more competitive than boys in some tasks in terms of performance change, whereas boys are more likely to choose to compete in general. Boys in both countries are more risk taking than girls, with a smaller gender gap in Sweden.
The challenge of understanding decisions in experimental studies of common pool resource governance
01/07/2011
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Common pool resource experiments in the laboratory and the field have provided insights that have contrasted to those derived from conventional non-cooperative game theory. Contrary to predictions from non-cooperative game theory, participants are sometimes willing to restrain voluntarily from over extracting resources and use costly punishment to sanction other participants. Something as simple as face-to-face communication has been shown to increase average earnings significantly. In the next generation of experiments, both in the laboratory and in the field, we need to extract more information that provides insight concerning why people make the decisions they make. More information is needed concerning attributes of individuals as well as the social and social–ecological context in which they interact that may give rise to such deviations from theoretical predictions. In the process of extracting more information from participants and the contexts in which they interact, we face several methodological and ethical challenges which we address in this paper.
Pobreza en capital social, reto para nuevos mandatarios
20/10/2011
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El 85,7% de los individuos en la muestra urbana no pertenece ni participa en organización social alguna.
More ‘altruistic’ punishment in larger societies
01/01/2008
Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World
30/01/2008
ABSTRACT Explanations of poverty, growth and development depend on the assumptions made
about individual preferences and the willingness to engage in strategic behaviour. Economic
experiments, especially those conducted in the field, have begun to paint a picture of economic
agents in developing communities that is at variance with the traditional portrait. We review this
growing literature with an eye towards preference-related experiments conducted in the field. We
also offer lessons on what development economists might learn from experiments. We conclude by
sharing our thoughts on how to conduct experiments in the field and then offer a few ideas for
future research.
How Do Property Rights Affect Individual and Collective Use and Conservation of Land, Timber, Water, Fish, and Other Important Resources?
29/10/2008
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In early 2008, the Conservation Strategy Fund, Resources for the Future, and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation convened experts to discuss the role of economic analysis as a conservation tool in developing countries.See here:
http://www.rff.org/News/Features/Pages/ConservationStrategiesintheTropics.aspx
Abstract:
This is a series of reflections on how institutions and behavior interact and affect the
levels of conservation or use of valuable ecosystems. These reflections emerge from new
theoretical developments and evidence gathered in the field and the lab regarding the behavior of
humans facing the dilemma of ecosystems conservation.1 These developments and this evidence
should yield some lessons for the design and monitoring of conservation projects, as well as
lessons for the design of policy aimed at promoting conservation and sustainable use of local
ecosystems. Further, there are direct implications on how we think the problem of property rights
both at the de jure and de facto levels.
http://www.rff.org/Documents/08_Tropics_Conference/Tropics_Conference_Cardenas_Property_rights.pdf
Dilemas de lo colectivo. Instituciones, pobreza y cooperación en el manejo local de los recursos de uso común
15/05/2009
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Reseña: Cuando nuestros intereses, deseos o necesidades particulares producen consecuencias socialmente indeseadas, enfrentamos un dilema de lo colectivo. Cumplir normas sociales, mantener nuestra riqueza ambiental o construir el espacio público de los ciudadanos son ejemplos en los que la cooperación de todos produce resultados socialmente superiores; no obstante, el interés individual se atraviesa con incentivos fuertes para no hacerlo.
Es necesario estudiar la riqueza infinita de soluciones que las sociedades han construido, más allá del debate reduccionista entre la capacidad del mercado o del Estado para solucionar los dilemas. Vale la pena subrayar las soluciones de auto-gobierno, en las que los grupos o comunidades alinean esos intereses individuales y colectivos por su propia cuenta.
Este libro construye desde diferentes disciplinas y herramientas un marco sencillo de análisis del problema. A partir de una amplia evidencia empírica recogida en años de trabajo de campo en diferentes comunidades en la región en años de trabajo de campo en diferentes comunidades en la Región Andina y en las costas Pacífica y Atlántica colombianas, se estudian aquí las barreras y las posibilidades de las formas locales de solución de los dilemas de lo colectivo.
Experiments in Environment and Development
01/10/2009
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Many of the main scientific challenges in the fields of development, environment, and resource economics have a microeconomic foundation wherein behavioral elements play a significant role. Preferences with respect to risk, time, societal others, and the environment shape the decision-making processes of individuals. Economic experiments have been extensively carried out in the lab and in the field to test the predictions of behavioral theories; some have had a particular focus on development and environmental issues. Random interventions have also proven to be an important source of information with respect to experimentation in development and policy design. This article identifies the contributions of experiments and random interventions and reflects on the value of having a productive dialogue—in connection with said experiments—with the main stakeholders regarding the problems being studied.
Free download from:
http://arjournals.annualreviews.org/eprint/vJDHpa5kWbVF5zQXztqv/full/10.1146/annurev.resource.050708.144056
Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
22/06/2006
Science 23 June 2006:Vol. 312. no. 5781, pp. 1767 - 1770Joseph Henrich,1* Richard McElreath,2 Abigail Barr,3 Jean Ensminger,4 Clark Barrett,5 Alexander Bolyanatz,6 Juan Camilo Cardenas,7 Michael Gurven,8 Edwins Gwako,9 Natalie Henrich,1 Carolyn Lesorogol,10 Frank Marlowe,11 David Tracer,12 John Ziker13
Institutions influence Preferences
27/03/2007
(Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization) http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/var/rw/archivos/cede/documentos/d2006-24.pdf We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation.
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